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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the safety of industrial 
controllers which incorporate software. Software safety is compared 
with software reliability as a means of discussing the special 
concerns of safety. Definitions are given for the terms hazard, 
risk, danger and safe. A relationship between these terms has been 
attempted and the philosophy of safety is discussed. A formal 
definition of software safety is given. The factors influencing the 
development of software are examined. The subjectivity of safety is 
discussed in the context of safety measurement being a conjoint 
measurement. Methods of assessing the risk resulting from the use 
of software are described along with a discussion on the 
impracticability of using state transition diagrams to isolate 
catastrophic failure conditions. Categories of danger are discussed 
and three categories are advanced. The structuring of the software 
for safety is discussed and the principle of using safety modules and 
integrity locks is proposed. In discussing the reasons for errors 
remaining present in the software after testing two methods of 
measurement are suggested; Plexus and Fallibility Index. The need 
to declare variables is discussed. 
An experiment involving 119 volunteers was conducted to examine 
the influence of the length of variable names'on the correct usage. 
It was found that variables with a character length of 7 have a 
better probability of correct interpretation than others. 
The methods of assessing safety are discussed and the 
measurements proposed were applied to a commercially available 
product in the form of a Software Safety Audit. 
It is concluded that some aspects of the safety of controllers 
incorporating software can be quantified and that further research is 
needed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Previous research has attempted to isolate those factors of 
software production which influence the incidence of software errors. 
However, previous research was reviewed for this thesis and it was 
found not to be concerned with the safety of industrial-based 
systems. Previous research has been mainly concerned with the non- 
industrial applications of computing though some has relevance to 
this thesis. 
The research for this thesis was concerned with studying the 
safety of industrial-based controllers which also incorporate 
software. The. study was concerned with the development cycle of the 
software from the specification and the development environment to 
the programming language, testing and maintenance. As a part of the 
research a set of metrics for assessing various features of the 
software have been developed to give some guidance on the structuring 
of such systems. The metrics are intended to allow comparisons to 
be made between different software development procedures. 
Since errors in the software can be considered as a risk and the 
combination of a risk and a hazard implies danger then it is asserted 
that software errors are dangerous. 
In this thesis an attempt has been made at providing guidelines 
for the production of safe software based on the research. 
In Chapter 2a survey is made of the current state of knowledge 
of various factors considered to influence software. 
Chapter 3 examines the difficulty of assessing safety from the 
basis of structural elements and develops some methods of 
quantification based on certain features of the software. 
Chapter 4 discusses the reasons for it being impracticable to 
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remove all errors and indicates where some of the errors arise. 
Chapter 5 reports on work undertaken on a real product to assess 
the safety of the product and makes observations as to where the 
difficulties lay in conducting such a safety assessment. 
Chapter 6 includes the conclusions and recommendations for 
further work. It is concluded that no ultimate solution was found 
during the research and there is a considerable amount of work left 
to done. 
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1.1 Problem Definition 
The reduction in the cost of computers has meant a corresponding 
increase in the use of computers for industrial-based control 
engineering applications. In such applications the consequences of 
an error are reflected in new risks to capital equipment, human life 
and the natural environment. The new risks are a consequence of 
implementing the control strategy in software when replacing existing 
technologies. In particular, microprocessors introduce new kinds of 
risk. 
The application of microprocessors in industrial-based control 
systems makes it necessary to be able to assess application programs 
according to some specified safety standards, though no method of 
measuring safety exists and a safety standard has not been 
formulated. 
In Great Britain there are legal considerations when applying 
industrial controllers to hazard-related processes; there is a 
contractual obligation of the User to inform the Supplier of safety 
requirements and, conversely, the Supplier has an obligation to 
inform the User of any safety related issues that have been 
identified in the controller. Within the framework of commercial 
activity due regard must also be given to the statutory instruments, 
such as the "Health and Safety at Work etc Act, 1974". 
The Health and Safety at Work Act is administered by the Health 
and Safety Commission through its Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
which has six Inspectorates, three of which are directly relevant to 
this thesis; the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the Mines and 
Quarries Inspectorate and the Factory Inspectorate. 
In hazard-related industrial control systems there is still a 
need to establish a method for assessing the safety of software once 
it has been developed and before it becomes operational with respect 
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to the plant that it will control. Some software test procedures 
check the software for correct operation within a limited range of, 
test data sets. These checks may be unsatisfactory for industrial 
controllers incorporating software and which may be used in a 
hazardous application. No standard testing method exists to 
demonstrate the safety of software in such a situation. Yet a 
complete industrial control system may comprise software packages 
from different sources of supply and sometimes developed for a 
different range of computers to the target computer under test. 
Safety of industrial control software should consider the 
software, the run-time environment that the software is expected to 
work in and the function of the software. Measurement of the 
software safety should indicate the extent to which the software can 
be confidently expected to work safely: both safe and consistent in 
operation when controlling equipment. 
Since software errors are hazardous, the containment of the 
hazard within acceptable limits is called software safety in this 
thesis. 
The safety of software is an area of research where there is 
little published evidence of research. 
1.1.1 Definitions 
Throughout the thesis the terms 'hazard', 'risk', 'dangerous' 
and 'safe' are used and to avoid confusion over the terms a 
definition has been placed on each of the terms; 
- 'Hazard' describes a condition with the potential to cause 
harm; to capital equipment. people or the natural environment 
- 'Risk' is used to describe the probability of a hazard 
materialising 
- 'Dangerous' is used to describe a situation where the level of 
risk of a particular hazard is considered to be unacceptable 
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- 'Safe' is used to describe a situation where the level of risk 
is judged to be acceptable. 
In all cases people need-to be present to transform a hazard into a 
dangerous state. 
Additionally, the term 'software' is used to refer to computer 
programs written to meet a specific industrial control application. 
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1.2 Safety 
'Reliability' and 'safety' are sometimes considered to be 
synonymous but in this thesis they are held to be related subjects 
with different goals. 
Reliability is often associated with the term 'reliance' to mean 
the dependence a user places on a system, when reliability is a 
measure of the success of achieving a desired operation. 
Safety is an emotive topic and the assessment of safety is a 
subjective judgement but 'safe' intuitively suggests some absolute 
measure that the risk is 'acceptable' or does not exist. The use of 
the term 'acceptable' must consider costs, benefits and to whom the 
risk is considered acceptable; the supplier, the procurer or the 
user. Therefore, acceptable should be used sparingly to express 
some agreement between the parties exposed to the risk of the costs 
and benefits. 
Since hazard is used to describe a condition with the potential 
to cause harm then it follows that for a hazard to materialise then 
the risk needs to approach unity. As the risk increases the 
threshold of acceptability will be crossed at a cusp point and the 
state will be considered to be unsafe which implies, if people are 
present, that the state is dangerous. 
Individual thresholds of danger will vary but it is possible to 
postulate a set of thresholds which categorise danger according to 
three levels of danger; serious, major and minor. Placing any state 
into one of these categories suggests that the level of danger can be 
expressed by such a term as 
Level of Danger = P(r) . Hn 
where P(r) is the probability of the hazard materialising, risk 
Hn is some subjectively assessed number associated with 
the hazard. 
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P(r) is the sum of all the events in the event space which can 
cause the hazard and P(r) is made up of a number of sets of events. 
The relationship of these sets of events to P(r) can be shown by 
using Venn diagrams. As an example, consider some computer- 
controlled machinery. 
In the simplest case, Figure 1.2.1. a), the set of events 
associated with the machinery alone being a hazard are given as P1 
and the event space is considered to be the universe of events 
unbounded. Since no people are present then, by definition, there 
is no danger. 
When people are involved then there is a set of events 
associated only with the environment being the hazard, P2'. The set 
of states intersecting P1' and P2', given as P12', are those events 
associated with the machinery and the environment. When the 
machinery is being operated by an Operator without the aid of a 
computer then the event space can be considered to be bounded to 
include only those events associated with the operation of the 
machinery, Figure 1.2.1. b). 
When the control of the machinery includes some form of computer 
control the boundary event space changes to include a set of events 
associated with the computer control alone being the hazard, P3''. 
The intersection of P1'', P2'' and P3'' is given as P123'' and is the 
set of events associated with the machinery and the environment and 
the computer control causing the hazard, Figure 1.2.1. c). 
The probability of events in the intersection of P2" and P3'' 
causing a hazard is low and the set of events in the intersection of 
P1'' and P3- does not involve people so, by definition, cannot be 
considered as dangerous. 
By including computer control on the machinery new risks are 
introduced. However, the introduction of computer control, P3''', 
"1 
may also reduce the set of events associated with the machinery 
alone, PI''', and so distort the boundary of the event space, Figure 
1.2.1. d). 
Figure 1.2.1 Venn Diagrams for Computer-Controlled Machinery 
a) 
b) 
r- ---ý 
ýýi 
P12' 
event space 
boundary 
bl' 
- ý. - _; 
P(r) = Pt' + P2' + P12' 
C) 
P123' ' 
- 
P2 I 
Iý 
P(r) = P1" + P2'' + P3" + P123" 
6- 
d) 
P(r) = P1... + P2' + P3.,. + P123'' - P13''' 
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1.3 Software Reliability 
Having established what is meant by the term safety and that 
software errors can affect safety then it is necessary to appreciate 
the concepts of software reliability before discussing what is meant 
by software safety. 
Definitions of software reliability range from an assessment of 
the correctness of a program with respect to the requirements 
specification through to a count of the number of programming errors 
in sample programs. 
The assessment of a program's reliability necessitates some 
knowledge of the programs requirements but the requirements 
specification can only be regarded as a necessary design document. 
A requirement specification will state what the software is required 
to do and may not include statements on safety although it may be the 
case that safety is to be maintained even when the software is 
abused. A requirement specification is insufficient to instil 
confidence in the correct and safe working of a program or to ensure 
that the program satisfies the requirements. 
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1.4 Software Safety 
The published material on software reliability presented models 
for indicating the number of software errors found and aimed to 
predict how many errors still existed. The models also consider 
that all errors present have the same hazard. The concern of this 
thesis is the extent to which a risk exists when an error is 
experienced. The Oxford English Dictionary defines safety as being 
the noun of the adjective safe: out of danger: not involving risk: 
cautious: ..... 
". The concern was with the maintenance of an 
operational condition which, whilst being reliable, is also free from 
danger, therefore, it is conjectured that the research for this 
thesis was on Software Safety. 
Though the terms 'reliability' and 'safety' are frequently 
interchanged they have different interpretations. An item of 
software may perform in an unintended manner and yet be safe in 
operation. Equally, software can be unsafe whilst functioning as 
intended in the specification. Reliability is concerned with all 
failures. Safety is concerned with the consequences of failures 
which may result in human or economic cost. Some failures incur 
more economic-social costs than others and so some errors are 
considered to be more serious than others. 
There has been much research into Software Reliability concerned 
with the intended function of the software but little specifically on 
Software Safety. 
Current software reliability theory attempts to quantify errors 
by predicting the number of errors expected to exist. The theories 
give equal weight to each error predicted to exist. By contrast, in 
safety assessment it is the intention to qualify errors by weighting 
them according to the resultant economic-social cost. 
Safety and reliability have different goals due to the differing 
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emphasis. Decision making in a safety-related system involves 
moral, ethical and economic factors and requires a knowledge of the 
difference in emphasis between reliability and safety. If this 
difference is not taken into account then less information will be 
available on which to base the decision. Therefore, software safety 
should be dealt with as a related but separate issue from software 
reliability. 
In this thesis software safety'is defined as: 
The confidence that a given program will, for a given run-time 
environment, perform its function in a controlled and 
reproducible manner within an acceptable evaluation of risk. " 
The term 'acceptable evaluation of risk' in the definition 
recognises that safety is a subjective judgement of which software is 
safe and which is unsafe. The subjectiveness in evaluating risk is 
a value judgement on the damage that could arise in possible 
situations and was reflected in the Report of the Court of Inquiry 
into the Flixborough Disaster Ell, Para. 197. 
Using propositional logic it is possible to formally state the 
definition of software safety such that there are three conditions to 
be satisfied; 
1. When the current state, si, is contained in a set of safe 
states S, there is a function F that will transform the current state 
to the next state, sj, which is also contained in the set of safe 
states, 
Vs E S, (F(s )=ss S) 
iijj 
2. When the current state is contained in a set of unsafe 
states, U, there is a function that will transform the current state 
to the next state, which is contained in the set of safe states, 
Vs E U, Ms )=sDs S) 
iijj 
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3. When the current state is contained in a set of unsafe states 
and there does not exist a set of safe states for the current state 
to be transformed to, then there is a function that will transform 
the current state to the next state with the lowest risk 
Vs E U. if 
IsES 
such that F(s )=s then 
ijij 
F(s )=sJ Risk < Risk 
ik (sk) (sj) 
where S is a set of states judged to be 'safe' 
U is a set of states judged to be 'unsafe', 
V is the universal quantifier 
is the existential operator 
In asserting that Risk < Risk consideration needs to be 
(sk) (sj) 
given to the time taken for the system to achieve state sk. 
There at least two strategies that can be adopted when 
considering the consequences of time. If Risk is considered to 
(sk) 
be lower than Risk , yet more time is required for the system to 
(sl) 
achieve state sk than state sl, a judgement can be made whether 
safety is best served by achieving state sk with a low risk in a 
longer time than state sl. State sl has a higher risk than state sk 
but a lower risk than state sj and can be achieved in a short time. 
Therefore, condition 3 can be qualified; 
3a. Vs E U. if IsES such that F(s s then 
ijij 
F(s )=sJ Risk < Risk 
ik (sk) (sj) 
iff Risk T<TA( Risk < Risk > Risk 
(sk) (sk) (sl) (sk) (sj) (sl) 
where T is the time required to achieve a particular state from 
the current state, si. This strategy is appropriate to those 
instances when it is only possible to one state ahead. 
If it is possible to look ahead more than one state an 
alternative strategy might be to achieve a state with a higher risk 
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for a short time in the knowledge that a state with a lower risk will 
be achieved ultimately. In this strategy safety could be expressed 
as the integral of the level of danger against time 
Safety =f P(r) . Hn dt 
The value of Hn is subjectively judged and could influence which 
strategy to adopt due to the level of confidence in the judgement. 
The definition of safety can be formally stated but what is 
considered to be a set of 'safe' states or 'unsafe' states depends on 
a subjective judgement based on knowledge, experience, emotion and 
legislation of what is acceptable at the time. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Factors Affecting Software Safety 
In this chapter an argument is advanced that the assessment of 
safety is subjective and will remain so until some method of 
measurement can be found which is not a conjoint measurement. 
Factors found during a literature survey, which have been considered 
by other researchers to influence software, are also examined in the 
context of each stage of the software development process before 
implementation and following implementation. 
There has been a substantial amount of material published 
attempting to establish those factors having an influence on the 
production of software. Since there has been a substantial amount 
of relevant material published only selected material has been 
identified and referenced. 
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2.1 The Subjectivity of Safety 
Software can be adversely affected by certain factors and it 
follows that the safety of an industrial process resulting from the 
use of the software can also be affected by these same factors. The 
factors considered in this chapter are those asserted by the 
respective researchers to have an undesirable influence on software. 
These factors are considered with the emphasis being on the safety of 
the software. The term 'safety of the software' is used to mean the 
safety of the system as a result of using software rather than to 
mean an assurance that the software is itself 'safe' from errors. 
To confidentally install a controller incorporating software it 
is necessary for some checks to be carried out leading to 
certification of the software for use in safety-related systems. In 
a safety-conscious industry it will be normal practice for these 
checks to be undertaken by a third party, separate from the User or 
Supplier, who is also aware of the requirements imposed through 
legislation or common by 'best world practice'. The relationships 
between the Supplier, the User, the Certification Authority and the 
Health and Safety Executive are represented diagramatically in Figure 
2.1.1 with the solidity of the line reflecting the strength of the 
relationship. 
Figure 2.1.1 Relationship between the parties in the 
certification process. 
Certification 
Authority 
User Supplier 
HSE 
The form that the certification takes will depend on the 
experience and knowledge of the User, of the Supplier, of the 
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Certification Authority and on the current legal requirements. The 
form of the certification will also be influenced by the state of 
knowledge of the certification methods. 
The certification of the design of any equipment needs to be 
comprehensive. The difficulty of undertaking a comprehensive design 
study was raised in the Court of Inquiry into the Flixborough 
Disaster, [14] paras. 191-193, when it discussed in general terms the 
probabilities of the "8-inch hypothesis" and the "20-inch 
hypothesis". The Court decided to refer to a special committee, 
paras. 217-219, the concern of a major disaster resulting from the 
design of process plant and equipment. 
The Danish organisation Elektronik Centralen, [17], have issued 
a draft directive on the testing of software used in control and 
surveillance systems. The level of safety is determined by 
assessing observable actions called 'qualities' which are considered 
to influence the safety of software. It is difficult to use the 
assessment as a comparison between two dissimilar systems since there 
are no quantitative measurements. Since these qualities are 
subjective observations made by the assessor of the software at the 
end of the whole development they have not been used as the framework 
for this Chapter. 
Software production factors such as the choice of programming 
language and data structures, programming methodology, quality 
assurance and project standards are sometimes asserted to influence 
software production. 
One researcher, Rault [59], surveyed the published work on the 
production of high quality software and concluded that there was a 
need for research into what he called "quality control" and listed 
some of the factors to be considered; 'complexity, comprehensibility, 
usability, modularity, reusability, adaptability, testability, 
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sortability, linkability, robustness wit! 
operations, and so forth, ' and suggested 
these factors. These factors are vague 
the end-product, the software, against a 
not observable. 
At each stage of the development of 
h respect to user mis- 
some methods of measuring 
and concerned with assessing 
set of qualities which are 
software there is a choice 
to be made between competing methods and techniques and in each case 
there are some good and some bad ones. The choice of method or 
technique to use will influence the safety of the software but, as 
the literature survey will show, there has been competing assertions. 
Following the literature survey, the factors in this thesis have 
been grouped into four sections covering the stages of the 
development process before implementation and after implementation. 
The sections are: 
Specification and Design 
Programming Language and Programming Structure 
Support Environment and Testing Strategy 
Operational and Psychological Factors 
Table 1 contains an analysis of the frequency of occurrence of 
these factors (and their subsets) by application area. The totals 
are for each set of factors found in the surveyed works. 
The sections of the survey assume that undesirable influences 
can introduce unsafety at each stage of the software development 
process and that each factor can affect the outcome. For safety to 
be assessed according to any one factor, the factor must be 
observable and quantifiable and not subjective which implies that it 
is possible to attach a numerical value to safety and that safety can 
be absolute. It is the desire to quantify safety that has led many 
people to relate safety and reliability, when reliability is a 
quantitative measure and a method has not yet been found of 
19 
quantifying safety. 
Calculations of software reliability related to the coding of a 
program do not constitute a definition of software reliability but 
can be categorised as a software metric. The assumption is that a 
well structured program will be more reliable than a badly structured 
one due to the clarity of expression of the logic in the program. 
The assumption takes account of the possibility that the logic could 
be incomplete and also assumes that good structuring is always 
possible. 
One definition based on error rates, from Rault and Bouissou 
[60] states that software reliability is; 
"the probability that a program works without error during a 
given time span on the machine for which it has been intended 
and under specified conditions". 
Here the concern is with a statistical probability of failure 
calculated from a count of the number of errors detected and 
corrected over a specified period of time. A problem arises in the 
use of elapsed time as a parameter since failure to function reliably 
is dependent on the occurrence of a specific condition. The history 
of the rate of reduction of programming errors will influence over- 
confidence in the software if it shows a rapid reduction. 
Conversely, if the number of outstanding errors is reduced at a slow 
rate, the confidence in that software would be accordingly low. 
If it is assumed that the failure density reduces exponentially 
then as the failure density reduces so will the hazard rate 
accordingly and demonstrate a steady state operational life. The 
effects of wear and aging of mechanical equipment causes random 
failures to be seen in the failure density giving a corresponding 
change in the hazard rate. The hazard rate will then be reminiscent 
of a bath-tub, which is where the term "bath-tub curve" comes from. 
20 
In software reliability it is assumed that the detection and 
correction of software errors reflects an exponential function and 
that a point can be reached where an 'acceptable' number of errors 
are considered to exist and after which time continued stable 
operation can be expected since software is not affected by aging or 
wear-out. 
Many industrial control systems will not be changed from their 
initial operating status during the life of the system. Many will 
be subjected to change after some period of stability to reflect the 
revised operational requirements. The changes may cause some new 
errors to be introduced causing a transient increase in the failure 
density and a consequent rise in the hazard rate. Modelling of the 
failure rate of software using the bath-tub curve is useful if 
changes to the system are anticipated. 
Figure 2.1.2 Failure Density and Hazard Rate 
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When the failed unit is repaired and returned to service, a 
measure of the reliability of a unit is the term Mean Time Between 
Failure, and when the failed unit is not repaired the term Mean Time 
To Failure is used. It has become accepted practice to use MTTF 
when measuring software reliability since any correction applied to 
21 
the program will change its characteristics and can therefore be 
regarded as a new instance of the program rather than the erroneous 
one being returned to service after repair. 
In using MTTF it is assumed that an exponential reliability 
function with a constant hazard rate, %, applies. However, MTTF 
equates to the reciprocal of /I and the number of failures experienced 
will be at least half of all failures, Figure 2.1.3. 
Reliability models can be grouped into two main types: 
Deterministic and Bayesian. 
Figure 2.1.3 Mean Time To Failure 
a) in terms of reliability 
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In the Deterministic group of models the Jelinski-Moranda and 
Musa models dominate the published material, [49]. The assumption 
in these models is that the times between detection of errors, T, are 
independent random variables, V, and that time, t, is conditionally 
exponential, so 
-At 
pdf(t I V) = ýe 
and 
k. =( N+ 1 )' 
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where N= initial number of faults 
= contribution to failure rate from each fault 
The execution time model of Musa is becoming more widely evident 
in published literature and is based on the Jelinski-Moranda Model. 
In the Musa model the expected number of errors, n, is given by 
n= No [1- exp( -Ct/NoTo )] 
where No is the inherent number of errors 
To is the MTTF at start of testing 
C is the 'testing compression factor' and. a ratio of equivalent 
operating time in the target environment to the actual 
operating time in the test environment. 
The present MTTF is given by 
Ct 
T= To exp( NoTo 1 
giving 
-t R(t) = Pr{ no failure in (t, t«1)} a exp( T 
To improve the MTTF from T to T' 
1_I 
An = NoTo (T T') 
and the execution time to achieve this change is 
MoTo T' 
At =C Ln (T) 
Littlewood (41] discounts the use of Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) 
and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) in the context of software as 
elapsed time can only be used when a regular pattern of use can be 
demonstrated. 
The Littlewood-Verrall model, [421, dominates the Bayesian group 
of models in the published material and also assumes exponential 
reliability growth; 
- it Of (t 1 1) = 11 e 
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where / is the program failure rate with a gamma distribution: 
that the failures do not occur at a constant rate but depends upon 
program usage. 
The model also assumes that different program errors have 
different probabilities of failure. The failure rate is given as 
a a-I - ? (i)71 
PDF( X)=[ 1(i)] Le 
r (a) 
where a= a-th failure 
7. = failure rate 
r (a) = gamma function 
V= linear function 
giving 
a 
F(t) t+ fli) )] 
a 
R(t) =[ ('P(i) )/(t+ Y(i) )] 
and 
MTTF = Y(i) / a-1 
The models discussed above are concerned with the operational 
performance of the software, the amount of testing needed and the 
software error-rate. There is no indication of the seriousness of 
the errors estimated to exist or which errors would create a 
catastrophic operational malfunction. The rate of detection and 
correction of errors does not indicate the risk associated with the 
usage of the software. 
In chemical plant design studies it is common practice for the 
design to be subjected to a range of techniques known by the generic 
term 'Risk Analysis', [3], in order to determine the risk associated 
with the design. The approach is to examine product flow routes and 
to ask the question 'would it be nasty if ... 
'. Probabilities of 
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component failure in each route are assessed and submitted to 
probabilistic analysis to establish the risk for the total plant. 
An analogy between the risks in a chemical plant and the risks 
in software is to be seen by viewing the data flow of the software in 
a similar manner to the material flow of an chemical plant. An 
assumption is made that the risk from the software is independent of 
the risk from the supporting hardware. Such an assumption is 
similar to that applied to other industrial plant when it is assumed 
that the risk from each nut and bolt or individual component is 
acceptable. In both instances, the resulting risk analysis is 
subject to external events on each component. 
Once a risk analysis has been done then it is a simple task to 
repeat the original risk analysis following modifications. The 
investigations reported by Taylor, (66], indicate that it may be 
possible to apply some risk analysis techniques to software following 
detailed examination of the functional specification. 
In the Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Flixborough 
Disaster, (14], the following comment is made in para. 196; 
"No plant can be made absolutely safe any more than a car, 
aeroplane, or home can be made absolutely safe. It is important 
that this is recognised for if it is not, plant, which complies with 
whatever may be the requirements of the day tends to be regarded as 
absolutely safe and the measure of alertness to risk is thereby 
reduced". 
Both 'risk' and 'hazard' can be quantified and the combination 
of risk and hazard is called 'danger'. Since 'safe' has been 
defined as being a situation where the level of risk is judged to be 
acceptable then it is desirable that safety should also be expressed 
quantitatively. The word 'safety' is often associated in peoples 
minds with the word 'dangerous' which describes a situation which, 
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though safe to one observer, may be considered to be unsafe to 
another. Dangerous has been defined in this thesis to mean a 
situation where the level of risk of a hazard materialising is 
unacceptable and will have an undesirable consequence on either 
capital equipment or people. 
Safety refers to the subjective judgement of potential hazards 
within the safety criteria and is based on personal experience 
supported by limited measurements of measurable parameters. This is 
currently not possible. 
To understand why safety cannot be expressed in terms of a 
quantitative measurement the epistemological and logical foundations 
of measurements need to be examined. But before examining the 
principles of measurements it is necessary to have a picture of the 
problem of fitting any scale of measurement to safety. 
On the one side of the picture there is a notion of safety 
comprising a conception of what is 'safe' and what is 'unsafe', a 
model of how safety relates to the world and a definition based on 
both of these. On the other side of the picture there is some 
method of instrumentation providing a measure which, through 
pragmatism, is ordered in to some index. The ordering of the index 
is not influenced by pragmatism alone but is also subject to 
influence by the model and the concept. 
Figure 2.1.4 The Measurement of Safety. 
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Pragmatism Instrumentation 
Definition '- -' Index Measure 
Concept 
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To be able to have some measurement of safety according to the 
definition it is necessary to have a mapping function between the 
definition and the index. Finkelstein, [19], formally defines 
measurement as being a set of mathematical entities 0 and a set 
numbers N with a mapping function M between the sets such that M maps 
the mathematical entities 0 onto the set of numbers, M: Q -> N. A 
scale of measurement S is given as the triplet S= {Q, N, M}. 
If the class of entities 0 is considered to be the definition of 
safety shown in Figure 2.1.4 and the set of numbers N as being the 
index, then in order for safety to be expressed in terms of a 
measurement a mapping function M which maps the definition D into the 
index I, M: D -> I, is needed. Such a mapping function may be 
considered as a conjoint measurement which, according to Finkelstein, 
relates to a set of measurements having the capacity to assign a 
measure to the object and order the measure in a set of measures. 
Conjoint measurements, then, are some form of ordering according to 
empirical observations (subjective judgement) not rankings which 
Finkelstein describes as a comparison against defined standards. 
Since defined standards do not exist for the safety of software it is 
asserted that the safety assessment of software is a subjective 
assessment. 
Safety, then, is some subjective judgement about the risk of a 
hazard materialising and that the risk is acceptable in the social 
climate prevailing at the time of the judgement. The Flixborough 
Inquiry, [14] para. 197, comments on the acceptability of risks; 
"When Mr Marshall refers to risks exceeding a specific value we 
understand him to refer to risks which exceed what at a given time is 
regarded as socially tolerable, for what is or is not acceptable 
depends in the end upon current social tolerance and what is regarded 
as tolerable at one time may well be regarded as intolerable at 
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another. Nowhere perhaps is this more apparent than in the field of 
road transport where the construction and use regulations have, over 
the years, become even more stringent". 
The acceptability of risk is dependant on personal experience 
and an appreciation of the probability issues involved. For example 
Knox, [37], has suggested that a probability of 100,000: 1 is 
considered to be safe whilst Starr and colleagues, [64], found that 
risks between 10,000,000: 1 and 10,000: 1 are considered by the general 
public as being acceptable since "their likelihood are no more than 
being struck by lightning". Caution must be expressed when thinking 
of acceptable risks in terms of ratios otherwise the wrong inferrence 
may be drawn. 
If it is subjectively assessed that activity X is "safer" than 
activity Y then the judgement may accurately reflect a comparison of 
some characteristic of the entities. However, the utility of the 
safeness of entity Y may be greater than that for entity X, since the 
social-economic consequences of entity Y being unsafe may be greater 
than for entity X. Therefore an assessment of safety must not be 
considered in isolation from the economic-social costs of being 
unsafe. 
As an example of the subjective nature of safety it can be said 
that the accumulation of explosive materials above that licensed by 
the Local Authority is not safe. Yet at the Inquiry into the 
Flixborough Disaster it emerged that the site had a licence under the 
Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928 to hold 8,500 gallons of explosive 
material yet the management, including the Safety Officer, had 
allowed 367,850 gallons of explosive material to be stock-piled. 
The storage of explosive material at a level of 43 times that 
licensed was not considered by the Court of Inquiry as unsafe. To 
the contrary, the Report commends the management in three paragraphs 
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(paras 201,202 and 206) for being "safety conscious". 
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2.2 Specification and Design 
The earliest stage of the development of software is the 
specification and design. A specification should be an unambiguous 
statement of the intended properties (characteristics) of a program. 
The unambiguous property of the specification applies whether it is a 
formal requirements specification or an informal functional 
specification and is a guide to the designer about the requirements 
of the system. The designer undertakes the design according to his 
understanding of the specification. 
The produced design is the designer's interpretation of the 
specification which he will consider to have understood in detail and 
yet may have produced a design which does not satisfy the 
specification. Such a design may be unsafe in operation due to the 
designer not having appreciated the safety requirements contained in 
the specification. 
Basili and Perricone, [4], examined two large software systems. 
One of the systems was for satellite planning studies and comprised 
approximately 90,000 lines of Fortran. The second system, a 
'ground-support' system, was programmed by the same organisation as 
the first but the length of the code and the programming language 
used were not reported. After analysis Basili and Perricone 
reported that on the 'ground-support' system only 81 of errors were 
attributed to specification errors yet on the satellite system 48Z of 
all errors were "... attributed to incorrect or misinterpreted 
functional specifications or requirements". 
2.2.1 Formal Methods 
Formal Methods of specification have been developed using Finite 
State Machines, Directed Graph, Control Flow Graphs, Modal Maths and 
Denotational Semantics. The published works have been largely 
concerned with the description of formal methods rather than specific 
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application examples. 
Berg et al, [5], suggest that formal methods are an aid to 
software production by stating precisely the requirements and 
objectives that the program is to satisfy. 
When a formal specification is used the designer may consider 
there to be minimal specification ambiguities. Acts of faith by the 
designer in the infallibility of the specification may lead to a 
lower awareness by the Programmer of the requirements and a 
consequential increase in human error during the software production. 
2.2.2 Functional Specifications 
A functional specification is a statement to the customer about 
the way the software is expected to react on a given input sequence. 
However, the action to be taken following an unanticipated and 
unspecified combination of inputs or events is not specified. A 
consequence of failing to make a statement about actions following 
unexpected events may mean that the designer fails to establish the 
unsafe conditions. 
Functional specifications have become common in many industrial 
installations over the years and are sufficiently detailed for many 
purposes according to Kopetz, [38]. The format of a Functional 
Specification varies according to the project standards in use within 
the organisation and no standard approach to its compilation exists. 
Non-standardisation of a specification format may create a situation 
where a specification is misinterpreted by a designer who is familiar 
with one format of specification and is being requested to prepare a 
design against an unfamiliar specification format. Consequently the 
designer may overlook some of the safety features of the design. 
Pyle, [57], suggests that the requesting authority for the 
design may be a Plant Manager who has a deep understanding of his 
process requirements but may not have a similar grasp of formal 
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specification methods. In such a situation functional 
specifications aid the requesting authority to have confidence that 
the overall safety of his plant will be maintained and aids him to 
appreciate complex concepts, particularly about the scope of the 
proposed solution. 
When Functional Specifications are used decisions on algorithms 
and their implementation are deliberately not taken at an early stage 
in the design process so that unnecessary constraints are not imposed 
on the designer. Henry, [28], warns of the dangers of 
"overspecification" hindering the conception process through limiting 
the set of possible solutions. 
With functional specifications a confusion may arise about the 
precise nature of the function to be performed and lead to the 
omission of some aspect of the design aimed at ensuring safety. 
Some functional specifications include a separate section on the 
safety aspects of the system. 
2.2.3 Specification Languages 
Ramamoorthy and Ho, [58], state that there is an urgent need for 
specification languages in which system requirements can be 
unambiguously stated and validated. 
The belief that specification languages can improve the 
consistency of the software design has led to the use of program-like 
languages to specify the design. A program written in a high level 
programming language describes the means of achieving a given 
transitional state without explicitly expressing the effect of the 
transition. For a specification to be meaningful to the requesting 
authority the effect of the transition needs to be expressed not the 
means. Pyle, (57], rejects the use of a specification language to 
formally specify a design since it is usual for such a specification 
to be useful solely to the designer and not understandable to the 
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requesting authority. 
Software specified by a specification language can be submitted 
for verification using formal methods but the use of a specification 
language does not implicitly ensure safety. Berg et al, [5], report 
that no major systems have been specified or verified using'a 
specification language. 
2.2.4 Structured Design 
Structured design is a software interpretation of the 
specification. 
Structured design is the arrangement of functional modules into 
a conceptual hierarchy of modules comprising the system. To 
construct the hierarchy a technique known as stepwise refinement, 
Wirth (69], can be used to develop a description of the system and 
its data structures. At each step in the refinement process a 
consistency check is made to ensure adherence by the design to the 
specification and that each development stage reflects the 
specification of the previous stage plus revisions. 
In order to construct the hierarchy two approaches are common; 
bottom-up design and top-down design. 
Bottom-up design is a method used by many designers when 
designing individual modules and arranging the interconnection of the 
modules until they meet the requirement. Top-down design examines 
the requirement and divides it into designs which are definable 
portions of the total requirement. The designs can be further 
divided until a number of modules have been identified. 
Step-wise refinement can induce errors when following either a 
purely top-down or purely bottom-up design because of the oversight 
of common functions. There is a secondary effect, that of creating 
a poor design because of the design being fragmented. These effects 
can be assessed qualitatively but not quantitatively. 
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2.3 Programming Language and Programming Structure 
2.3.1 Programming Language 
Whilst the design method influences the system structure and 
interactions, the main production tool in software development is the 
programming language. The choice of programming language influences 
the amount that errors can be introduced into the resulting code. 
Young, [71], gives a comprehensive review of languages for 
industrial control systems and makes recommendations on those 
languages he considers to be suited for the purpose. Young sets out 
six basic criteria for the design of a real-time language; "security, 
readability, flexibility, simplicity, portability and efficiency". 
Security of a language is some measure of the extent to which 
errors in the program will be detected by either the compiler or the 
run-time support system. Readability concerns the choice of 
variable names and legibility such that a conceptual understanding of 
the software can be gained by reading the program listing without 
recourse to further documentation. Flexibility of a language is the 
richness of choice available to a programmer using the language. 
Simplicity reflects the time and cost required to train a 
programmer in the language and also the reduction of programming 
errors caused by misinterpretation of the language. Portability is 
the ease with which a program written in a particular language is 
able to be moved from one computer to another computer without being 
dependent on the supporting hardware of either computer. Efficiency 
is some measure of the computational throughput compared with the 
constraints imposed by the control system and some measure of the 
predictable overheads, such as data manipulation. Young suggests 
that of the six criteria security and readability are vital in 
safety-related systems. 
It was found during the survey of published literature that some 
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languages are considered to be more secure than others, due to their 
syntax. Horning, [31], gives an insight into some of the problems 
of using particular languages. 
For high-level programming languages there are fewer errors for 
a given function then would be the case with a low-level programming 
language. Therefore, the programming language has an effect on 
software safety. 
Comments have been made by Young, [71], and Horning, [31], about 
the type of language to be used for different tasks. Rzevski, [61], 
reported on experiments which he asserts show that expert FORTRAN 
programmers write equally reliable and safe programs as expert PASCAL 
programmers. Rzevski also reported that he has found it easier for 
novices to learn to write reliable programs in PASCAL than in FORTRAN 
and attributed the findings to the structuring of the language. 
Gannon, [21], suggested that a programming language for real- 
time use needs to be secure and cites the implementation of data 
typing as an example of language security. A data type specifies 
the set of operations that can be applied to objects of that type and 
the range of values an object of that type may have. The method 
that a programmer adopts to ensure the security of data is a safety 
concern since data corruption can lead to incorrect functioning of 
programs. 
Another aspect of programming languages which Horning, [31], 
considers to be unsafe regardless of the task, is the control 
structure. The control structure is influenced by the amount of 
code indentation and in an experiment conducted to examine the 
effects of the indentation of code Miara et al, [47], found that 
indentation significantly influences'the comprehension of the program 
by programmers and concluded that the experiment coincided with the 
earlier work of Kerninghan and Plauger, (36]. 
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Reference was found to faulty instructions not being detected 
during testing and resulting in unsafe operation. One such report 
concerned the early termination of a French meteorological experiment 
caused by a controlling satellite issuing the 'abort' command instead 
of the 'read' command and destroying 72 of the 114 weather balloons, 
Anderson and Lee [21, and Myers, [50]. 
In some languages, notably BASIC and FORTRAN, the declaration of 
variables is not required and new variables can be implicitly 
declared within the body of the program. The alternative strategy 
is to require that all variables be defined in a declaration block at 
the beginning of a program. Languages which do not require 
declarations may be considered as unsafe when used for industrial 
control since the declaration of variables within the body of the 
program promotes ambiguity. 
An example of the risks of not requiring declarations of 
variables is the reported loss of a space mission to Venus, Mariner 
I, Myers (50], which was reportedly due to an error in a program 
written in FORTRAN of the type: - 
DO 31=1.3 
Because Fortran is a context-dependent language, the statement 
was treated as an assignment of the value 1.3 to a variable and 
allocated D031 to that variable rather than correctly executing a DO 
loop. 
Reported losses of equipment through software errors have caused 
expensive losses of equipment. There have been no published reports 
of incidents endangering human life. Reports such as these 
demonstrate the risk of not declaring variables. 
The ability to handle non-standard input-output devices such as 
Analogue-Digital Convertors and Digital-Analogue Convertors. is 
important to the control strategy and needs to be considered when 
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selecting a particular language for control. In industrial control 
systems programs need to be able to control low-level devices and 
problems have been recorded with low-level languages, Pyle [56]. It 
is considered by Pyle to be preferrable to use a high-level language 
for such occasions yet there needs to be a capability of programming 
low-level device hardware, without needing to resort to machine code. 
The language 'C' has many low-level features as part of the language. 
In industrial control systems it is common for an external 
stimulus to execute more than one program simultaneously whilst 
maintaining synchronism. Such a requirement is called concurrency 
and with the development of multi-tasking languages like Ada, [11], 
it will be possible to operate concurrent tasks at the program level 
rather than through the Operating System. With multi-tasking 
languages special problems arise in validating the software for 
safety but no evidence of these problems has yet been published. 
The mechanism for handling exception conditions in high-level 
languages in a safe way is important and with the development of the 
language Ada exception handling is becoming a feature incorporated 
within the language rather than being a feature of the operating 
system. 
2.3.2 Program Structure 
According to Ramamoorthy and Ho, [581, safety of the software 
can be improved by using a high-level language and structured 
programming techniques. 
Understanding the problem that the program is attempting to 
satisfy is important in reducing the extent of errors and may also 
ease the task of testing. If each module specification states the 
internal and external program interfaces the possibility of a 
mismatch between, and with, other modules is reduced. 
Modularisation of the system allows the programmer to become 
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familiar with the module to be worked on and to comprehend the 
detail. But if the program is badly modularised it is probable that 
the programmer will not be able to appraise the objective of the 
program. However, with modularisation there is the need to maintain 
standard inter-module interfaces and dependencies. 
Unless the programmer has an intimate knowledge of the program 
he will not be adequately equipped to test it. If the program is 
not tested to the best of the programmer's ability then only a 
limited amount of reliance can be placed on the program. 
Structured programming was defined by Dijkstra, (16], as being a 
set of rules for programming to meet just such a requirement. Since 
Dijkstra's initial paper on structured programming there have been 
many definitions including the definition by Myers, [50] p. 130, where 
structured programming is defined as "the attitude of writing code 
with the intent of communicating with people instead of machines". 
The Infotech Report, [341, singles out one definition of structured 
programming as; "the task of organising one's thoughts in a way that 
leads, in a reasonable time, to an understandable and correct 
expression of a computing task". 
In structured programming functions are structured into distinct 
units which may be subsequently interpretted into program blocks, 
procedures or function calls depending on their purpose within the 
program, Young, [71]. Statements are arranged in a manner that will 
reflect the logical execution of the program. An example is the 
interpretation of the general statement if x obtains then do y 
otherwise do z" into the program statement "IF x THEN y ELSE z". 
Reduction of abstract function statements into a structured program 
removes the need to use GOTO statements but makes use of the basic 
control statements; sequence. IF.. THEN.. ELSE.., WHILE.. DO.., 
REPEAT.. UNTIL.. and CASE.. OF... 
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Pyle, (55], suggests that structured programming techniques are 
not sufficient for industrial control systems without improving on 
existing techniques. Pyle bases his argument on the significant 
differences he has observed between control software and conventional 
sequential programs. The main difference being the need for control 
software to respond to external stimulii and for the control software 
to be not only correct but also safe. Pyle's argument is more 
significant as concurrent software becomes accepted in control 
systems. 
Structuring of the total system, which may consist of many 
programs, influences safety in a positive way according to Allworth. 
[1]. If a computer has the facility for interrupts and priority 
levels then the commonly used structure in industrial control 
computing is to put the frequently run and time-critical programs, 
like alarms, on the higher priority levels and the less critical 
programs, like reports, on the lower priority levels. The interrupt 
facility can then be retained for activating those programs which 
must be run without delay from the scheduler of the run-time support 
system. 
The language chosen for the given task, the style of programming 
used and the availability of programming constructs which reflect the 
problem structure can result in errors in interpreting a 
specification of a program. 
2.3.3 Programming Methodologies 
As part of the extensive range of work being undertaken on the 
language Ada two comprehensive studies have been made into 
programming methodologies for embedded computer systems. 
In the first study, Pickett et al, [10], a range of formalised 
methods of programming methodologies were examined. The study aimed 
to determine which, if any, existing programming methodologies would 
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be most appropriate for British Industry when programming embedded 
systems using the language Ada. The complete study described 21 
methodologies and outlined a further 15. In the analysis of 
methodological features Pickett observed the difficulty of supplying 
a reliable system when the requirements may change between the 
inception of the project and its completion. Further, the study 
determined that the objectives of a programming methodology suitable 
for embedded systems are rigorous checking of the requirements with 
the produced system, formality of specification, rapid prototyping of 
the system and automation of as many parts of the software production 
cycle as practical, without a reference to ensuring safe operation of 
the software developed on the methodology. 
The study concluded that whilst many of the methodologies 
provided some of the required features none of the methodologies 
fully met the study objectives. Methodologies such as CCS, HDM, 
JSD, SARA and VDM were considered to provide most features. 
The second study. Wasserman and Freeman, [67]. examined 24 
methodologies. The study, known as "Methodman" complemented the 
earlier "Steelman" [13], and "Stoneman", [12], documents. The 
emphasis was on the software issues rather than on the more general 
issues of systems engineering. Concern was expressed by the authors 
of the study that inadequate analysis is "virtually certain to lead 
to project failure" because of a resulting poor specification. 
In support of functional specifications the "Methodman" study 
asserts that functional specifications are "the basis against which 
validation is performed .... whether by acceptance testing or through 
formal proof of program correctness. " 
Twelve requirements are listed, p.?, as being essential for a 
methodology but none specifically refers to the need to ensure a safe 
software product. However, in the constraints, p. 9, the effects of 
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the program on the development cycle are acknowledged as coming from 
the severe constraints often placed on embedded systems, for instance 
real-time responses and memory usage. 
The 'technical characteristics' of a methodology, p. 13, for 
embedded systems are considered to include "reliability - the absence 
of errors that lead to system failure" and "safety - the avoidance of 
run-time failures which could lead to the loss of life or the 
occurrence of other catastrophic consequences". Yet these two 
issues were not addressed either in the questionnaire or the 
evaluations of the responses to the questionnaire. 
Both studies, [10], and, [67], acknowledge the requirement to 
ensure safe and reliable programs but failed to determine which, if 
any, methodology addressed the requirement of safety and the 
developers of the methodologies failed to indicate that the safety 
requirement had been addressed in their methodology. 
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2.4 Support Environment and Testing Strategy 
The provision of software tools, compilers and editors, is the 
role of the programming support environment. The programming 
support environment may also be an aid to the programmer in the 
production of programs by maintaining a single project database of 
approved interface standards. common modules and standard testing 
facilities. 
2.4.1 Support Environment 
Some published material conflicted on precisely what was the 
correct view of a programming support environment but Lehman, [40], 
makes a contribution to this conflict of views when he declared that 
the programming process is "the transformation of a computer- 
application concept into an operational system and the subsequent 
evolution of that system to maintain it satisfactory and effective in 
its changing operational environment". 
Degano and Levi, in [8] pp. 251-264, assert that by making full 
use of the resources of the programming support environment the 
programmer is able to construct a program compatible with those of 
the rest of the project and the programmer is able to test his 
program in a consistent manner. Although the production of software 
with a programming support environment is more efficient in terms of 
costs, has a more consistent structure and it is more probable that 
testing will have been conducted within a better framework, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the safety of resulting programs is any 
better. 
No published material was found to demonstrate how a programming 
support environment will influence a program's ability to meet the 
required safety criteria. 
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2.4.2 Test Strategy 
Rushby, in Meek [46] p. 87, states that "it is program testing, 
rather than debugging, which is the central feature of the final 
stage in the creation of a program. The objective of testing is to 
verify that the program functions as it should, that it conforms with 
its specification, and solves the right problem in the real world". 
Rushby developed his argument until concluding that it is reasonable 
"to stop error hunting when only a relatively small number of errors 
are left and the costs of finding any more are not justified". 
Assuming that a program contains any number of errors without some 
method of measuring the number of errors remaining, or their effect, 
infers that the remaining errors are benign. 
Zweben, in [B] pp. 3-12, states that no single test strategy is 
sufficient to satisfy all test conditions and recommends that a good 
testing strategy should be capable of determining that errors exist. 
Miller, in [33] pp. 4-16, lists some of the benefits of program 
testing as being better user acceptance because the software is more 
reliable, demonstrable history of high-quality performance and 
confidence in the software product. 
The testing strategy adopted is considered by Rushby, in [46], 
as influencing the production of the software and as a consequence 
the safety of the software. 
In recognition of the need to approach a uniform testing 
strategy national regulatory bodies are examining ways of assessing 
various factors concerned with testing, Elektronik Centralen, [17]. 
2.4.3 Program Proving and Correctness Methods 
Ramamoorthy and Ho, [58], demonstrate how a program with only 
nine paths can have an extremely large number of execution sequences 
thus making exhaustive testing impractical. 
Proofs of correctness decompose the software logic into 
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axiomatic statements using mathematical notation to develop a 
mathematical proof. Program proving is a specialised and protracted 
activity with little evidence of what can be formally proved other 
than the absence of certain specific hazards, like the output from a 
variable which has not been assigned following initialisation. 
Criticism has been expressed by Cho, [7], as to whether a proof can 
itself be proved to be correct. 
According with the view of Cho, (7], is that of Good and London, 
[23]. when they observed that a 433 statement program required 46 
pages of formal proof. 
Validation and verification techniques abound but there is 
difficulty in establishing a general definition of the terms. 
Myers, [50], asserts that validation and verification are similar to 
correctness proofs, except that validation aims to find errors by 
running the program in a real environment, whilst verification aims 
to find errors by running the program in a test environment. Other 
definitions, Bologna, [6], and Dahll et al, [9], suggest that 
verification is the testing of a subset of the total program suite 
and that validation is the testing of the total program suite. 
The idea that a software module can be analysed for 
structuredness by measuring topological features without 
consideration of the logic it portrays is given in the work of 
Hennell, [27], on LCSAJ (Linear Code Sequence and Jump) and Tai, 
[65]. Essentially, the technique relates to the number of crossings 
of flow or control paths within the program code. Such a measure is 
called 'knot complexity'. Woodward, [70], compares the knot 
complexity of 26 programs with McCabe's cyclomatic complexity, V(G), 
for the same set of programs and found a close correlation. 
Huang, [32], gives a comprehensive overview of the most commonly 
used testing methods. 
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2.4.4 Software Metrics 
Lord Kelvin, [44], is often quoted as having said; 
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express 
it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the 
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts 
advanced to the stage of science. " 
The view of Lord Kelvin summarises the objective of the work on 
software metrics. 
Testing of software is an aimless task unless some measure is 
used to indicate the effectiveness of such testing. Software 
Metrics aim to establish methods of measurement relating to the 
software. 
Halstead, [25], introduced the phrase 'software science' to 
describe a set of empirically derived measures of the software based 
on phenomanological aspects of the software. There have been many 
other researchers in software metrics, notably McCabe, [45], who 
defined a measure based on a graph theoretic approach and known as 
the 'cyclomatic number'. Many metrics have been developed and 
Perlis et al. [54], considered some of these metrics and recommended 
research into software metrics. 
Gilb, [22], presented a set of metrics but little material has 
been published regarding their derivation or application. Harrison 
et al, [26], reviewed many metrics concerned with complexity and 
found that their experiments supported Gilb's assumption that the 
degree of decision-making logic in the program can be correlated to 
characteristics of a program such as error proneness, development 
costs and time. Findings similar to these are reported by Farr and 
Zagorski, [18], and Sime et al, [63]. 
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Shen et al, [62], critically examined the work of Halstead and 
the experimental results published by other authors in support of 
Halstead and concluded that the theory of software science was still 
evolving. Further, they resolved that researchers should continue to 
refine Halstead's metrics as there is a need for such measures. 
2.4.5 Simulation 
The use of software or hardware simulations, designed to test 
the control software prior to implementation, is not common due to 
the high costs involved in the development of a simulator. 
The method commonly used in Industry is to construct a panel of 
switches and knobs to allow simulation of the anticipated normal 
input-output sequence and, to a lesser extent, the known exception 
paths from a restricted data set. The disadvantages of a hardware 
simulation are the high costs involved, the time to produce the 
simulator, the need for manual operation of the simulation and the 
need for a protracted and accurate repetition of the test causes 
doubt to be cast on the effectiveness of such simulation tests. 
Software simulation has been shown by Nunns, [51], and others to 
overcome many of the drawbacks experienced by the hardware approach 
but the cost of developing a software simulator is still high. 
Using a software simulation it is possible to establish a detailed 
simulation of the expected plant input sequences that will exercise 
either separate programs or complete systems. With a software 
simulator it is possible to run these simulation sequences for 
protracted periods of time and often at a rate of input sequences 
greater than or less than those to be expected in real-time 
operation. 
A development of software simulation is the use of simulation 
monitors which log data from specific application areas, such that 
when a malfunction occurs in plant operation a simulation model is 
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available to the Plant Engineer who can in turn request further 
controlled testing from the Programmer. 
One major difficulty with software simulations is ensuring the 
faithfulness and accuracy of the simulator. 
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2.5 Operational and Psychological Factors 
At all stages of the software production cycle people are 
involved. Since people are fallible the effects of their failings 
can be seen in the errors introduced into the software. 
Hirsgh, [303, reported that in an experiment to determine the 
error rate of humans operating a typewriter keyboard a total error 
rate of 6.1751 was encountered out of a sample of 5 million key 
depressions. An error rate of this magnitude infers that on average 
one in every 16 keys depressed will be in error and with most 
programs containing many hundreds of characters a considerable number 
of characters can be expected to be in error. 
2.5.1 Psychological Factors 
Green et al, [24], suggest that software production is a design 
activity and dependent on the mental agility of the programmer. 
Errors can, therefore, be induced into a program due to psychological 
factors. 
Kopetz. [38], cites Per Brinch Hansen as having said; 
"If the intellectual effort required to understand and test a 
system increases more than linearly with the size of the 
system, we shall never be able to build reliable systems beyond 
a certain complexity. " 
In the works of Mohanty, [48], and Fitzsimmons and Love, [20], 
there are references to a Stroud number which is derived from the 
definition of a 'moment' given by J. M. Stroud; 
"The time required by the human brain to perform the most 
elementary mental discrimination. " 
The number of mental discriminations required to understand a 
software module influences the production of software according to 
the amount of effort required. 
Estimates of an individual's Stroud number (the number of 
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'moments' in a second) range from 5 to 28 and have been used in 
experiments concerned with programming rates. Halstead, [25], used 
a Stroud number of 18 to indicate what he considered to be a 
reasonable level of mental activity for a concentrating person. The 
usefulness of measures based on the Stroud number is supported by 
easili, in [54], yet discounted by Curtis, in [54]. Researchers 
such as Mohanty. [48], and Sime, [63], hold the view that the greater 
the effort required, the more the risk of inducing errors yet there 
is no consensus view on the usefulness of psychological measures. 
Wasserman and Freeman, [67], acknowledged that there is a 
psychological factor affecting the development of software as a 
result of what they have called the "physical workplace", that is to 
say the actual place where the developer undertakes the development. 
The factors that they refer to include "access to computers, privacy 
and noise levels. ergonomic considerations of terminals, and 
availability of reference materials including books and journals". 
They further suggest that there is little doubt that these factors 
are significant. 
None of the references suggested ways of restricting the 
influence of the psychological factors which affect the programmer 
other than methods of detecting and measuring the extent to which 
there is an effect. Research into the psychology of programming 
continues but few applications of the findings of such research have 
been reported. 
2.5.2 Operational Factors 
The operational factors include the industrial equipment and the 
process or the plant being controlled by the software. 
The safety of control systems incorporating software is 
influenced by the activities of external factors, for example, the 
need for safe operation of the software to be maintained when the 
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equipment malfunctions. In such cases the equipment will provide 
erroneous information for the software to interpret but the software 
should be designed to cater for such events. Though the particular 
event may have been considered improbable. 
Hardware failures may suggest to the observer that the software 
malfunctioned instead of the equipment whilst the software may have 
reached a reasonable interpretation of the information. The 
software may be considered to have failed to meet the safety 
requirement yet in reality it was the equipment reliability that was 
suspect. 
The operation of the software should not compromise safety 
because of operational difficulties. Low reliability of equipment 
will cause an initial low confidence in the safety of the software 
since the equipment and software are frequently viewed as one. 
Longbottom, [43], and Williams, [68], have suggested that 
hardware failures influence the production of software. Suggestions 
such as these have led to software reliability being measured in such 
terms as 'errors per 1,000 hours'. 
Anderson and Lee, [2], have investigated the effects of hardware 
failure on software and the outcome of their investigations are ideas 
such as fault-tolerant computing. Fault-tolerant computing is an 
extremely large field of study and in general is more concerned with 
equipment reliability than safety. 
At the final stage of testing many errors will remain in the 
software. So the provision of satisfactory documentation to enable 
comprehensive testing should be mandatory for all software projects 
according to Hewitt, [29]. 
Hewitt, [29], and Johnson, [35], have suggested that 
documentation should be built up as the project progresses. They 
suggest that a poorly documented project will also be subjected to a 
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restricted set of tests and if the test set is limited by the 
documentation then it is held that documentation influences software 
safety. 
It is important to document changes to the software. Lawley, 
[39], developed a scheme, known as HAZOP, for documenting the 
desirable and undersirable effects of changes proposed for chemical 
plants. Nunns, [52], and, [53], has shown that a modified HAZOP 
procedure can be implemented for software. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Many factors have been advocated as those influencing software 
but none were found which were claimed to specifically influence the 
safety of software. 
It may be that factors affecting the safety of software can be 
identified but then there needs to be a knowledge of how to 
manipulate them. how to measure them and what such measurements mean. 
Any set of measurements of factors will need to address three 
points of issue for each measurement; 
1. the relative criticality 
2. the relative importance 
3. can it be assessed 
From the current state of the art consistent opinion is that 
there are factors influencing software and there is a consensus on 
their likely effects but there is no evidence to isolate which 
features these are. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Structural View 
The structure of the software has an influence on the safety of 
the software. In this Chapter the ways that the software can be 
structured to ensure a safe operation and methods of analysing that 
safety will be examined. 
The Chapter begins by examining the use of a set of techniques 
known, generically, by the term Risk Analysis. In particular, the 
applicability to software of Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree 
Analysis is explored. 
State Transition Diagrams are sometimes considered to be the 
means of identifying all possible fault conditions. State 
Transition Diagrams are examined with particular reference to the 
interaction between software, the hardware and the system. 
Having examined methods that may be, applicable in isolating a 
fault condition an argument is advanced for weighting errors 
according to three categories of danger. 
Finally, the structuring of the software for safety according to 
the control flow is examined. It is recommended that in safety- 
related systems the software should be structured into Control 
Modules, Safety Modules and Arbitrators. It is also suggested that 
a system of Integrity Locks should be used. 
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3.1 The Risk Analysis of Software 
'Risk Analysis'. is a generic term used by Engineers to describe 
a group of methods used to determine the conditions that will cause a 
hazardous state to exist and the associated risk. There is a need 
to assess the risk resulting from the use of computers as controllers 
in safety-related processes. The principal cause for concern is the 
possible number of software errors that can exist and the effects of 
these errors on the system. Since these techniques are used to 
analyse the risk associated with industrial processes and its 
hardware, it follows that control software should also be subject to 
similar analysis. 
Risk Analysis comprises a collection of analytical techniques 
used to examine the design of complex items of equipment within a 
safety context. The principle risk analysis techniques are Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA), [12]. The 
application of both these risk analysis techniques to software will 
be discussed in this Chapter. 
3.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Chelson, [4], has shown that fault-trees are constructed by 
first listing all the possible hazards considered to be present in 
the system. Once the hazards have been listed the construction of a 
fault tree begins by assuming that a particular event has caused one 
of the hazards and then to trace backwards through the logic of the. 
system to find which events could lead to the hazard. Since 
preceeding events may be the logical combination of other events a 
set of symbols is used to represent the logical sequence of possible 
events. As each node in the tree is encountered a decision is made 
whether further investigation is required. As the investigation 
continues more symbols are included in the tree until a node is 
reached where either no further investigation is necessary, called a 
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Failure Event, or a Terminal Event, also called a Basic event, is 
encountered. These symbols are shown in Figure 3.1.1.1. 
Figure 3.1.1.1 FTA Symbols 
Top Event 
Terminal or Basic event 
requiring no further investigation 
OR gate 
AND gate 
Failure event, not a basic 
fault event but one which 
requires no further 
investigation 
Leveson and Harvey have shown, [8], that Fault Tree Analysis 
can be applied to software provided that the catastrophic event which 
is to be considered can be defined in a precise manner. Since FTA 
was developed for hardware and has now been applied to software, it 
is possible to link the two sets of analyses to form a complete set 
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for the total system. Fault Tree Analysis applied to software has 
been renamed by Leveson and Harvey as Software Fault Tree Analysis 
(SFTA). 
SFTAI in common with hardware FTA. examines the potentially 
dangerous conditions that could occur. called 'catastrophic events', 
as a result of 'top events' or 'loss events', and considers all 
possible actions that could cause the dangerous condition to exist 
using diagrams which are a variation of those used for hardware FTA. 
Leveson and Harvey, [8], have also shown that SFTA can be 
performed at various levels and stages of software development. The 
highest level of analysis is the functional description. At the 
lowest level of investigation SFTA analyses the program code. 
Leveson and Harvey also suggest that it is possible to construct 
fault trees from a program design language and that the information 
derived from the tree during the software development phase can be 
used. However. SFTA does not cater for the effect of one part of a 
program influencing another. 
In SFTA it is assumed that for a dangerous condition to exist it 
is necessary for there to be a related output from the computer. 
Therefore, the starting point for SFTA, when working at the program 
level, is the section of code responsible for effecting an output. 
The analysis then proceeds backwards through the code determining 
both how the program arrived at the section of code and what are the 
current states of the variables. 
Standard forms of symbolism have been proposed by Leveson and 
Harvey for Pascal-like program statements. The general form for the 
IF.. THEN.. ELSE.. statement is shown in Figure 3.1.1.2 (a). The 
statement " IF a>b THEN x := f(x) ELSE x := 10 " is shown in Figure 
3.1.1.2 (b) below when analysed for the event "x> 100 ". 
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Figure 3.1.1.2 SFTA for IF.. THEN.. ELSE.. 
(a) 
condition true 
'then-part' 
causes event 
cond. true then-part' 
prior to causes event 
statement 
(b) 
a>b, x :: f(x) I 
causes x> 100 
if-then-else 
condition false 
'else-part' 
causes event 
cond. false 'else-part' 
prior to causes event 
statement 
x> 1001 
a>bx:: f(x) 
prior to causes x> 100 
statement 
a <= b. x := 10 
causes x> 100 
a<= bI Icauses x := 10 
prior to x> 100 
Since the right-most node, stating that x: =10 causes x>100, is 
clearly nonsense the node can be assigned a zero probability and 
removed from the tree. Analysing for the top event of x>100 could 
stop at this point and assertions placed in the code or the 
proceeding code could be analysed for the events "a >b" and "f(x) > 
100 ". 
Figure 3.1.1.3 (a) shows the suggested general format for 
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analysing a WHILE.. DO statement and Figure 3.1.1.3 (b) shows the 
analysis for the loop 
WHILE b>x DO 
BEGIN b: = b-1; 
z: - z+ 10; 
END 
analysed for the top event "z> 100 ". 
Figure 3.1.1.3 Example of SFTA 
(a) WHILE statement 
causes event 
stat. notl 
executed 
event prior 
to WHILE 
(b) 
cond. false 
prior to WHILE 
stat. executed 
cond. true 
prior to WHILE 
n-th iteration 
causes event 
WHILE statement 
causes z> 100 
stat. not 
executed 
Istat. executed 
6 
z> 100 prior b<=x prio 
to WHILE to WHILE 
b>x prior z+10, b-1 
causes z>100 
Leveson and Stolzy, [9], have suggested that real-time features, 
like concurrency found in the language Ada, can also be analysed 
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using SFTA. 
A disadvantage with SFTA is the difficulty in determining all 
possible top events that may arise and assessing their preceeding 
events. called cut sets, and basic failure events, called minimum cut 
sets. SFTA is not exhaustive and relies upon the person analysing 
the system to identify the "top events". Also there is no check to 
indicate that the analysis is complete. 
In the software context, tracing through the data flow of a 
program and analysing for failure events will identify some hazard 
situations which can be further analysed using SFTA. One method of 
tracing the data flow is to use Petri Nets or Event Tree Analysis. 
3.1.2 Petri Nets 
Petri Nets, [10], are formal methods of representing information 
flow and can be used to illustrate information flow in a program 
statement. Petri Nets can be used to represent the information flow 
at the level of the specification or at the level of the actual 
program. 
Petri Nets are bipartite directed graphs consisting of two basic 
components; a set of places, P, and a set of transitions, T. In 
addition two functions are created to link transitions to places: the 
input function, I, and the output function, 0. For each transition, 
tj, there is a set of input places, I(tj) and for each transition, 
tj, there is a set of output places 0(tj). Formally, a Petri Net is 
made up of a quadruple C=(P, T, I, O). Since each Petri Net has. an 
initial condition,, uo, the initial condition needs to be included in 
the structure giving a quintuple (P, T, I, O, )I). Defining the initial 
condition of the Petri Net is called "marking" a Petri Net. 
Diagramatically the places in a Petri Net are represented by 
circles and the transitions are represtened by a line crossing the 
arc joining two places. A transition is said to be enabled to 
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"fire" if and only if all the input tokens for that transition, 
markings, are satisfied and which allow the token at an input place 
to be transferred to an output place. The transition of the token 
is, in the abstract, the transfer of information from one place to 
another place. 
When the statement IF x THEN y ELSE z is executed the control 
will pass to either y or z according to the truth of x. A Petri Net 
can be represented graphically for such a statement; 
where Pi is the initial input place which fires transition t1. 
Transition t2 will only be fired and pass a token to y when tl has 
fired and place x has a token (x is true). Transition t3 will fire 
and pass a token to z when tt has fired and x bar has a token (x is 
false). For the IF x THEN y ELSE z statement places y and z would 
be the input places for the following statements. 
The firing of transition tt enables the firing of either t2 or 
t3 dependent on the logical state of x. However, when considering a 
programming statement according to a failure criteria it must be 
considered that the conditional expression, x, may also fail. If 
the possibility of the conditional statement, c, failing in the 
statement, IF x THEN y ELSE z, is included then the Petri Net becomes 
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0 
The transitions tl and t4 will fire according to the status of 
the conditional statement, c, and transitions t2 and t3 will fire 
according to the logical truth of the conditional expression, x. 
The failure of the conditional statement is called the conditional 
failure and the logical truth of the conditional expression is called 
the temporal switch. 
Figure 3.1.2.1 shows the general form for some Pascal-like 
programming language statements using Petri Net diagrams. 
Petri Nets of complete programs become unmanageable and need 
simplification. One method for simplifying the representation of 
failure events is to use a Risk Analysis technique called Event Tree 
Analysis. 
For a graphical representation of an abstract model of 
information flow to be useful in identifying risks the probabilities 
of failure for components of the model need to be added. The 
addition of such probability data to a Petri Net will detract from 
its function of representing the logical sequence. 
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Figure 3.1.2.1 Program Statements using Petri 
Nets 
a) assignment' 
i 
O 
Pf Po 
b) IF.. THEN.. ELSE.. 
D 
c) WHILE x DO y 
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3.1.3 Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is less common than FTA but is 
becoming more commonly used in Industry, [2] and [3]. 
Hardware ETA attempts to identify those events which may cause a 
sequence of events leading to a dangerous condition and can be 
considered as an approach to the task of identifying risks from the 
lowest event towards the 'top event'. FTA starts with the 'top 
event' and traces back to the lowest event in the sequence examining 
the causes of events. ETA examines the consequences of possible 
failures. The use of 'event trees' provides a graphical method of 
presenting the results of the analysis. 
To construct an event tree of failures, each probable failure is 
considered from the start of the process being analysed to the 
finish. The first stage of the ETA construction is to consider the 
outcome of each component failure and to represent the outcome as a 
decision branch. For each outcome of the first stage consideration 
is given to the outcome of each subsequent component failing. The 
analysis of each subsequent stage is then added to the decision 
branch of the preceeding outcome. The analysis continues until each 
component in the process has been considered, its outcomes determined 
and added to the evolving tree structure. Probabilities of failure 
can then be attached to each outcome of the complete event tree. It 
is possible to determine the probability of success/failure at any 
given point in the process. 
Figure 3.1.3.1 shows an event tree drawn for a parallel pump 
system employing two water pumps. The failure probabilities are 
included on the drawing as an example of the calculations. 
The application of ETA to software is given the name Software 
Event Tree Analysis (SETA). 
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Figure 3.1.3.1 ETA Analysis of a Pumping System 
Pump A 
Pump A fails 
Pump B fails Outcomes 
Pump A working 
System works 
P(1 - a) P(1-a) 
Pump B working 
System working 
P(a) . P(1-b) 
Pump A fail 
P(a) Pump B fail 
System fails 
P(b) P(a) . P(b) 
Each programming statement in a high-level language is executed 
according to a set of rules governing the logic of the statement, for 
instance the statement IF x THEN y ELSE z will execute y or z 
according to the logical condition of x. Further, the sequence in 
which the statements are executed is determined according to the 
logical relationship of one statement to another. 
By convention the failure branch in an ETA diagram is drawn to 
the left and the success branch is drawn to the right. From a 
single entry to a complete program there are only two possible exits: 
success and failure. So for each statement within the program there 
are also two exits from a single entry. Within the statement the 
branching strategy continues to a lower level of detail but the 
respective exits are connected to maintain the higher strategy of the 
statement. The respective exits from the statements are connected 
in order to maintain the strategy of the complete program. Pascal- 
like programming statements represented in SETA format are shown in 
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Figure 3.1.3.2. 
Figure 3.1.3.2 Program Statements using SETA 
a) assignment 
success branch 
failure 
point 
statement 
on entry 
failure branch 
where the symbol '*' denotes a terminal failure which would 
cause an irrecoverable failure to exist. The failure branch can 
occur on other statements but has been labelled only on this one. 
b) IF.. THEN.. ELSE.. 
THEN part 
Temporal ELSE part 
switch 
* 
N. B. The temporal switch, , permits the flow to take 
whichever path is relevant according to the conditional 
expression assuming that it has not failed. Since it is 
the data flow that is the concern and not the control flow 
the format collapses to 
THEN part 
ELSE part 
where the reduced statement, IF.. THEN.., is used the diagram 
becomes 
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THEN part 
since the else-part is implied as being the following statement. 
c) WHILE x DO y 
y-Statement part 
* 
Conditional part 
x 
removal of the temporal switch causes the format to collapse to 
y-Statement part 
Conditional part 
d) REPEAT x UNTIL y 
Conditional part 
x-Statement part 
* 
* 
* 
removal of the temporal switch causes the format to collapse to 
Conditional part 
x-Statement part 
e) FOR x TO x DO y 
i 
y-Statement type 
Conditional xi part 
Conditional x part 
* 
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f) CASE x OF yl .. yn 
yl-Statement type 
yn-Statement type 
Conditional x part 
* 
It is possible to apply SETA to program design languages in the 
same way that Leveson and Harvey have applied SFTA to design 
languages but the maximum benefit is to be gained by applying SETA to 
the source code, assuming that the compiler and other software 
development tools are dependable. This is the lowest level of 
abstraction needed for a meaningful representation of the program. 
SETA, like ETA, has the probabilities added to the diagrammatic 
representation and will be demonstrated by means of an example. 
To show how SETA can be applied to a simple program consider the 
program below taken from Jensen and Wirth, [7]. 
PROGRAM fcount(input, output); 
VAR ch: CHAR; 
count: ARRAY['a'.. 'z'] of INTEGER; 
letter: SET OF 'a'.. 'z'; 
BEGIN 
letter ['a'.. 'z']; 
FOR ch :: 'a' TO 'z' DO 
count[ch] :=0.; 
WHILE NOT eof DO 
BEGIN 
WHILE NOT eoln DO 
BEGIN 
read(ch); 
write(ch); 
IF ch IN letter 
THEN count[ch] :: count[ch] +1 
END; 
writeln; 
readln; 
END 
END. 
The declaration part of the program adds little to the 
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information flow of the program and is not included in the analysis. 
In the example that follows the omission of the declaration part 
presents the first line of the analysis as being an assignment 
statement. 
The next statement is FOR ch := 'a' TO 'z' DO whose SETA, 
statement format is added to the success branch of the preceeding 
assignment statement. 
The analysis continues until the tree includes all the 
statements in the program. The structure is shown in Figure 3.1.3.3 
with the tree orientated through 90 degrees. The success branch has 
been aligned vertically to prevent the tree tending towards the 
right. 
Three significant items of information can now be deduced from 
this tree; those statements whose failure will cause a terminal 
failure, the probability of successful execution and the probability 
of particular terminal failures. To be able to extract information 
from the event tree the probability of successful and unsuccessful 
execution of each statement needs to be added to the tree as in 
Figure 3.1.3.4. To avoid presenting too much information at the 
expense of clarity the programming statement has been substituted by 
a probability of successful execution. 
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Figure 3.1.3.3 SETA of the Example Program 
entry 
letter := ['a'.. 'z'] 
failure branch success branch 
FOR ch :: 'a' 
TO ch :: 'z' 
count[ch] :=0 
WHILE NOT eof 
NOT eoln 
read(ch) 
write(ch) 
IF ch IN letter 
count[ch] := count[chl +t 
writeln 
* 
* 
readln 
II successful exits 
eeee 
4321 
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Figure 3.1.3.4 SETA of the Example Program with Probabilities 
Assigned 
entry 
Pr(a) 
1- Pr(a) 
x 
1- Pr(b) Pr(b) 
x 
1- Pr(c) Pr(c) 
x 
1- Pr(d) 
771 Pr(d) 
x 
Pr(e) 
Pr(f) 
1- Pr(g) Pr(g) 
x 
1- Pr(h) Pr(h) 
Pr(i) 
t- Pr(j) Pr(j) 
1- Pr(k) Pr(k) 
t 
1- Pr(1) Pr(1) 
successful exits 
eeee 
4321 
Each possible successful exit, ei, has an individual probability. 
Assuming s-independent events, the exit probabilities are 
Pr(el) = Pr(a). Pr(b). Pr(c). Pr(d). Pr(e). Pr(f). Pr(g) 
. Pr(h). Pr(i). Pr(j). Pr(k). Pr(l) 
Pr(e2) = Pr(a). Pr(b). Pr(c). Pr(d). Pr(e). Pr(f). Pr(g) 
. Pr(h). (1 - Pr(i)). Pr(k). Pr(l) 
Pr(e3) = Pr(a). Pr(b). Pr(c). Pr(d). Pr(e). (1 - Pr(f)). Pr(k). Pr(1) 
Pr(e6) = Pr(a). Pr(b). Pr(c). Pr(d). (1 - Pr(e)). Pr(k). Pr(l) 
There are four possible successful exits. The probability of a 
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successful exit from the program is the sum of individual 
probabilities and given as 
Pr(S) = Pr(el) + Pr(e2) + Pr(e3) + Pr(e4) 
The probability of an unsuccessful exit is given as 
Pr(F) =t- Pr(S) 
=1-[ Pr(el) + Pr(e2) + Pr(e3) + Pr(e4) ] 
As the number of statements increases so the probability of a 
successful exit is reduced. There are two issues to be considered; 
1) the probability of failure of a statement is related to 
the syntactic and semantic complexity of that statement. 
The resulting probability of failure of the function 
being performed by that program statement is influenced 
by the programmers choice of statement. Therefore 
consideration has to be given to the trade-off between 
the number of statements and the probability of failure 
for particular statement types. 
2) in Chapter 3.4 it was postulated that the 
probability of failure of a module is related to 
its length and that from a safety point of view 
a larger number of small modules is preferable 
to a small number of large modules. So a 
reduction in the length of a module will also 
influence the probability outcome. 
3.1.4 Discussion 
Leveson and Harvey, [8], observed that SFTA can be combined with 
FTA to provide a comprehensive analysis of a total system including 
hardware and software. The application of ETA to the hardware 
associated with a computer system can continue to a point where the 
software element needs to be considered. To consider the software, 
SETA can be used to provide a comprehensive analysis. 
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As an example of how ETA proceeds to the point where SETA can be 
used consider the case where plant sensors are used to pass data to a 
computer on the functioning of a critical plant area so that optimal 
control of the plant can be maintained. Using ETA the sensors, the 
instrumentation, the Analogue-Digital Converter and the computer 
input-output mechanisms are considered. However, once the analysis 
has reached the point where data is requested by the software making 
a request to the operating system, device driver or control software 
then SETA can be used. SETA can be used to assess the software in 
the context of programs or programming statements. 
A complete ETA/SETA analysis is then possible to identify 
particular items of concern and to seek to reduce the probability of 
a failure. Assuming an item of concern can be described in terms 
suitable for analysis using SETA and that the risk is assessed to be 
such that further detailed analysis is necessary, then additional 
SFTA can be undertaken. 
Summarising. the approach is to identify potential failures 
using ETA/SETA and then to further examine the concerns using SFTA. 
The application of existing Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to 
software (SETA) is possible and provides useful information to the 
analyst on failure probabilities. By careful identification of the 
issues raised with SETA further analysis can be undertaken using what 
Leveson and Harvey have called Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) in 
order to isolate the concerns. Once these concerns have been 
isolated then suitable remedial action can be taken to eradicate 
them. 
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3.2 The Use of State Transition Diagrams 
The internal state of a process can be modelled in the abstract 
at any moment using graph theoretic methods such as the State 
Transition Diagram which is a special case of the Finite State 
Machine. The State Transition Diagram is commonly used by engineers 
to assess the behaviour of a system, whether that system is an 
industrial process or the internal function of a computer. 
A Finite State Machine consists of a finite set of input symbols 
A, a finite set of internal states S, a finite set of output symbols 
Z. a next-state function f and an output function g. The machine M 
is denoted by M= {A, S, Z, f, g}. Additionally an initial state qO may 
be included, when the machine M will be denoted by M= {A, S, Z, gO, f, g}. 
An example Finite State Machine could be one with three input 
symbols, three internal states and three output symbols as 
A= {a, b, c} 
S= {gO, ql, q2} 
Z= {x, Y, z} 
the next-state function f could be defined as 
f(gO, a) = q1 f(ql, a) = q2 f(g2, a) = qO 
f(g0. b) = q2 f(gl, b) = qt f(g2, b) = q1 
f(qO, c) = qO f(ql, c) = q0 f(g2, c) = q2 
the output function g could be defined as 
g(qO, a) =x g(ql, a) =x g(q2, a) =z 
g(gO, b) =y g(ql, b) =z g(g2. b) =y 
g(gO. c) =z g(ql, c) =Y g(q2, c) =x 
A state diagram is one way of representing the machine M. A 
state diagram is a labelled directed graph with the vertices being 
the states S of M such that an arc can be drawn between state qO and 
q1 and labelled with the pair a, x representing the next-state 
function f(gO, a) = q1 and the output function g(qO, a) = x. 
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Figure 3.2.0.1 The State Diagram for the Example Machine M. 
z 
Another way of representing machine M is to use a state table 
which tabulates the next-state and output for each combination of 
current state and input. A state table for machine M would be 
Current Input Input Input 
State abc 
qO ql, x q2. y qO, z 
q1 q2, x ql, z qO, y 
q2 qO. z ql, y ql, x 
A State Transition Diagram consists of a set of states S. a set 
of events E and a transition function, t. 
The state transitions for Finite State Machine M can be 
represented as 
S= {gO. q11q2} 
E= {x. Y, z} 
and the transition functions are 
t(gO, x) = ql t(ql, x) = q2 t(q2, x) = q2 
t(qO, y) = q2 t(gl, y) = qO t(g2. Y) = ql 
t(gO, z) = qO t(gl, z) = ql t(q2, z) = qO 
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the State Transition Diagram would be that shown in Figure 3.2.0.2. 
Figure 3.2.0.2 State Transition Diagram for the Example Machine 
Industrial control systems can be modelled using both Finite 
State Machines (FSM) and State Transition Diagrams (STD) but the use 
of STD is more common. . 
As an example of the use of STD, take a simple control system 
consisting of a fluid pump, P. under the control of a fluid level 
float, F. whose aim it is to maintain the level of a liquid within a 
certain vessel by turning the pump 'on' to lower the level of the 
liquid when the level is indicated as 'high' by the float. Assuming 
that the liquid flow into the vessel is constant and not under the 
control of the system being modelled, the process scheme is shown in 
Figure 3.2.0.3. 
Figure 3.2.0.3. Example Process 
The objective of the control system is to ensure that none of 
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the liquid flows over the top of the vessel. If any liquid flows 
over the top of the vessel the condition is considered to be a 
catastrophic event. 
To keep the model simple it is assumed that both the float F and 
the pump P work correctly even though there is a probability that the 
control signals may not. It is also assumed that no such failure of 
control signals exist. 
The pump P is switched on when the float F is indicating 'high' 
and the pump is switched off when the float indicates 'low'. 
The set of states S are 
S= {gO, ql, q2, q3} 
where qO = level low, pump off 
q1 = level low, pump on 
q2 = level high, pump off 
q3 = level high, pump on 
the set of events E are 
E= {a, b, c, d} 
where a= Float high 
b= Float low 
c as Pump on 
d= Pump off 
and the transitions functions t are 
t(g0, a) = q2 t(gl, a) = q3 t(g2, b) = qO t(q3, b) = qt 
t(qO, c) = q1 t(gl, d) = qO t(g2, c) = q3 t(g3, d) = q2 
The state transition diagram for the control system is shown in 
Figure 3.2.0.4. With the transition T being T= {S, E, t} and the 
initial state qO being included to give T= {S, E, gO, t}. 
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Figure 3.2.0.4 State Transition Diagram for the Example 
Control System 
4 
The transition functions can also be represented by a table 
called a transition table. Such a transition table for the control 
system being considered is 
State Float Pump 
qO low (0) off (0) 
q1 low (0) on (1) 
q2 high (1) off (0) 
q3 high (1) on (1) 
State Transition Diagrams are deterministic and exhaustive. To 
demonstrate the exhaustive nature of STDs consider the control system 
to have been extended to ignore transient inputs from the float by 
requiring the float to indicate high for two successive observations 
before switching the pump on. The control algorithm is expressed as 
Po = (Fs A Fi A NOT Poi) v (Fs v Fi) v Poi 
where Po is the pump output value according to the logic 
Poi is the initial or currently stores value for the pump 
output. 
Fs is the stored value for the float 
Fi is the input value for the float 
assuming no errors experienced the transition table becomes 
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Poi fs fi Po 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 
In this thesis the concern is the identification of catastrophic 
failures/conditions and such a condition could arise in the control 
system if the level was high and the pump failed to operate causing 
the liquid to overflow. From the transition diagram and the 
transition table a catastrophic failure condition can be seen not to 
occur when all the equipment functions correctly. 
So far the concern has been with representing the state 
transitions when all the equipment is working correctly and with no 
errors. When the control system has the same control algorithm but 
uses an industrial controller incorporating software to implement 
that algorithm then a catastrophic failure/condition can arise due to 
the failure of components of the controller, even though the electro- 
mechanical equipment may work correctly. 
The transition tables for the control system using software 
considers three error types: stuck at 0, stuck at 1 and inversion. 
The conditions underlined are those which are considered to satisfy 
the criteria of a catastrophic failure/condition; fluid flowing into 
the vessel, float fluid level high and pump not on. 
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1) Error caused by Po being inverted when stored in Ps 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Psi fit fs2 Pot Pst fi3 fs3 Po3 Ps3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
2) Error caused by Ps being stuck at 1 (on) 
Poi fsi fit fs1 Pol Psi fit fs2 Pot Pst fi3 fs3 Po3 Ps3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3) Error caused by Ps being stuck at 0 (off) 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Psi fi2 fs2 Pot Pst fi3 fs3 P03 P53 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
o 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
o 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
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4) Error caused by Po being inverted on output, Ps is true value of Po 
Poi fsi fit fs1 Pol Psi fit fs2 Pot Ps2 fi3 fs3 Poi Psi 
0 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 10 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 10 1 1 1 0 1 1 
_Q_ 
1 
0 1 1 1 01 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 01 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 01 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 01 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 01 1 1 
_IL_ 
1 1 1 Q_ 1 
1 1 1 1 01 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 1 1 1 01 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
5) Error caused by Po being stuck at 1 (on) 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Pst fi2 fs2 Po2 Pst fi3 fs3 Po3 Psi 
0 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 
,1 
1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6) Error caused by Po being stuck at 0 toff) 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Psi fit fs2 Po2 Pst fi3 fs3 Po3 Ps3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 o t t o o t t _Q_ o 0 0 1 t o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o o t 1 0 o t 1 
_Q_ 
0 1 1 L, 0 
o 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 t 1 g 0 
o 1 1 t o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 1 1 1 
_ .Q 
0 1 1 0 1 1 
_, 
Q_ 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 t 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 t Q 0 
1 1 t 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
_Q_ 
0 1 1 
_ 
Q. 
_ 
0 1 1 
_Q, _ 
o 
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7) Error caused by Fi being inverted when stored in Fs 
Poi fsi fit fs1 
0001 
0001 
0010 
0010 
0101 
0101 
0110 
0110 
1001 
1001 
1010 
1010 
1101 
1101 
1110 
1110 
8) Error caused by 
Poi fsi fit fsl 
0001 
0001 
0011 
0011 
0101 
0101 
0111 
0111 
1001 
1001 
1011 
1011 
1101 
1101 
1111 
1111 
Pot 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Fs b 
Pol 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Psi fi2 fs2 
001 
010 
001 
010 
001 
010 
101 
110 
001 
010 
101 
110 
101 
110 
101 
110 
eing stuck at 1 
Pst fit fs2 
001 
011 
001 
011 
001 
011 
001 
011 
001 
011 
101 
111 
001 
011 
101 
111 
Pot Ps2 
00 
11 
00 
00 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
00 
11 
(high) 
Pot Ps2 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
fi3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
fi3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
fs3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
fs3 
1 
Poi Ps3 
00 
11 
00 
00 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
00 
11 
Poi Psi 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
00 
11 
11 
11 
9) Error caused by Fs being stuck at 0 (low) 
Poi fsi fit fst Pol Pst fit fs2 P02 Pst fi3 fs3 P03 Ps3 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 o _Q, _ o o 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o o 1 a o o 1 o _Q o 1 o o o 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 1 o 0 0 0 1 o 0 0 1 o ý_ o 
o 1 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 1 1 0 ý_ o o _ Q- o t o o 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 o 0 0 0 0 1 o 0 0 1 o 0 0 
1 o 1 o > > o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 o 1 o > > > o 1 1 1 o 1 1 
> > o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 o t o 0 o t o o 
> > > o t 1 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 t 1 o t t 1 0 1 t 
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10) Error caused by Fi being inverted on input 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Pst fi2 fs2 Pot Ps2 fi3 fs3 Po3 Ps3 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
o 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _Q_ 0 0 0 0 0 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
o 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
o 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
o 1 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
_Q_ 
0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0_ 0 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
_, 
0 0 0 0 
_, 
0 0 
11) Error caused by Fi being stuck at 1 (high) 
Poi fsi fit fsl Pol Pst fit fs2 Po2 Pst fi3 fs3 P03 Ps3 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12) Error caused by Fi being stuck at 0 (low) 
Poi fsi fit fs1 Pol Pst fi2 fs2 Po2 Pst fi3 fs3 Poi Psi 
0 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 00 000 0 0 0 0 
N. B. All occas ions are potential catastrophes. 
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The example process modelled for the discussion has been a 
trivial control system and yet many error conditions have been 
identified. If the control system was more complex with many more 
parameters to consider then the dimensions of the state diagram would 
become unmanageable. The number of instances where an error can 
exist and create a catastrophic failure/condition becomes 
proportionately greater as the number of parameters increases making 
the use of state transition diagrams difficult to use for isolating 
potential hazards. 
In many industrial control systems the number of states would be 
so great that exhaustive checking of all conditions would not be 
practicable. 
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3.3 Categorisation of Dangers 
Examination of the risk arising from the use of software in an 
industrial process control system requires the dangers to be 
categorised. An argument for three categories of danger called 
minor, Major and Serious is presented. 
3.3.1 The Software Control Element 
The flow of information through a control system is dependent on 
the control strategy adopted for that industrial process. A general 
structure for various routes that the information can take through 
the software element of the control system, depending on whether it 
is a fully automatic control system, a system with manual 
intervention or a simple data logger is shown in Figure 3.3.1.1. 
Each route through the software has its own unique function and 
potential for error. Each of the points at which an error can occur 
are called 'error points' and assigned a number. 
Figure 3.3.1.1 Software Control Element 
Process 
input output 
"`-r 
", r 
State 
Memory 
.-'- 
Output Input 
Operator 
software 
The Health & Safety Executive, [6) p. 3, has suggested that there 
are three typical modes of operation: 
'Mode 1 
The computer receives signals from the plant or machine to 
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which it is linked and then processes this information and 
transmits or displays it. The computer does not send 
control signals to the plant or machine. The operator 
controls the plant without recourse to the computer except 
for information, and thus retains the power of both, 
decision and control. 
Mode 2 
The computer acts as a link between the person, who is 
monitoring the process, and the control elements (e. g. 
valves or contactors). This role may involve the feedback 
of signals from the plant or machine to the computer but 
the computer's scope for plant alteration is limited 
essentially to carrying out the instructions of the person 
in control of the process. In this mode, therefore. the 
decision is made by the person but control is exercised by 
the computer. 
Mode 3 
The computer, without human intervention. makes significant 
changes to, or puts significant restrictions on, the plant 
or machine operating conditions in accordance with its 
program. The computer therefore retains the power of both 
decision and control". 
Because of the reduction in the cost of automation and the 
economic pressure for more industrial efficiency there is a tendency 
to make greater use of industrial controllers operating in Mode 3. 
Principally, there are two ways that an Industrial Controller 
can reduce the safety of the process it controls or create a 
dangerous condition; by abnormal operation of the program or by 
aberrant behaviour of the controller. In all modes there will be 
occasions when the Industrial Controller can exhibit aberrant 
90 
behaviour and produce dangerous situations. 
3.3.2 Potential for Errors 
Mode 1 operation, data logging, would cause process inputs to 
enter the software and pass via the state memory to the Operator 
output port which may have a computer monitor attached for use by the 
Operator. There will be no response from the Operator entered to 
the software, in response to the output. 
Mode 2 operation would be as Mode 1 but in addition the Operator 
responses would be input to the software and pass to the process 
outputs via the state memory. The Operator responses would be 
reflected back to the Operator via the operator output port and the 
computer monitor. 
Mode 3 operation would be as Mode 1 but instead of the response 
coming from the Operator, as in Mode 2, the input will be routed to 
some decision making procedure which will effect the response through 
the process outputs. Knowledge of the response may only be 
available to the Operator by observing the process status displayed 
on a computer monitor. 
From Figure 3.3.1.1 eight points of potential error can be 
identified, called 'Error Points'. These error points are shown in 
Figure 3.3.2.1. 
Figure 3.3.2.1 Error Points 
16 
8 
25 
7 
34 
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Where single extreme errors can occur and their effect will now 
be examined. It is assumed that extreme errors are those where the 
information contained in the data is completely wrong in a permanent 
way and not transient, which have special characteristics. 
Error point 1 would cause the information on the process state 
to be corrupted. The corruption of data on input would cause 
erroneous information to be presented to the Operator and to the 
decision module. Information available to the Operator and any 
decision module would not represent the true process state. 
At error point 2, an error in the input data which was correct 
on entering the software, would be corrupted. The effect of the 
error would be to cause the Operator to be misinformed on the process 
state. Any subsequent action by the Operator would be correctly 
conveyed to the process. Since the process state is incorrectly 
displayed the Operator would have some indication that an error had 
occurred from the observable plant status. 
At error point 3, the introduction of an error would cause the 
process state information and the Operat 
incorrectly displayed to the Operator. 
alerted to the error by noting the error 
and also by monitoring the process state 
observed. 
If an error occurred at error point 
or input commands to be 
The Operator would be 
shown in his input commands 
displayed compared with that 
4 the Operator input 
commands would be corrupted causing the wrong actions to be conveyed 
to the process and the commands displayed to the Operator would also 
be corrupted. The Operator would only become aware of an error by 
monitoring the response of the process state and monitoring his 
reflected commands. In a slow industrial process the risk would be 
limited by the Operators actions. In a fast industrial process the 
risk would be greater. 
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At error point 5, the existence of an error would cause commands 
from the Operator to be incorrectly interpreted by the control 
software and as a consequence convey the wrong actions to the 
process. Error point 5 has a greater risk than that of error points 
2&7. In a process which is not time-critical the error would not 
cause an increase in the risk since the process state would still be 
displayed correctly. But the error is more dangerous in a time- 
critical process. Also the Operator is able to compare his commands 
with the resulting process reaction, which corresponds to an 
unexpected plant state being corrected by the feedback control 
mechanism. 
A potentially great risk exists when an error occurs at error 
point 6; the Operator input commands or the decision module commands 
are corrupted on output. In either case the wrong actions are 
conveyed to the process. The result may be a situation with a high 
risk, without the Operator being aware of the danger. 
Error point 7 has the potential to incorrectly display the 
commands of the Operator but the error will be identified as an error 
by the Operator noting the disturbance. 
Error point 8 has a potentially great risk when the control 
strategy permits control actions to be taken directly by the 
software. The actions may also be monitored by the Operator, if 
there is one. An error at error point 8 in the software would cause 
the decision module to issue wrong commands which, though founded on 
correct process inputs, would then pass to the process undetected. 
3.3.3 Categories of Danger 
From the discussion above the effects of errors existing at 
various points in the software have been proposed. Whilst all 
errors have some effect there are some which present a much greater 
risk than others. Therefore, some weighting needs tobe applied to 
93 
isolate the error and to place it in the appropriate category. The 
weighting used here is a subjective assessment of the degree of 
danger resulting from the occurrence of that error. 
Three categories of danger resulting from errors in software 
used in control applications have been distinguished as; 
minor - errors which are undesirable and inconsistent with the 
specification but do not cause a hazardous condition to 
exist. For instance, mis-spelled warning messages and 
file corruption. 
Major - errors which cause a hazardous condition to exist but 
which allow correction by an Operator. For example, 
failure to check correct outputs by re-input, output 
action differing from that commanded and reported, 
corruption of command with resulting incorrect action 
(input or output). The effects of errors in this 
category are observable by the Operators. 
Serious - errors which cause a high level of risk to exist; 
erroneous output on a fast or time-critical process, 
overriding of protection mechanisms like watch-dogs, 
uninformed bridging of safety checks, corrupted limit 
checks, wrong logical deduction from inputs resulting 
in a wrong output. 
The category of minor is placed on a set of errors which, though 
undesirable and inconsistent with the specification, do not cause a 
hazard to materialise. As an example, consider an error in a module 
whose function is to log data. An error in the module might cause 
the correct output message `alarm 99" to be displayed incorrectly as 
"alm 99", where the number indicates an alarm number and not a 
sequence number. Such an error might cause the Operator to suspect 
a fault in the software but would not prevent him from understanding 
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the message. The ability to understand the corrupted word in a 
message is due to the message having in-built redundancy allowing the 
message 'alm' to be recognizable as 'alarm'. Message Redundancy is 
also known as the 'richness' of the language. The context of the 
message is contained in a descriptor which contains information. 
However, if the corruption had been that the alarm point "99" was 
corrupted to "9" then it is possible that the Operator would not 
recognise the correct message from this limited information. 
Alternatively, had the Operator input the command "Open valve 6" 
which was corrupted to "Open valve 4" by the command input module 
then the error would no longer be in the minor category since the 
intended message cannot be determined. If the corruption was such 
that the erroneous command was displayed as "Open valve 4" and also 
effected the action on valve 6, then the Operator would be aware of 
the error and react accordingly. There is little redundancy in the 
message since the valve has been identified by a single character and 
not a descriptor containing more information. Therefore the message 
is considered to be unsafe. Errors of this type have been put in 
the set of errors called the Major category of errors and refers to a 
set of errors that cause a hazard to exist but which are not too 
great for the Operator to correct. 
Taking the above example of the Operator inputting the command 
"Open valve 6", if an error occurs in the process output module and 
corrupts the command to "Open valve 4" then the error is in the set 
of errors called the Serious category of errors. The error is in 
the Serious category of error because the command will have been 
correctly displayed to the Operator, who now expects an action, but 
the output to the process is not as commanded; the Operator may be 
unaware of the potentially dangerous situation for some time, by 
which time a disaster may have occurred. The Serious category of 
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error refers to a group of errors which present a, high level of risk. 
Only single permanent failures have been considered so far but 
it is possible for there to be combinations of permanent errors and 
transient errors. Both types of error have severe implications to 
the safe working of the system. 
Combinations of errors are many and varied. The consequence of 
combinations of errors is that individual single permanent errors may 
be masked by the accompanying permanent error and create a confused 
view of the problem. The category of danger for a combination of 
errors is the category of the higher single permanent error included 
in the combination. For example, a combination of a permanent minor 
error and a permanent Major error is considered to be a Major error. 
Transient errors, however, present an error condition which may 
be short lived and infrequent. The consequence of which may be that 
an unsafe condition applies for the duration of the error and it is 
improbable that the error will be isolated immediately. The full 
effect of a transient error cannot be appreciated until the transient 
error is identified and safety requires that maximum caution should 
be exercised where uncertainty exists. A transient error is placed 
in the category of Serious until such time as the error is isolated. 
Due to transient errors being in the Serious category a combination 
made of permanent and transient errors is considered to be in the 
Serious category. 
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3.4 The Structuring of Software Modules for Safety 
Software modules are discrete units of computer programming 
collectively providing a sphere of"influence within a system. The 
software modules can be structured, or configured, in many different 
ways to achieve the same sphere of influence. The term "sphere of 
influence" refers to the extent to which the actions of a specific 
module are influential within a system and is not limited to first- 
order effects. The structuring of the system affects the amount of 
confidence the designer is justified in vesting in the system. 
Using robust programming techniques, such as N-Version Programming 
and Recovery Blocks, influences the safe execution of a program. 
Some of the structural options available to software designers 
are considered in this Chapter and it is postulated that the use of a 
structuring technique called 'Safety Modules' improves the safe 
operation of control modules without an increase in either the run- 
time resources or the complication of the system. 
3.4.1 N-Version Programming 
Hardware fault tolerant systems commonly use a strategy called 
N-Modular Redundancy (NMR), involving an odd number, say three or 
five, redundant versions of the same hardware with a voting system. 
N-Version Programming is a software implementation of the NMR 
strategy for hardware and was first proposed by Chen and Avizienis, 
[5]. 
In N-Version Programming a number of similar programs. N, are 
written to perform identical functions using different programming 
techniques to perform the same function or using different source 
languages. To add diversity the programs may be written by 
different teams of programmers, even in different locations. 
In N-Version programming structuring of the system is such that 
the N-versions of the program are usually placed under the control of 
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a driver program within the run-time environment. The driver 
program invokes each version of the program, awaits completion of the 
respective execution, compares the results and takes action 
accordingly. 
The driver program synchronises the execution of the versions 
and maintains a record of those versions which take longer time to 
execute. Once the versions have all reached completion and have 
been synchronised then a voting mechanism compares the respective 
results. If it is not possible for all the versions to return the 
same result then 'inexact voting' is used when small discrepancies in 
the results are tolerated. In industrial systems the accumulation 
of such discrepancies, accumulated over a period of operation, cannot 
be disregarded as the error may become too severe to permit safe 
operation. Therefore N-Version Programming cannot be recommended in 
safety-related systems. 
3.4.2 Software Fault Tolerance 
Errors in the program itself can demonstrate the characteristic 
of having 'failed' in many ways; suspect inputs, inadequate inter- 
program communication, hardware malfunctions or loss of 
synchronisation with other programs with which it corresponds. For 
a system to continue operation whilst overcoming these 'faults' a 
technique known as fault tolerance is required. 
One fault-tolerant technique is Recovery Blocks, [1] and [11]. 
Recovery block design makes use of one or more redundant programs in 
addition to the original program. The original program is called a 
'primary block' and is tested for failure by an 'acceptance block'. 
On detecting a failure the acceptance block will cause one or more of 
the redundant blocks, called 'alternate blocks', to be executed until 
either all 'alternate blocks' have failed or one has functioned 
correctly. 
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The recovery block strategy is 
1) the primary block is executed 
2) the acceptance block tests 'for a satisfactory result 
3) if the result is acceptable then the next primary block in 
the sequence is executed. If the result is not acceptable 
then the system is said to 'recover' to a point where the 
system state is restored to that existing before the failed 
primary block was executed and one of the alternate blocks is 
executed, 
4) the execution of alternate blocks is repeated until an 
acceptable result is achieved, 
5) if an acceptable result cannot be achieved then the system is 
said to have failed. 
To implement the recovery block strategy requires two special 
procedures; 
RECOVER - which keeps account of whether it is the primary 
block or one of the alternate blocks being executed 
and maintains a copy of the state of the system 
prior to the block being entered, 
ACCEPTANCE - performs the acceptance test and causes a system 
recovery if a failure is detected. The procedure 
also has a record of whether it is the primary 
block or an alternate block being executed. 
In a multi-processing environment where shared data is used to 
pass data between programs it is possible for there to be an overlap 
when two or more competing blocks are recovering. Randell, [11], 
called this situation the 'domino effect and observed that whilst 
only one block may have failed the failure of more blocks may be 
indicated thus causing a system shut-down. To limit the domino 
effect additional facilities need to be provided, [t], which further 
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increases the amount of resources committed to the strategy. 
Whilst the Recovery Block strategy is simple in its concept the 
implementation is more involved. It does allow alternate control 
strategies to be attempted on detection of a failure. The major 
disadvantages in using the recovery block strategy for industrial 
control systems are; 
- the difficulty of restoring the system to a known state 
without causing a 'domino effect' where alternate blocks force 
other blocks to restore 
- the time taken to restore the system to a known state may mean 
that the restored system state no longer reflects the current 
plant state 
- considerable resources are required to implement multiple 
copies of the primary block 
- if the system is safety-related then the personnel maintaining 
the system operationally need to be made especially aware of 
the nuances of such a strategy. 
These difficulties could create a situation where the system actively 
seeks to restore itself without maintaining a safe plant status. 
3.4.3 Safety Modules 
If, due to the increased probability of an undetected error 
being present, it is assumed that the probability of failure of a 
program module is related to the number of characters forming the 
program then the probability of failure of a system is similarly 
related to the structure existing between the modules. In the case 
where the module effects control over some critical item of plant it 
is desirable to maintain a low failure probability which suggests 
that the module lengths need to be correspondingly short. 
There are two ways of reducing the length of a module; dividing 
the module still further into a number of sub-modules or reducing the 
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length, usually by using advanced programming-techniques. 
A satisfactory division of the roles of the original module is 
normally possible without a consequent increase in the complexity of 
the software other than in the interconnection coupling between 
modules. The outcome of the division of the module is that low 
probabilities of failure can be achieved for individual sub-modules 
and the software retains a simple internal structure which allows the 
sub-modules to be understood. The internal simplicity is important 
to allow changes to the function of the sub-module to be effected 
without disturbance to any safety checks in the module. 
Length reduction using advanced programming techniques has an 
immediate disadvantage in the resulting program becoming so esoteric 
that only the originating programmer is able to fully understand its 
function which in turn means that it is only the originating 
programmer who can safely make changes arising out of testing. 
Such practices are undesirable from many points of view. Most 
significantly, from a safety view, is that the safety checks within 
the program may have been installed by the programmer and these can 
be unintentionally by-passed when changes are made by another 
programmer who is unfamiliar with the program. 
Since modularisation of the software does not substitute 
convenience for safety, the principle of module sub-division is to be 
preferred to length reduction. 
A control module will probably have safety checks built into the 
software. In which case the structure could conceptually be as in 
Figure 3.4.3.1 with the control part of the module intimately co- 
operating with the safety part of the module. 
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Figure 3.4.3.1 Safety and Control Software Integrated 
where S= Safety Part 
C= Control Part 
It is assumed that the probability of failure of a sphere of 
influence, P(F), is related to the length of the modules. The 
relationship between the length of a module and its probability of 
failure may be exponential, linear or differential or any of the 
relationships below; 
Pf 
It is assumed in this thesis that as the length of the module 
increases it is more probable that errors will be introduced and that 
the relationship exhibits an exponential characteristic. 
If the modules are structured as in Figure 3.4.3.1 then the 
failure probability for such a structure is 
P(F) = P(S) + P(C) 
where P(S) and P(C) are the failure probabilities for the Safety Part 
and Control Part, respectively and P(F) is the probability of 
failure. 
If the safety part is seperated from the control part into a 
seperate Safety Module whose primary role is to ensure that the 
Control Module continues to function safely there will be distinct 
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Length of Module 
flows of data between them. The flow of data is considered to be 
between each module and the run-time environment of the computer, 
with channels to each. 
Communication between the safety module and the control module 
may be such that before control of the plant is effected by the 
control module the safety module will check that the action is 
reasonable given the plant status. The safety module may have 
exclusive access to data concerning the operation of the item of 
plant it is concerned with, for example equipment design limits and 
rates of change of plant parameters. Plant data could be stored in 
a read only file. The control module may have access to a limited 
sub-set of plant data in order for it to be able to perform all the 
logical and mathematical functions necessary to maintain control. 
The control can be effected either by the control module or the 
safety module. If the action is taken by the control module as in 
Figure 3.4.3.2 a), b) and c) then there exists a probability that the 
action approved by the safety module will be corrupted in some way 
before being effected. Also a probability exists that corruption of 
the control action may occur if it is effected by the safety module, 
Figure 3.4.3.2 d) and e). though it is probable that the safety 
module will detect the corruption and take the necessary corrective 
action. Therefore the risk of an unsafe control action being 
effected is lower when the action is undertaken by the safety module. 
Figure 3.4.3.2 Configuration of Safety and Control 
Modules 
a) 
IS()C 
EE= Run-time 
Environment 
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b) 
C) 
dI 
e) 
When the two modules are seperated in the way discussed they can 
be structured to operate either sequentially or concurrently. 
The conceptual structure for the Safety and Control modules 
operating sequentially is shown in Figure 3.4.3.3. 
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Figure 3.4.3.3 Safety and Control Modules Operating Sequentially 
where 
S= Safety Module 
C= Control Module 
The operation of the modules involves the two modules functioning in 
a serial manner. It is assumed that the probability of failure is 
related to length such that L(C) and L(S) combined gives L(C) + L(S) 
then the probability of failure is given as 
P(F) = P(C) + P(S) 
Providing the run-time operating system orders the 
synchronisation of tasks, the safety module can also be configured to 
execute concurrently with the control module, Figure 3.4.3.4, and 
maintain a safe operation with respect to the control module through 
the linking mechanism. Since the run-time environment is required 
to schedule both modules the probability of failure of each module 
also needs to include the effect of the run-time environment on the 
outcome. 
Figure 3.4.3.4 Safety and Control Modules Operating in Parallel 
_ 
C] 
If 1 
Each module can fail to execute its role in distinct ways; 
abnormal execution as a result of the other module. non-execution as 
a result of the other module, corrupt data as a result of the other 
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module and the run-time environment, corrupt instruction as a result 
of the other module, failure to communicate as a result of the other 
module and the run-time environment. 
The module can fail as a result of any of these independent 
reasons. The probability of a failure in this configuration is 
P=CP (Lc)+P (Lc)+P (Lc, E)+P (Lc)+P (Lc, E) ] 
FS Sp Sn Scd Sci Sfc 
P=[P (Ls)+P (Ls1. P (Ls, E)+P (Ls)+P (Ls, E) 
FC Cp Cn Ccd Cci Cfc 
where 
P, P= prob. of failure of the Safety/Control Module 
FS FC 
P, P= failure of safety/control module 
Sp Cp 
P, P= non-execution of safety/control module 
Sn Cn 
P, P= corrupt data of safety/control module 
Scd Ccd 
P, P= corrupt instruction of safety/control module 
Sci Cci 
P, P= communication failure of safety/control module 
Sfc Sfc 
Ls = length of safety module in characters 
Lc = length of control module in characters 
E= run-time environment 
The failure of the safety module can be caused by a failure of 
the control module and prejudice safety by allowing unjustified 
freedom of action to the control module. Therefore a mechanism is 
required to maintain the safe operation of the safety module. The 
paradox is not new and was noted almost 2000 years ago in the phrase 
"Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? " 
Juvenal, 'Satires' c60-130 A. D. 
The probability of failure of the safety module can be reduced 
by placing a restriction on the ability of the control modules to 
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corrupt either data or instructions when communicating with the 
safety module. For the safety module to effect the actions 
requested by the control module it is necessary for the control 
information to be made available to the safety module through some 
secure communication mechanism such as parameter passing or sharing 
of data space. If parameter passing is used then there is a 
probability that errors will be induced by the run-time environment, 
which can itself cause data corruption. The option of using shared 
data space is subject to a lower probability of error because of the 
linking procedures used within the compiling system for declaring 
global data references. 
A module whose sole function is to maintain an ultimate safe 
working condition by monitoring the safety modules within a system 
needs to be inviolate and must be allowed to make some judgement on 
the safety modules operational capability. The module would have a 
connection to the run-time environment but not with any other item of 
software. Connection with the run-time environment is exclusively 
for the purpose of checking that the version of the safety module to 
be executed by the run-time environment has not changed in any way 
from that considered to be safe when the module was first made 
operational, or that the execution of the safety module is not 
overdue in time with respect to the previous instance. If changes 
have been made to the safety module which is now considered to be 
'suspect' or it is considered to be overdue the ultimate safety 
module will inform the responsible plant authority of the suspicion 
and effect a predefined safe control operation on that plant area. 
Changes to the safety module can come about by another module 
causing corruption to the safety module or by functional changes to 
the safety module requested by the plant authority. Functional 
changes to safety modules have a probability that the implications to 
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safe working of such changes may not be appreciated by those making 
the changes. 
In most industrial plants it is a proscribed activity for an 
Engineer to override an ultimate safety limit without permission 
being granted on the authority of the Plant Engineer. Such 
authority may take the form of the possession, by Authorised 
Engineers, of the necessary key to physically unlock the safety 
protection system surrounding the limit. The safety limits proposed 
for the safety modules should be regarded in the same way. Access 
permission to the ultimate safety module should be restricted by 
managerial action of, say, the Plant Engineer. Such an ultimate 
safety module is called the Arbitrator Module. 
To maintain the inviolate nature of the Arbitrator Module it 
could be located in a Read Only part of the main memory of the 
computer. The Arbitrator Module could use a strategy of checking 
the unique identity of a safety module in order to monitor the safe 
working of the safety modules. Conceptually the Arbitrator Module 
can be viewed as in Figure 3.4.3.5. 
Figure 3.4.3.5 The Arbitrator Module 
(a) 
Data flow between 
modules 
(b) 
Communication line 
SC between modules 
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Cc) 
Functional 
relationship between 
modules 
where A= Arbitrator Module 
S= Safety Module 
C= Control Module 
E= Run-Time Environment 
3.4.4 A Mechanism for Ensuring the Integrity of Software 
The role of the Arbitrator Module and its relationship with the 
Safety Modules have been discussed on the assumption that the modules 
have not been corrupted as a result of software errors, incorrectly 
installed modifications to the system or deliberate sabotage. If 
the system has been corrupted in some way it cannot be said to be 
complete. The Oxford English Dictionary defines completeness as a 
synonym of integrity. It is in the context of completeness that the 
word integrity is used in this thesis. A mechanism to restrict the 
probability of corruption not being detected is called an Integrity 
Lock. 
When the system is put into operational use it is reasonable for 
the Functional Authority to assume that all the modules are 
considered to be safe. If at this point a unique identity is given 
to each module such that safe operation is only possible when the 
identity is shown to be valid, then a strict regime of managerial 
control can be exercised on the installation of any changes to the 
system. 
To create a unique identity some form of encryption based on the 
run-time code of the module can be used. 'A similar requirement is 
found in data communication systems where a unique code, such as a 
cyclic redundancy check or Hamming code, is generated to assist the 
receiver in determining whether an erroneous message has been 
received. The unique identity may be corrupted by a single error or 
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by multiple errors. Hamming codes have been developed to cater for 
at least one error and so could be the immediate choice for creating 
the unique identity. The creation of the unique identity ought to 
be done under the strictest controls, for instance under the 
authority of a Senior Engineer, to maintain security. The unique 
identity could be generated by a module called the Security Module. 
The Security Module needs to be capable of reading the 
particular control or safety module as an ordered set of characters 
forming a message and generating the identity according to a 
specified algorithm. Having generated the identity the Security 
Module could then place it in an area of storage, called the Key 
Area, which could then be declared to the system as "Read Only". 
The Key Area may contain many identities each mapped to a 
particular module by the module name. The correct functioning of 
the Integrity Lock would require that strict administrative controls 
existed and the location of the Key Area would not be commonly known, 
possibly only to the Plant Engineer since he is ultimately 
responsible for the safe working of equipment. It is a managerial 
decision on who would have the necessary information on how to run 
the Security Module in mode 1, generation mode. 
When a control or safety module is called by the Operating 
System to be executed mode 2 of the Security Module, check mode, 
would read the control module as a message and generate the identity 
for that control module. As a function of the Safety or Arbitrator 
module the current identity would be compared with the stored 
identity. If the identities did not match then alarm conditions 
would be raised. However, when the identities match the Operating 
System would be allowed to execute the module. The procedure 
described is shown in Figure 3.4.4.1. 
The function of the Security Module in mode 1, generation mode, 
110 
is the highest level of integrity, Integrity Level 1. Integrity 
Level 1 is only executed when a satisfactory password has been 
entered. 
When the Security Module is executing in mode 2, checking mode, 
the level of integrity is less than mode 1 but higher than the level 
occupied by the control module, safety module, arbitrator module and 
the operating system which are all at Integrity Level 3. The level 
associated with Security Module mode 2 is the Integrity Level 2. 
By using a technique such as the Integrity Lock there is a 
probability of executing a control module, or a Safety/Arbitrator 
Module, which has previously been categorised as safe. 
Figure 3.4.4.1 Integrity Levels 
Integrity Level 1 
Password 
All Modules Security Module Key Area 
Mode 1 
Integrity Level 2 
Security Module 
Mode 2 
Integrity Level 3 
Module to Operating Safety or 
be executed System Arbitrator 
Modulo 
3.4.5 Discussion 
There exists methods for tolerating faults arising in the 
software. 
The technique known as Recovery Blocks allows the system to 
retrace, or back track, to the last known point where safe 
computation took place and to re-establish a safe working attitude. 
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But back tracking can cause a 'domino effect' where the system 
retraces back so far that meaningful control actions are difficult to 
achieve given that the plant status may have changed significantly 
since the recovery began. Time can be important in maintaining 
effective control of an industrial process and if a recovery system 
cannot roll-back to a satisfactory point in a given time then 
decisive action will have to be taken, possibly by the Operator. 
Recovery Blocks have been used in systems not having a plant 
status responsibility, such as Command and Control Systems, but in 
industrial control systems the speed at which the plant status 
changes may mean that some method is required which will maintain 
plant safety whilst the fault is investigated. Though Recovery 
Blocks may serve to protect the safety of the plant in some part they 
are not sufficient in themselves and require additional features, 
such as the strategy of using Safety Modules. 
The use of Safety Modules is a strategy for seperating the 
software into control modules, which would determine the necessary 
control, and into safety modules which would be dedicated to ensuring 
safe control actions on industrial plant. There would also be an 
ultimate safety module, the Arbitrator Module, monitoring the safety 
modules. Such a strategy permits the plant designer/manager to 
specify or change the safe working limits for the particular plant 
areas without modifying the control module. The strategy also 
prohibits the main body of the system from effecting control outside 
the limits. The strategy is not a fault tolerant technique but it 
does ensure that safe control can be maintained. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Influence of the Development Process 
on the Safety of Software 
Chapter 3 examined the safe operation of the system through the 
interactions of the software and the hardware with the emphasis being 
on the control flow. 
In this Chapter the emphasis will be on the control flow of the 
software. 
It is held in this Chapter that errors in the software affect 
safety and so the Chapter examines the occasions where errors can be 
introduced into the software, why it is not practicable to remove all 
errors from the software and introduces a basis for measuring certain 
features of the software. It is suggested that these measures, 
though not rigorously proved, do give some indication of the scope 
for error in an individual item of software. 
The development and production of 'safe' software systems has 
five distinct stages, each having a quality assessment part; 
requirements specification, system specification, program 
specification, program production and system test and integration. 
Before the software development can begin the originator of the 
development, the Requesting Authority. needs to obtain a concise 
understanding of the requirements. Once the software has been 
implemented and is in operation the Requesting Authority may identify 
what are considered to be short-comings in the produced system which 
may necessitate the requirements specification to be recompiled. 
The requirements specification may have been prepared by a 
collection of people from differing disciplines and functions within 
the organisation, including the end-users. It is, therefore, 
necessary for the requirements specification to be unambiguous to all 
those. people involved in its preparation. The ambiguity of the 
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requirements specification is a research topic using established 
formal mathematical methods to formulate the requirements 
specification but the use of such formal methods presents a paradox; 
to make the statements unambiguous the axiomatic methods used require 
a considerable degree of understanding of mathematical logic which 
may not present a problem to computer scientists but may to the 
Requesting Authority, who may not then understand the requirements 
specification. If written natural language is used for the 
specification then the computer scientist may find the specification 
to be imprecise, whereas the Requesting Authority may claim to 
understand it. At the state of the art there is a risk that 
ambiguity will persist in requirements specifications for industrial- 
based control systems. 
The system specification, which follows from the requirements 
specification, is concerned with the design of the total system 
against the requirements specification. 
Program specifications are concerned with the design of specific 
programs and the interfaces between them to meet the system 
specification. How the software is structured into a system 
influences the extent to which the system will conform to the 
requirements specification, as conjectured in Chapter 3. ' If the 
structuring of the software does not conform to the requirements 
specification then the software may need to be redesigned. To 
ensure that the software is structured in conformity with the 
requirements specification, an iterative process is called for 
involving all those personnel involved in the requirements 
specification and system specification. The process described is 
sometimes called the 'design process'. 
Once the design process has been satisfactorily achieved the 
'program development' can begin. During program development the 
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program is written in accordance with the previously agreed program 
specification. At the end of program development, the program is 
tested in isolation from the other programs forming the system. 
Following program development is a set of procedures called 
'system test and integration' when the individually tested programs 
are tested as a complete system and integrated into a target 
implementation. 
The multi-stage iterative process which describes the 
development process can be viewed as a directed graph, Figure 4.0.1, 
where the nodes represent stages of development, each having an 
associated activity; 
Figure 4.0.1 Software Development Cycle 
1- Requirements Specification 
2- System Specification 
3- Program Specification 
4- Program Production 
5- System Test & Integration 
6- Implementation 
7- Operation 
Nodes 1 to 5 in the directed graph of Figure 4.0.1 have an arc 
from that node and returning to that node to show that progress to 
the next stage (represented by a node) is not permitted until some 
form of quality assessment process has been satisfied for that stage. 
Each normal path between stages, except 7 to 1. has a forward and 
reverse arc indicating that when the quality assessment cannot be 
satisfied at a particular node it is necessary to return to the 
preceeding node and examine the transformation that took place. The 
arc between stage 7 and stage 1 is uni-directional since the logical 
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progression from node 1 is to node 2. 
To account for the occasion when the quality assessment process 
has shown discrepancies from the specification such that a radical 
consideration of the design or structure is required some nodes have 
additional arcs to nodes other than the succeeding or preceeding 
node. As an example, if the Requirements Specification cannot be 
met in the Program Specification it may be necessary to follow the 
arc from node 3 to node 1. 
There is a need in all the stages of the development process to 
analyse errors and to take the appropriate action. Error analysis 
takes three forms; error prevention, error detection and error 
correction. 
Error prevention implies the use of good programming practice; 
the use of the best known methods of software production. for 
example, the selection of meaningful variable and constant names, 
structured programming and other methods of programming. 
Finding and removing the cause of errors is an intensive and 
prolonged activity. Though it is important to correct an error it 
is equally as important to ensure that the knowledge of the error. 
its original cause and the correction is recorded in the guide to 
good programming practice being used by the programmer, possibly by 
some recording mechanism. Error detection and error correction will 
be carried out by the programmer in the most efficient way as part of 
his function. 
The work in this Chapter on the determination of errors had the 
following concepts in mind 
1 that the software compiles satisfactorily 
2 that the Programmer has completed the test-set provided for 
the purpose and is satisfied that the tests were as exhaustive 
as one can make them given the restraints of time, effort and 
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possibly commercial urgency for the software 
3 that the development stage when metrics will be used is that 
stage immediately preceeding the commissioning of the software 
into operational use, possibly during acceptance testing 
4 that satisfactory test limits will have to be determined for 
the proposed metrics before the application of these metrics 
to Industry 
5 that the test limits and the metrics presented will provide a 
pass/fail criteria for a Certification Authority seeking to 
approve the software. 
The Chapter starts by examining the reasons for errors remaining 
in software, even after extensive testing. Having discussed the 
software development process in terms of a feedback model a method is 
developed to indicate the potential that exists within the software 
for perturbing the software through single character errors, followed 
by a discussion on the need to declare variable and constant names 
and a report on an experiment conducted to examine the probability of 
error through incorrect interpretation of mneomonics. 
The final section of the Chapter is concerned with the 
development of a measure called Plexus which measures the syntactic 
complexity of software. 
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4.1 The Feedback Model of Software Production 
The development of software involves a number of stages. The 
exact number of stages and their relationship is largely dependent on 
the organisation under which the development is done, the extent of 
the project and the development methodology used. Many authors, for 
example Sommerville, [12], Kopetz, [6], Peters, [8], have all tried 
to model the development process in varying degrees of detail. At 
the level of the gross model there is a consensus of opinion that 
five stages exist; requirements specification, system specification, 
program specification, coding and acceptance testing. Errors can be 
created, detected and corrected at each of these stages but there 
will still be residual errors which are not detectable until after 
the software has been commissioned. This section of the Chapter 
will demonstrate the enormity of the task required to eliminate all 
software errors (if that was possible) prior to commissioning. 
4.1.1 Process Model 
The process of developing software can be compared to the 
production processes of a manufacturing line and it is this analogy 
that has been used in this Chapter to develop a model. 
Figure 4.1.1.1 Production Process 
Raw Process Process Process Process Dispatch 
Materials 1234 
Each process in the model has an input and an output with 
rejects, from that process, being rejected at that process. 
Inside each process stage there are two sub-processes, namely, 
manufacture and test, Figure 4.1.1.2. 
Figure 4.1.1.2 Manufacture and Test within a Process Stage 
Process Stage 
i 
Manufacture Test 
L--- --- --- -- ---J 
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Since testing will cause some corrective action to be taken on 
the rejects detected then these actions can be considered as feedback 
loops, Figure 4.1.1.3. Ideally testing will be such that no errors 
are passed to the next stage and all errors are fed-back to the 
preceeding manufacture sub-process or sub-processes for correction. 
However, the model must consider that errors can be created at both 
the manufacture and test stages and that the test coverage is 
limited, Figure 4.1.1.4. 
Figure 4.1.1.3 Rejection Feedback in a Process Stage 
Process Stage 
1 
Manufacture Test 
Figure 4.1.1.4 Test Coverage 
Process Stage 
ý-- -----ý e-- - -- --- to 
1 
`f Manufacture) 01 Test 
I 
where e is related to the errors introduced during manufacture 
and to is related to the errors undetected or allowed to pass 
as a consequence of the testing practice. 
The input to the test stage will be a duple (quantity 0, 
probability of error P) and the output will be (failed, failed by 
mistake, passed by mistake, satisfactory). The model is now shown 
in Figure 4.1.1.5. 
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Figure 4.1.1.5 Test Stage 
PC 
iT 
satisfactory 
a, P 
assed by mistake 
ed by mistake 
The test coverage (normally less than 100X) is shown by C and 
the probability of testing determining the error shown by PT. The 
quantity considered to be satisfactory, as, is given as 
Os = Q. Pr((1-PT). (1-C)) + Q. (1-P). (1-C) 
The test stage will have an output leading to the input of the 
next manufacturing process and an output corresponding to the 
erroneous components detected, either correctly or by mistake. The 
detected erroneous components will be subjected to some form of 
repair mechanism before being re-submitted to the test stage. The 
repair mechanism has been added to the test stage model shown in 
Figure 4.1.1.6. 
Figure 4.1.1.6 Repair Mechanism 
efficiency p 
where res. is the residual error 
ß is the effectiveness of repair 
If it is assumed that the detection of errors by the model shows 
a reduction in errors according to some exponential function then the 
residual errors, res, is given as 
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res. efficiency 
res = f(t) = exp (-at) 
From control theory the testing stage can be given as a first 
order loop whose transfer function is given using Z-transformation 
Z 
op = -at 
t-e 
where Op = quantity produced 
Since the repair mechanism forms a feedback loop from the test 
stage to the input of the manufacturing stage the residual error can 
be viewed using a first order feedback model 
Op 
res = 0r Or = quantity 
repaired 
1+ ßZ 
since Or = -at 
Z-e 
z 
-at -at 
res =2-eZ-e 
1+ p2 2 
-at 
Z-e 
-at 
=Z-e 
-at 
Z-e+ ßZ 
-at 
=Z-e 
-at 
Z(1 + ý) -e 
-at 
=12-e 
1+ß -at 
t-e 
1+ß 
To reduce the residual errors requires a level of test 
efficiency and test coverage above that attainable. Therefore, it 
is concluded that there will always be a number of residual errors. 
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4.1.2. Software Model 
Taking the model above and substituting the five stages of 
software development for the procýss stages, the model becomes that 
shown in Figure 4.1.2.1. 
It has been suggested by some researchers, notably Boehm Ell, 
that the majority of error-detection effort should be committed to 
the requirements specification stage and so reduce the number of 
errors needing to be detected at the following stages, especially at 
the acceptance tests. Whilst such a strategy may be intuitively 
sound it should not be assumed to be sufficient in itself since an 
extreme amount of effort at the requirements specification stage 
could cause a bottle-neck in the development process and be counter- 
productive to achieving the project time-scales. 
Figure 4.1.2.1 Software Feedback Model 
e te e te 
User o PrsI- 4 Vrsl- RS APssI X VssL- SS -iý 
SA system 
4- 
where Pi 
Vi 
RS 
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C 
SA 
Production of stage i 
Validation of stage i 
Requirements Specification 
System Specification 
Program Specification 
Code 
Accepted system 
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4.1.3 Macro Model 
The software development model can be applied to varying levels 
of detail. For instance, the process of producing the program code 
can be considered to consist of the following stages; typing the 
original program, review of the program, program compilation, 
execution of the code, testing of the code and editing stages, 
forming a model like that in Figure 4.1.3.1. 
The edit process itself can be further modelled, Figure 4.1.3.2. 
where e is the probability of introducing errors 
It is conjectured that each stage of development is prone to 
errors and the process of correcting errors is itself prone to 
further errors. It cannot be assumed that the use of extreme 
amounts of effort at the requirements specification stage will 
produce significant improvements in error reduction. It is 
suggested that all items of non-trivial software contain some 
erroneous feature. 
If all software has at least one erroneous feature then the 
criteria in testing hazard-related systems should be to identify 
those classes of errors which could cause a dangerous state to exist. 
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Figure 4.1.3.1 Software Edit Stages 
Figure 4.1.3.2 Edit Process 
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4.2. Single Character Errors in Programs 
In writing even the simplest program there is a probability of a 
character being typed in error. When the program is submitted to 
the compiler a considerable number of these mistakes will be detected 
but it is not practically possible to remove all errors. There are 
occasions when the compiler is not able to detect the mistake. 
The simple program below forms the basis of the discussion that 
follows; 
PROGRAM name (FILE); 
VAR XY, XZ: REAL; 
BEGIN 
XY 2; 
XZ 3; 
END. 
If the initial letter of the keyword BEGIN, "B", was mistakenly 
typed as the letter, "N", the compiler would be able to detect that 
NEGIN is not included in the list of reserved words for that 
language, also that NEGIN is not a declared variable and so reject 
the line as being in error. The rejection of the line would cause 
the compilation to fail since BEGIN indicates the start of a 
procedure block. 
Errors in program variables are not always so obvious. Take. 
as an example, a language which requires all variables to be 
declared. In a program, like that above, written in such a language 
the effect of typing X2: =2 instead of the correct XY: z2 would be 
easily detected since X2 has not been declared as a variable. Had 
the error been that XZ: =2 had been typed instead of XY: z2 then the 
error could not be detected by the compiler unless it checked for 
unused variables, XY being unused. If the language did not require 
all variables to be declared, as for example with the language BASIC. 
then neither of these example errors would have been detectable by 
the compiler or interpreter, but they should have been detected by 
the tests of the programmer, (concept 2). 
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When a single character is omitted or altered to another 
character. or when there is a single additional character there are 
similar opportunities for undetected errors. 
4.2.1 Theory 
There are three error classes of mistakenly typed programs; 
- omitted single character (Po) 
- additional single character (Pi) 
- altered single character (Pa), which can also be 
considered as a combination of Po and Pi 
To examine the effects of each of these error classes the 
following assumptions have been made; 
- that individual errors are independent and no 
account is taken of complimentary errors since the 
probability of such is considered to be low 
- that each character has an equal probability of error. 
If it is assumed that errors can be introduced as a result of a 
mistakenly typed character and remain undetected the expectation of 
such a mistake*is given as Elmistake) and the number of characters is 
given as Nc, then the expectation of the number of mistakes on 
initial input of the program is 
E{No. of mistakes} = E{mistake} . Nc 
If the probability of making an undetected mistake is given as 
Pm then the expectation of the number of undetected errors is given 
as 
E{No. undetected errors) = E{No. of mistakes} . Pm 
which can be expanded to 
E{No. undetected errors} = E{mistake} . Nc . Pm 
There are three classes of error influencing the number of 
undetected errors which are related to 
- the expectation of the number of undetected alterations, E{a}. 
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- the expectation of the number of undetected omissions. E{o}, 
- the expectation of the number of undetected additions, E(ij. I 
The number of undetected errors is given as 
E(No. undetected errorsl = E(uj = E{aj + E(ol + Eji) 
The expectation of an undetected altered character, Ejaj, is 
given by 
E{a} = Pa . Nc . Pm 
Cs -1 
where Pa is the probability of a character in a certain character 
position being altered and remaining undetected, Nc is the number of 
characters in the program, Pm is the probability of making an error 
in typing a character and Cs is the number of characters in the 
character set permitted in the language. 
The Expectation of undetected altered characters in a program is 
given by 
E(a) = (Pal + Pa2 + .. Pan) Nc . Pm 
Cs -1 
= Na . Nc . Pm 
Cs-1 
where Pan is the probability of a character being altered in the n-th 
position of an ordered set of characters by each admissible character 
from the set of characters in the character set and being undetected. 
The number of altered and undetected characters is Na. 
The expectation of the number of undetected omissions, Efol, is 
given by 
E{o} = No . Nc . Pm 
where No is the number of occasions an omitted character will be 
undetected. 
The expectation of the number of undetected additional 
characters, Efil, is given by 
E{i} = (Ni / Cs) . Nc . Pm 
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where Ni is the number of occasions an additional character.. 
The total number of possible errors is determined by; 
No. possible omissi6ns = Npo = Nc 
No. possible alterations = Npa z Nc . Cs-1 
No. possible insertions = Npi = (Nc + 1) . Cs 
= Nc . Cs + Cs 
giving 
Max. possible errors = Npe = Npo + Npa + Npi 
=2 (Nc . Cs) + Cs 
since No. Na. Ni and Npe will vary with the size of the program the 
normalised ratio between these is given by the ratio 
F= (Na + No + Ni) . Pm 
Npe 
which is called the Fallibility Index of a program and expresses some 
measure of the extent that undetected errors are possible. Since 
all errors contain a risk and the risk increases in relation to the 
number of errors, the Fallibility Index indicates the scope for 
undetected errors and gives some indication to the risk. As the 
scope for errors remaining undetected increases so does the 
probability that there will be at least one error which has the 
characteristics of creating a catastrophe. 
4.2.2 Example Programs 
The hypothesis above can be demonstrated by analysis of two 
simple programs. First, the Pascal-like program used earlier with 
line numbers added for clarity of discussion; 
I PROGRAM NAME (FILE); 
2 VAR XY. XZ; REAL; 
3 BEGIN 
4 XY: =2; 
5 XZ: =3; 
6 END. 
Although the program header "PROGRAM NAME(FILE): " is required in 
some languages it is not included in these calculations since it only 
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adds to the length of the program without constraining it in any way 
and FILE is only used by the compiler to signal the input/output 
requirements. I 
To determine the expectation of undetected altered errors, E{a), 
an examination shows that alteration of the keywords PROGRAM, VAR, 
REAL, BEGIN and END will be detected by the compiler. Similarly. if 
an alteration caused either of the declared variables to have the 
same identity the similarity would be detected. If the altered 
character caused the variable to have an identity different from 
those in lines 4&5, then the error would be detected. There are 
only 4 instances where an alteration would remain undetected; 
- P(Y=>Z) 
- P(2 => 0,1,3.. 9) 
- P(Z => Y) 
- P(3 => 0.. 2,4.. 9) 
from line 4 [alternates =1] 
[9] 
from line 5[1] 
[9] 
The number of undetected alternate characters, Na. is 20. 
Counting the number of characters ( including Newline as a 
terminating character but excluding leading Spaces and the program 
header as being unnecessary to the calculation) gives Nc = 41. The 
permissible character set Cs for the Pascal-like language is 96. So 
E(al can be calculated as 
E{a} = Na . Nc . Pm 
Cs-1 
which becomes 
E{a} = 8.6 . Pm 
To calculate Ejol. the expectation of undetected omissions, the 
program is analysed for instances where an omitted character would be 
undetected by the compiler. In the example program the only 
instance where an omission would be undetected is in the program 
header which has been omitted. So 
E{o} =0 and No =0 
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The expectation of undetected additions, Eli), requires the 
analysis of the program to determine the instances where an 
additional character could be inserted and undetected. The integer 
assignments could have additional characters before (+, -,., 0.. 91 or 
after (., 0.. 9) and be undetected. Since the piýogram header is being 
ignored Ni a 46, Eli) can now be calculated as 
E{i} = Ni . Nc . Pm 
Cs 
= 20.5 . Pm 
The sum of E(al, E(o) and EW is the expectation of the number 
of undetected errors and for the example program 
E(No. undetected errorsj = E{u) z E(al + Efol + E{ij 
= 29.1 . Pm 
No. possible errors = Npe = 2(Nc . Cs) t Cs 
= 7968 
giving a Fallibility Index of 
F= (Na + No + Ni) . Pm 
Npe 
0.0085 . Pm 
As a comparison an equivalent FORTRAN-like program is analysed 
in the same way. The program is 
XY: 2 
XZ=3 
END 
In the Fortran-like example Nc = 14 and Cs = 48. 
There are 6 possibilities for an undetected alteration; 
P(X * A.. W, Y, Z) E 25 alternates 
P(Y 0 A.. X, Z#O.. g) C 35 1 
P(2 => 0.1,3.. g, A.. Z) 35 
P(X * A.. W, Y, Z) 25 
- PIZ => A.. Y, O.. 9) [ 35 ] 
- P(3 0 0.. 2.4.. 9, A.. Z) [ 35 1 
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thus Na = 190 and E{a} becomes 
E{a} = Na . Nc . Pm 
Cs-1 
= 56.6 . Pm 
There are 4 possibilities of undetected omissions: X or Y in the 
case of XY and X or Z in the case of XZ being omitted individually, 
No = 4. So E{o} is given by 
E{o} = No . Nc . Pm 
=4.14 . Pm = 56 . Pm 
Additional characters can be introduced, without being detected 
as errors. The notation used to demonstrate these instances uses 
the symbol '=>* to indicate "may be perturbed to" and the symbol 'I' 
to read "a character or set of characters preceeding a character or 
set of characters% In the example program the instances are: 
- PIX => A.. ZIX) 26 additions 
- P(X => XIA.. Z. O.. 9) C 36 1 
- P(y Z> YIA.. Z. O.. 9) [ 36 1 
- P(2 => .. +. -, O.. 9. A.. ZI2) C 39 1 
- P(2 => 210.. 9.. ) c 11 1 
- P(x => A.. ZIX) C 26 1 
- P(X => XIA.. Z. O.. 9) [ 36 
- P(z --> ZIA.. Z. O.. 9) [ 36 
- P(3 => .. +, -. O.. 9. A.. ZI3) [ 39 1 
- P(3 => 310.. 9.. ) c 11 1 
Thus Ni = 296 and E{i} becomes 
Eli) = Ni . Nc. Pm 
Cs 
= 86.3 . Pm 
The expectation of the number of undetected errors is 
E{u} = E{a} + E{o} + E{i} 
= 198.9 . Pm 
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The number of possible errors, Npe, is given as 
Npe = 2(14 , 48) + 48 = 1392 
Thus the Fallibility Index is 
F= 490 Pm = 0.352 . Pm 
1392 
If Pm is assumed to be equi-probable for both the Pascal-like 
10 
language and Fortran-like language then a comparison can be made 
between the two trivial programs analysed. In the Pascal-like 
program the Fallibility Index was 0.851 whereas in the Fortran-like 
program the Fallibility Index was 35.21 suggesting that in the simple 
examples the Pascal-like program can be considered to be less 
fallible and having a lower risk of error. 
The mandatory use of the declaration of variables has at least 
one disadvantage; that declarations can be mistaken for other similar 
but unique identifiers because of a single character error within the 
body of the program. These errors can result from the omission, 
insertion or deletion of a single character. Perturbations to the 
program resulting from single character errors are an indication of 
the scope for undetected errors existing in software which, when in 
use, could be in control of potentially hazardous equipment. 
A realistic program taken from Jensen and Wirth, [51 p. 38. 
written in Pascal. FORTRAN and BASIC will now analyse. To 
illustrate the analysis each program has 4 columns; number of 
characters on the line, number of undetectable alternate characters 
Na. number of undetectable character omissions No and the number of 
undetectable character additions Ni. 
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4.2.3 Pascal Version 
The program has been compiled using UCSD PASCAL. 
Nc Na No Ni 
PROGRAM graph2 (output)-, 
16 CONST d=0.0625; 45 6 72 
6 s=32; 18 2 35 
7 hIa34; 18 2 35 
7 h2=68 -, 18 2 35 
11 c: 6.28318; 54 7 82 
8 lim=32; 18 2 35 
21 VAR i, j, k, n: INTEGER; 0 0 0 
10 x, y: REAL; 0 0 0 
24 a: ARRAYEI.. h2l OF CHAR; 10 1 0 
6 BEGIN 0 0 0 
29 FOR j: zl TO h2 DO aEjl: z' 94 1 153 
19 FOR i: =O TO lim DO 17 0 le 
6 BEGIN 0 0 0 
8 x: =d*i; 45 0 0 
23 Y: =EXPI-x) * SIN(c*x); 68 1 is 
12 a[hll: =': *; 74 1 128 
20 n: =ROUND(s*y) + hl; 68 1 0 
11 a[nl: ='*'; 77 0 128 
21 IF n( hl THEN k: zhl 47 2 2 
11 ELSE k: =n; 13 0 0 
30 FOR j: zl TO k DO WRITE(a[jl); 34 0 25 
9 WRITELN; 0 0 0 
10 a[nl: --' 77 0 0 
4 END 0 0 0 
5 END. 0 0 0 
Nc = 334 Cs = 64 Na = 795 No = 28 Ni = 767 
Substituting, the Expectation of an undetected error for this 
version is: 
E(a) = Na Nc . Pm 
CS-1 
= 4215 . Pm 
E{ol x No Nc . Pm 
= 9352 . Pm 
E{i) = Ni . Nc . Pm 
Cs 
= 4003 Pm 
Efu) = Val E(a) + Efi) 
= 17570 Pm 
Npe = 2(Nc Cs) + CS 
= 42816 
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giving a Fallibility Index of 
F= (Na + No + Ni) . Pm 
Npe 
1590 . Pm = 0.037 = 3.71 
42816 
4.2. 4 BAS IC Version 
This program has been prepared usin g Microsoft BASIC-80. 
.I 
Nc Na No Ni 
11 10 DIM A$[681 43 0 30 
14 20 FOR J=l TO 68 79 2 113 
is 30 A$CJI=CHRS(32) 81 2 94 
7 40 NEXT J a 1 0 
14 50 FOR I=O TO 32 79 2 113 
10 60 X=I*. 0625 124 6 229 
25 70 Y=EXP(-X)*SIN(6.28318*X) 191 8 336 
16 80 AS[34]: CHRS(58) 93 4 63 
11 90 NX=32*Y+34 157 6 243 
16 100 A$ENXI=CHR$(42) 76 3 94 
29 110 IF NX<34 THEN K=34 ELSE K=N1 200 6 369 
13 120 FOR J=l TO K 70 0 ill 
13 130 PRINT AS[J]; 38 1 98 
7 140 NEXT J 0 1 0 
6 150 PRINT 0 0 2 
16 160 A$CNj1=CHR$(32) 76 3 94 
7 170 NEXT 1 0 1 0 
4 180 END 0 a 0 
Nc = 234 Cs = 68 Na = 1307 No = 46 Ni 1989 
E{a} = Na N c. Pm 
CS-1 
= 4565 . PM 
Efo) = No . Nc . Pm 
= 10764 . Pm 
Eli) = Ni . Nc . Pm 
Cs 
= 6845 . Pm 
Therefore 
E(ul = E(a) + E(o )+ EW 
= 22174 Pm 
Npe = 2(Nc Cs) + Cs 
= 31892 
giving aF allibility Index of 
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Fz (Na + No + Ni) . Pm 
Npe 
3342ý. Pm z 0.105 
31892 
4.2.5 FORTRAN Version 
This program has been tested usi ng the Mic rosoft Fortran-80. 
Nc Na No Ni 
PROGRAM GRAPH2 10 
14 LOGICAL M(68) 18 2 0 
10 DOIJ=1.68 76 3 92 
11 1 M(J)--* , 62 1 156 
10 D021=0.32 75 3 89 
11 X=I*0.0625 106 6 194 
25 Y=EXP(-X)*SIN(6. 28318*X) 165 8 302 
10 M(34)=*: ' 71 3 120 
10 N=32*Y+34 160 5 216 
9 M(N)=**' 62 1 156 
16 IF(N. LT. 34)K=34 150 4 216 
15 IF(N. GE. 34)K=N 142 3 232 
12 WRITE(1,3)M 36 1 0 
19 3 FORMAMH . 68Al) 78 5 30 
11 2 M(N)--* 62 1 156 
4 END 0 0 0 
Nc 187 Cs 48 Na = 1263 No = 46 Ni 1959 
Eta) = Na Nc . Pm 
CS-1 
= 5025 . Pm 
Efol = No . Nc . Pm 
- 8602 . Pm 
Efil = Ni . Nc . Pm 
CS 
= 7632 . Pm 
Therefore 
E(u) = E(al + Efol + EM 
= 21259 Pm 
NPe = 2(Nc Cs) + Cs 
= 18000 
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giving a FallibilitY Index of 
F -- (Na + No + Ni) . Pm 
Npe 
0.182 = 18.2Z 
Although the language Fortran requires the first six characters 
of each line of a program to be spaces, continuation markers or 
labels, the analysis has only consildered the effect of an erroneous 
label because any additional labels will not introduce an error and 
also any label which is not numeric will be rejected by the compiler. 
4.2.6 Discussion 
An increase in the number of characters to write a program 
causes a corresponding improvement in the Fallibility Index (Figure 
4.2.6.1 and Graph 1). One possible reason for such an improvement 
is the increase in characters causing an increase in the useful 
redundancy. 
Figure 4.2.6.1. 
Language Nc FZ 
Fortran 187 18.2 
Basic 234 10.5 
Pascal 334 3.7 
The analysis of programs is tedious and time-consuming and can 
be eased if automatic analysis techniques are used to analyse 
programming languages that have a publicly available syntax. 
As part of the research a suite of programs was developed to 
analyse programs. Since the algorithm. used perturbed each character 
position in the program with each character from the allowable 
character set for each class of error the computer time needed was 
considerable. The analysis was performed using a DEC VAX 11/750 
computer with programs written in the language Pascal and C supported 
by the YACC and LEX tools of UNIX. An analysis typically took 30 
minutes of computer time to execute. Refinement of the algorithm 
used would, no doubt, cause the analysis to be executed with less 
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computer time but the current algorithm has established the principle 
that the analysis can be automated. 
10 
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4.3 The Need to Declare Variable and Constant Names 
High-level programming languages, like FORTRAN and BASIC, do not 
require the declaration of variabie and constant names at the 
beginning of a program. With the introduction of the so-called 
structured languages, like ALGOL and PASCAL, which require variable 
names to be declared there has been some discussion on the need for 
declaring variables and constants, how many characters should be used 
in a name and also how representative such names should be. 
Chapter 4.2 considered the influence that variables have on the 
resulting Fallibility Index. It is hypothesised that the 
declaration of variables based on the uniqueness of a name gives the 
variable security from misinterpretation and the number of instances 
of names is large before unique names contribute to the 
misunderstanding of the objects. 
4.3.1 Variables in Declarative Languages 
If no range checks are in force and no account is taken of 
omissions or additions in the symbol the probability of an error in 
the variable Pwv is 
Pwv =I. m. Pm . Nd 
N 
where I is the number of instances 
m is the number of characters forming the variable 
Nd is the number of permissible positions 
N is the size of the permissible character set 
To calculate the probability of an error in the symbol consider 
the occasion where the symbol is wrong (Ps) and the occasion when the 
symbol is correct but the value is wrong (I-Ps), giving the 
probability of using the wrong variable, Pwrong, as 
Pwrong = I. Ps + Ps + (i-Ps). m. Pm. Nd + ps(I-ps). m. Pm. Nd 
NT 
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putting the expression in terms of Ps. it becomes 
2Ps. m. Pm. Nd a I+l - m. Pm. Nd + m. Pm. Nd 
Ps -- N. 1+1 
2 Nd. Pm. m 
which suggests that declarations in the local context increase the 
redundancy, yet in practice highly secure programs are not infinitely 
10 
large. 
4.3.2 Constants in Declarative Languages 
Constant declarations are generally of the form 
C ..... C -- D ....... D 
In1m 
for numbers only the probability of using the wrong value Pwrong is 
given as 
Pwrong I. Pd 
for numbers and declarations, Pwrong I. Ps + Ps + Pd 
which optimises when 
I. Pd > I. Ps + Ps + Pd 
and Ps < Pd (1-1) - Pd 
n 
where Ps = S-1 / (Nc-1) . Pm . Nc 
N 
S No. Symbols 
Nc character set 
m no. of digits 
I no. of instances 
n no. of character 
positions 
and Pd =m. Pm . Nd 
N 
In terms of the number of instances, 1, the equation becomes 
n 
(S-1 / (Nc-1) Pm . Nc = m. Pm. Nd . I-1 F7 1+1 
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n 
which reduces to (S-1 . NO (Nc-1) m. Nd. 1-1 I+l 
n 
substituting A for Nc / (Nc-1) and B for m. Nd the expression 
becomes 
(S-1). A B 1-1 
1+1 
10 
1. (S-1). A + (S-II. A B. I 
I. ((S-1). A-B) -(S-1). A-B 
-(S-1 + B/Al 
(S-1 - B/A) 
So if Nc = 26 , Nd z 10 and m, n 8 
n8 
A= Nc / (Nc-1) 26 8 M. 10 B/A = (m. 10.25 
258 26 
when is I>2 
((S-1) + (B/A)) 
(B/A - (S-1)) 
giving B 
A 
2C - 2S -2=C+S-1 
C-I= 3S 
So the number of symbols at which the declaration of constants 
reduces the useful redundancy is given by 
S= (C-1) 
3 
n 
Substituting for Cm- Nd (Nc 
S Ný- 
The expression above demonstrates that the number of symbols is a 
controlling influence in the use of declarations. 
4.3.3 Errors in Variable and Constant Names 
Declaring variable names protects the program from randomly 
distributed errors in the naming of variables and constants, with the 
resulting misinterpretation of the object being referenced. 
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The stream of characters forming the variable or constant is 
regarded as a message having 
a) an equal probabilitylof error in each character 
position, p, and 
b) the errors in the character positions are independent. 
Since typing errors can be introduced in the preparation of the 
program, conditions a) and b) above apply. 
The probability of no errors in n-positions is given by 
n 
(1 - p) 
and the probability of a single error in the n-positions is given by 
n-1 
np(I - p) 
The probability of k errors is given by the k-th term in the binomial 
expansion: 
nn n-I 
P) + PI (I - P) + np(l - p) 
2 n-2 n 
pn(n - I)p (I - p) p 
2 
so the probability of exactly two errors, Pe2, is 
2 n-2 
Pe2 = n(n - 1)p (i - p) 
2 
4.3.4 Error-Protection of Variable and Constant Names 
Hamming, [41, defined the concept of the 'Hamming distance* of a 
message as being 'the number of digit positions by which two states 
differ from each other'. 
Hamming, [41, considers a message string of O's and 1's as a 
point-in a vector space of n-dimension where each digit is a value 
giving a co-ordinate in the space. Each vertex is a string of n O's 
n 
and n I's. The space will therefore consist of 2 vertices. 
Since each vertex is a received message a single error moves the 
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message pointer along one edge of the space to an adjacent point. 
Hamming speculates that if every originating message was required to 
be a 'distance' of at least two edges away from any other message 
then any single error will move the message pointer along only one 
edge and thus indicate that the received message is illegal. 
Assuming independent errors a minimum 'distance' of one 
11 
character in the name makes the name unique. Whilst a name with a 
minimum 'distance' of two allows single errors to be detected. 
The use of 'Hamming Distance' in variable and constant names 
suggests that each name varies from each other name by at least two 
characters then a single error would be detectable by the compiler 
when the name is referenced and would not transfer the context to 
another similar name. 
The use of two-character names does not provide a sufficiently 
rich choice of names. Whereas, names of greater than two characters 
provide a rich choice of names and gives protection against single 
character errors. 
From the argument presented the hypothesis is that variables and 
constants should be declared. However, when the number of symbols 
is extremely large the gross choice will add to the programmer's 
misunderstanding of the program. Since such a number of symbols is 
large it is concluded that the names of variables and constants 
should always be declared. 
A controlling influence in the declaration of variables is the 
number of symbols used to declare the identifier. Recognisable 
identifiers can normally be constructed using the 26 letters of the 
English alphabet and the numerals O. A. When each identifier 
consists of upto eight characters, then the number of non-repetitive 
permutations is P(36,8), which yields a large number of choices for 
the programmer so uniqueness is assured. 
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Since most languages allow the use of letters and numerals, each 
identifier in a program can vary from each other identifier by at 
least two characters and be protected against the effects of single 
typographical errors. 
Shneiderman, [111, found that a typical typing error-rate 
amounted to 6.175Z, or about 1 error in every 16 characters typed, 
suggesting that there is a 0.5 probability of an error in character 
streams of 16 characters or more, on initial input of the program. 
It follows that to limit the probability for error in a name, each 
name should be no longer than 15 characters and no less than two; the 
median value being eight characters which restricts the incidence of 
typing errors, provides a rich choice of uniqueness in the name 
whilst giving scope for a 'distance' of two. 
4.3.5 An Experiment on the Use of Mnemonics 
As part of the research for this thesis an experiment was 
conducted to examine the hypothesis that; 
*In recognising the significance of a variable name the 
probability of an error is lower when the number of characters used 
to represent the name is at least two and less than 16". 
The experiment was conducted at the 1983 Open University Summer 
Schools at the Universities of Warwick, Bath and York with 119 
students taking part distributed as 23.63 and 33 respectively. The 
participating students were volunteers mainly from the Technology 
Foundation Courses, though some volunteers came from a Second Level 
Technology Course. The experiment used a Superbrain OD 
microcomputer running a database package, dBase II. 
The experiment required each volunteer to suggest eight 
mnemonics in response to eight descriptive texts presented on the 
computer screen seperately. After the eight mnemonics had been 
input by the volunteer, the volunteer was asked to repeat the 
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mnemonics for the same eight descriptions which were presented in a 
different order. Finally, the eight mnemonics suggested originally 
by the volunteer were displayed sýperately to the volunteer who was 
asked to provide a description. A record was kept of each 
volunteer's name, venue, date, original mnemonic, second mnemonic and 
the description provided by the volunteer. 
To maintain independence of results the volunteers were only 
permitted to ask questions regarding the purpose of the experiment 
and were not told their accuracy. 
A correct answer was one where the description supplied by the 
volunteer conveyed the same information as the description supplied 
by the experimenter. Each volunteer took approximately 12 minutes 
to participate in the experiment. 
The descriptive texts supplied to the volunteer were; 
TIME OF DAY 
LIQUID FLOW IN LITRES/MINUTE 
WEIGHT OF PRODUCT IN TONNES 
VALVE 8 POSITION 
PERCENTAGE OF SULPHUR DIOXIDE IN THE ATMOSPHERE 
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE 
DISTANCE FROM THE VALVE CONTROLLER TO THE VALVE IN METRES 
MOTOR SPEED IN R. P. M. 
The database program is listed in Appendix 1 and the analysis is 
in Graph 2 and Table 2. 
Table 2 contains the analysis of correct answers, incorrect 
answers and all answers by mnemonic length and mnemonic number with 
the frequency of the type of answer. The responses to the 
experiment were analysed and it was found that 701 of all answers 
were correct. 
From the analysis the conclusion is that: 
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mnemonics of one character in length are prone to 
misinterpretation. All single character mnemonics were 
I found to be incorrectly interpretted. 
2. The mean character length for correct mnemonic usage was 7.88 
characters with a standard deviation of 3.83. 
3. The probability of a correct interpretation of a variable was 
10 
found to be greatest when seven characters were used, with a 
probability of 0.125. The probability of a correct 
interpretation fell significantly when more than seven 
characters were used. The probability of a correct 
interpretation of less than 0.01 was found for variables of 
15 characters or more. 
It is concluded that the hypothesis was proved with one 
observation; that the ordering of the construction of the mnemonic 
may place a context on it. The context of a mnemonic may not be 
apparent to everyone using it and an experiment could be conducted to 
examine the optimum construction of mnemonics in order to reduce the 
risk of misinterpretation. So that the context could be 
recognisable to all users, a system of significant character 
positions could be used. 
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4.4 A Measure of Syntactic Structure and Error-Proneness 
for Application Programs 
In an optimally encoded program there will be no information 
I 
beyond that necessary to encode the program but in all computer 
programs there is additional information. The additional 
information is redundant to the main body of the program but serves 
to establish the programs context. ' The redundant information is 
called useful redundancy. Decision Content, Information Content and 
Redundancy are all properties of Information which have been explored 
in the context of error detection in computer programs. The method 
of calculating these properties is discussed and simple examples 
given. Example programs are analysed to illustrate the usefulness 
of Information Theory as an indicator of the amount of information 
required to declare a program. 
Information Theory has its origin in the work of C. E. Shannon, 
[91, who published a paper in the Bell Systems Technical Journal 
concerning the communication of information through symbols. 
Information Theory can be used to indicate the amount of useful 
redundancy but from a safety aspect the concern is with the inverse 
of redundancy called Error-Proneness. 
4.4.1 Halstead's Software Science Metrics 
and McCabe's Cyclomatic Number 
Halstead's work on Software Science, [31, put the emphasis on 
quantitative measures of programs using a count of the number of 
operators and operands in the program. 
Halstead's work presents a set of metrics which are derived from 
a basic set of measures. These measures are 
n number of unique operators 
1 
n number of unique operands 
2 
N= total occurrences of operators 
1 
N= total occurrences of operands 
2 
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Halstead's Vocabulary metric is given as 
nn"n 
12 
and the Length metric by 
N=N+N 
12 
which is intuitively apparent. 
.4 
The Volume metric uses the Vocabulary and the Length metrics 
to estimate the size of a program and uses bits as its dimension 
assuming a uniform binary encoding. The metric is given as 
Volume, V= (N +N )Log (n +nN Log n 
1212 
The Volume will vary with the amount of coding required for the 
program but does not take any account of the frequency of occurrence 
of individual operators or operands. 
The estimated length of the program is given as 
n Log n+n Log n 
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The results of Halstead's work has found criticism, [101, principally 
because of the empirical foundation of the work. One problem with 
the work is that Halstead's measure of length remains constant 
regardless of the number of times individual operators or operands 
are used. Halstead's 'length' refers to the number of symbols being 
used and is not a measure of linear expansion. 
McCabe, (71, suggested a measure of complexity based on Euler's 
formula for planar graphs given as 
V(G) = edges(e) - nodes(n) * no. of connected components(p) 
McCabe suggested that each node was a branch point in a program and 
the edges were the lines of flow between branches. McCabe stated 
that in a strongly connected graph of a program control network the 
value of p will be 2 and so reducing the equation to 
V(G) =e-n+2 
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The measure can be considered as a count of the number of branch 
points plus one. McCabe reduces the vocabulary of the program to 
branch points (nodes) and terminals with linear code sequences 
forming links (edges) between each node. The method corresponds to 
a measure of the number of choices presented at each branch point. 
Each branch point being represented by Log 2 bits and one terminator 
10 
represented by Log 2 bits. McCabe's Complexity can be represented 
by nLog 2+Iz n+1 bits, where n is the number of branch points. 
There is similarity between Halstead and McCabe in the way that 
a programs' complexity is regarded as a number of mental 
discriminations and represented by sums involving the expression 
nLog 2. 
4.4.2 Information Theory 
Information Theory measures information relating to the number 
of symbols in a message and the richness of choice of those symbols. 
In programs the amount of coding required depends on the problem, the 
programmer and the language used. 
The symbols of a program are syntactic elements and the richness 
of choice depends on the syntax of the language being used, the 
constraints placed on the programmer through organisational 
standards. style or inexperience and the context in which the symbols 
are to be used within the program. Although McCabe, [71, and 
Halstead, [3]. did not explicitly invoke Information Theory their 
results have a form similar to results involving Information Theory. 
However, McCabes work whilst well founded refers only to control 
structures. Halstead's work, based on empirical measures, neglects a 
number of features of programs and has been criticised for this by 
Shen and colleagues, [10]. 
Decision Content of a message, is defined in E23, also called 
the Maximum Information, H, is a logarithmic measure of the total 
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vocabulary from which a statement is chosen, assuming each event has 
an equal probability of being chosen. 
Information Content of a message, defined in [2]. given by I. is 
a logarithmic measure of the actual amount of coding required to 
represent the choice. Since the syntax of the language restricts 
the choice of symbols in certain character positions, there are two 
10 
different measures. 
Once the Decision Content and Information Content have been 
calculated it is possible to determine the Relative Redundancy. 
Relative Redundancy is the measure of the amount of information 
available but not required to represent the program. Relative 
Redundancy, r, is given by 
r (H - I) IH 
and converted to a percentage. 
4.4.3 Calculation of Plexus and Error-Proneness 
When an object, whether it is a program, a calculation or 
whatever, is considered to be "complex* some assessment is made of 
what is commonly termed "complexity". In order to assess complexity 
account needs to be taken of two factors; the syntactic content and 
the semantic content, which combine in some way to give an individual 
view of complexity based on the individual's knowledge. If the 
object is a computer program then the syntactic content is a function 
of the language syntax whilst the semantic content is some function 
of the 'meaning' or function of the program. Though there are many 
expressions for software complexity none consider the semantics of 
the program and cannot, therefore, justifiably be called measures of 
complexity. 
For any measure to be useful it must be finite and not 
subjective. Since the measures of complexity use only the syntactic 
element of an individual's view of complexity then these measures are 
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subjective judgements. Information Theory can be used to measure 
the syntactic features of a program but cannot assess the semantic 
content. In order to express a ýeasurement of the syntactic element 
some term is needed, other than complexity. 
When developing a program the syntactic choice available to the 
programmer can be considered as being a multi-nodal network with each 
10 
node representing a choice. The network of nerves in the human body 
is greater than the network being discussed here for software, but 
the function of such a neural network is described by the term 
0 plexus'. A network such as the McCullock-Pitts neural network, 
where the primitive units are called neurons, was the network 
structure Von Neumann used to demonstrate that reliable machines can 
be built from unreliable components, [131. 
The term 'Plexus' has been used in this thesis to refer to a 
measure of the syntactic choice being made from a network of choices 
to express a program. 
A program written in a high-level language is constructed of two 
parts; the declarative part and the procedural part. The procedural 
part is influenced in its richness of choice by the syntax of the 
language. The declarative part of a program further restrains the 
vocabulary in addition to that. already existing in the syntax. Both 
Halstead and McCabe excluded the declarative part from their 
calculations. Any measure of the syntactic structure of the program 
is influenced by the declarations. In the research for this thesis 
it was concluded that where declarations exist they should be 
included in the calculations concerned with choice. 
The syntax of a simple language in the form of a BNF forma! lism 
is shown in Figure 4.4.3.1. 
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Figure 4.4.3.1 BNF Syntax for the Example Language 
(program> PROGRAM <declare> 
BEGIN <body> 
END 
<declare> <declare statement> I <declare> <declare statement> 
<declare statement> :: = VAR: (variable> 
<variable> :: = <letter> 
d 
<letter> :: = A.. Z 
(body> :: = <procedure> <body> <procedure) 
(procedure> :: = (print> <assign> I <add> 
<print> :: = PRINT: <variable> ; 
<add> :: = <variable> := Oariable> + <variable> 
(assign> (variable> <integer> ; 
<integer> knumeral> <numeral> <numeral> 
<numeral> O. A 
The diagrammatic style of presentation of a syntax was modified 
by Jensen & Wirth, [51, in the syntax description of the language 
Pascal. The procedure part of the BNF syntax can be drawn as a 
syntax diagram and expanded, after [51, as shown in Figure 4.4.3.2. 
Figure 4.4.3.2 Syntax Diagram for the Example Language 
PRINT: - variable 
variable - variable +- variable 
variable - integer 
The amount of choice available in the selection of a message 
from a restricted range of allowable variables is 26, (a.. z), giving 
a set of symbols of 26. Integers are selected from a range of 0 to 
the maximum integer permissible for the implementation (MAXINT). 
Taking these restrictions into account the syntax diagram in Figure 
4.4.3.2 can be mapped onto Figure 4.4.3.3 to reflect the range of 
choice available. 
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Figure 4.4.3.3 Revised Syntax Diagram for the Example Language 
var 26 
PRINT: -[ 
var 1 
- var var 26 
var 1: = 
var var I 
var 26 var 26 
var 26: = -1 
var var 
int. 
var 1: 
0 
int. 
var 26: -E*o 
- 
Measures based on the diagram, Figure 4.4.3.3, reflect 
properties of the language and not a particular program as there is 
nothing in the diagram to illustrate the structure of a particular 
program. 
A particular instance of a program represents an ordered 
selection of items from the syntax diagram. An example of such a 
program (Program 1) written in the language is 
PROGRAM 
VAR: x; 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN 
x: =2; 
Y: =95; 
X: zx+y; 
PRINT: x; 
END 
If the syntax diagram of Figure 4.4.3.3 is redrawn to reflect 
only the syntactic items used in the sample program, the syntax 
reduces to the diagram shown in Figure 4.4.3.4. 
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Figure 4.4.3.4 Syntactic Items of Sample Program 
II PRINT: - 
-2 
y: = - 95 
-x-+-y 
END 
The declarations are considereb in a similar way with a seperate 
syntax diagram being required. In the language being used the 
options available within the syntax for declarations can be 
represented diagrammatically, Figure 4.4.3.5. 
Figure 4.4.3.5 Syntax Diagram of the Declarations 
a 
PROGRAM -- VAR: BEGIN 
z 
Keywords are syntactic necessities to the language and because 
of their certainty can be considered to have a probability of 
occurrence of one. Whilst keywords contribute to the Decision 
Content and Relative Redundancy they contribute nothing to the 
Plexus. Therefore when the diagram is redrawn to take account of 
the declarations used in the program it becomes that shown in Figure 
4.4.3.6. 
Figure 4.4.3.6 Revised Syntax Diagram of the Declarations 
VAR: x; 
VAR: y 
4.4.4 Method 
Program 1 can be regarded as a message transmitted as a stream 
of symbols to the compiler (or to a person reading it), where a 
symbol is one or more characters in a defined syntactic group. 
There is a probability of occurrence associated with each individual 
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symbol and each symbol pair. Each symbol is assigned an information 
value according to the choice available and the constraints of the 
syntax. The method used concerns the syntactic structure and takes 
no account of the intended computation of the program, that is to say 
its semantic context. 
once a statement type is encountered in the message there are 
only three possibilities within the syntax of Figure 4.4.3.2; PRINT, 
assignment or addition. The positioning of the character P 
immediately identifies that a PRINT statement is to occur and the 
characters 'RINT' add no more information. Therefore the group of 
characters 'PRINT' can be treated as a single symbol. Similar to 
the keyword PRINT, the pair of characters ': =' and the group of 
characters forming the ordered set ': = ....... are considered to be 
single symbols forming a set of three statement types. From an 
information viewpoint Plexus represents the choice available. 
The numbers 2 and 95 might be viewed as three numerals and a 
probability of 1/3 could be equally assigned to the numerals 2,9 and 
5 suggesting that 2 has a probability of 1/3 and that 95 has a 
probability of 1/3 * 1/3. The syntax diagram of Figure 4.4.4.1 is 
implied and allows for numbers other than 2 and 95. The choice is 
wider than the program allows. 
Another view is that if 2 is chosen there are no further options 
and if 9 is chosen the only option is S. Since there are only two 
options the probability of occurrence that can be assigned to the 
value 2 and 95 is 1/2., Figure 4.4.4.2. 
I 
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Figure 4.4.4.1 A Method of Assigning a Probability 
of Occurrence to Three Numbers 
S 
5. 
2 
9 
5 
Figure 4.4.4.2 Another Method of Assigning a Probability 
of Occurrence to Three Numbers 
---E-9 , --5: 1- 
There are many ways of viewing how the numbers can be 
represented and also any collection of syntactic elements. The 
selection is dependant on the view of what constitutes a syntactic 
entity. Ultimately the selection is a subjective judgement. 
However the syntax descriptions of languages are based on the 
designers views of syntactic entities and these form a basis for 
analysis. 
In Program I the PROGRAM statement has a probability of one. 
PROGRAM is followed by the declarative part of the program. In the 
declarative part the choice exists between a VAR declaration of a 
variable and a BEGIN statement which punctuates the recursive 
declarations and signals the start of the procedural part. In the 
language only single letter variables. in the range a.. z, are 
allowed. Therefore as each variable is declared the remaining 
choice is reduced by one. 
From the program the following probability of each symbol being 
used on a line can be determined: 
for declarations 
P(VAR: ) z 1/2 
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P(BEGIN) z 1/2 
P(x) = 1/26 
P(Y), = 1/25 
for statements, assuming all statements are equally probable 
P(PRINT) = P(assignment) = P(addition) = 1/3 
for variables 
10 
P(x) = 6/9 P(Y) = 3/9 
for values 
P(2) = P(95) = 1/2 
The probable occurrence of each line of the program is given by 
P(PROGRAM) =1 
P(VAR: x) = 1/2 * 1/26 
P(VAR: y) = 1/2 * 1/25 
P(BEGIN) = 1/2 
P(x: =2) = 1/4 * 4/6 * 1/2 
P(Y: =95) 2 1/4 * 3/6 * 1/2 
P(X: 2x+y) z 1/4 * 4/6 * 4/6 * 2/6 
P(PRINT: x) = 1/4 * 4/6 
P(END) = 1/4 
Since PROGRAM has a probability of unity it conveys no 
information and is omitted from the calculations. Each line of code 
has an Information Content expressed by the term 
Log P 
i 
assuming equal probabilities of occurrence of each statement type. 
Since the program is influenced by the number of changes that can be 
made a measure is required of the number of possibilities for change 
to be made to the program. If there was only one way to declare a 
program then the number of possible changes would be low but as the 
number of alternatives increases so does the number of possible 
changes. Therefore, the number of different ways that a program can 
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be declared must be reflected in some measure. Information Content 
measures a program's potential perturbations and in this context the 
principals of Information Content are regarded as the measure of 
Plexus. Plexus is given by P, so 
for VAR: x; P= Log 2 + Log 26 
for VAR: y; p= Log 2 + Ldg 25 
for BEGIN P= Log 2 
for x:: 2; p= Log 4 + Log (6/4) + Log 2 
for Y: =95; p= Log 4 + Log (G/2) + Log 2 
for X: zx+y; P = Log 4 + 2Log (6/4) + Log (6/2) 
for PRINT: x; p= Log 4 + Log (6/4) 
for END P= Log 4 
The Plexus of Program I is given by the sum of the individual 
expressions as 
P= 5Log 2+ 5Log 4+ Log 26 + Log 25 
+ 4LOg (6/4) + 2Log (6/2) 
= 29.8 bits 
Decision Content, from 4.4.2, is given by 
H= NLog Cs 
= 53Log 40 
= 282.1 bits 
where N -- no. of characters required to express the procedure 
part 
Cs = the size of the available character set 
giving a Relative Redundancy for the whole program of 
r= 89.4Z. 
The amount of information contained in the program and which is 
not required for optimal encoding is given as the Relative 
Redundancy. The scope that exists within the program for errors to 
be introduced is given as the Error-proneness, E. and is the inverse 
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of relative redundancy. 
the probability that the 
E 
Applying Halstead's 
Program 1 the following 
n3n=4 
2 
The lower the error-proneness, the lower 
program can be perturbed without detection. 
1001 -r 
10.6Z 
Estimatý*d Length and Volume metrics to 
measures are arrived at 
N5N=8 
2 
V= 36.49 bits 
N4 a 12.75 
As another example. the program can be linearly expanded to give 
Program 2 
PROGRAM 
VAR: x; 
VAR: y-, 
BEGIN 
x: =2; 
y: =95*, 
X: zx+y; 
X: zx*y; 
PRINT: x 
END 
using the method discussed above the values for Program 2 become 
H= 313.3 bits 
P= 34.54 bits 
r 88.98Z 
E 11.02Z 
Halstead's measures for Program 2 are 
n3n=4N=7N= 11 
212 
so the Volume is 
and the Estimated Length 
50.58 
0= 12.75 
Linear expansion of Program I and Program 2 has been included in 
iss 
I Appendix 2 along with comparison measures of Length, Volume. Decision 
Content, Plexus and Error-proneness. The measures have been plotted 
graphically and these are containeý in Graph 3 to Graph 5. 
In the method described the recursive declarations are 
punctuated by a BEGIN. The declarative part comprises two elements; 
the declaration statement and the variable used. The Plexus of the 
declarative part includes the number of permissible declaration 
statements from which a choice is made Nsd, the number of 
declarations used, D, plus the BEGIN statement and the amount of 
choice represented by each variable declared. 
Assuming equiprobable choice, the Plexus of the declaration 
statements is the product of the number of statements used, D, and 
the Plexus of each statement, Log Nsd. The Plexus of the variables 
declared is the sum of the Plexus of a reducing set of available and 
undeclared variables, Vs - i. 
The Plexus of the statements and the variables is summed to give 
the expression 
(b- I) 
D. Log Nsd +fb Log (Vs-i) 
i=O 
where D= number of declarative statements used (including BEGIN) 
Nsd = number of choices of declarative statements 
Vs = number of possible variables 
b= number of variables declared 
The procedure part comprises control statements, variables and 
values. The Plexus of the procedural part takes account of the 
number of lines of control statements and the number of permissible 
control statements from which a choice is made. The frequency of 
occurrence of variables and values is summed giving the expression 
bd 
Sc. Log Nsc +E Fvi Log (Nv/Fvi) +4 Fdi Log (Nd/Fdi) 
i=l 1=1 
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where Sc = number of control statements used (lines of code) 
Nsc = number of types of control statements 
Fvi = number of occurrences of variable (i) within the 
procedure part 
Nv = number of occurrences of all variables in the procedure 
part 
Fdi = number of occurrences of value i within the procedure part 
Nd = number of occurrences of all values in the procedure part 
d= number of values 
The Plexus of the whole program can be considered as being the 
sum of the plexus of the declarative part and the procedural part, 
given as 
(b-1 )b 
P=D. Log Nsd +jb Log (Vs-i) + Sc. Log Nsc +f Fvi Log (Nv/Fvi) 
imo iml 
d 
Fdi Log (Nd/Fdi) 
izl 
Conventional programming languages, unlike the example language 
used so far, include relational operators and allow the use of 
external routines called procedures and functions. Procedures and 
functions are one type of external call which are implicitly declared 
and handled in the same way as any other declaration, that is to say 
by considering their frequency of occurrence. 
Considering the frequency of external calls, pc, and relational 
operators, op, in the same way as values adds the term 
pq 
Fpci Log (Np/Fpci) + J'Fopi Log (Nap/Fopi) 
i=l i=l 
where Fpc = number of occurrences of external calls (i) within the 
procedure part 
Np = number of all external calls in the procedure part 
Fop = number of occurrences of relational operator (i) in 
the procedure part 
Nap = number of all relational operators used 
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number of individual external calls 
q= number of individual relational operators 
The expression for the Plexus'of the whole program is the sum of 
each of the terms combines to give the expression 
(b-1 )b 
P=D. Log Nsd +rb Log (Vs-i) + SC. Log Nsc +r Fvi Log (Nv/Fvi) 
i=O icl 
dpq 
Fdi Log (Nd/Fdi) +I Fpci Log (NP/Fpci) +f Fopi Log (Nop/Fopi) 
i=1 i--l icl 
The term for variables, values, external calls and relational 
operators is the same so the expression can be simplified to 
(b-1 ) 
PaD. Log Nsd +b Log (Vs-i) + Sc. Log Nsc 
i=O 
mn 
I Fi. j Log (Ni/Fvi, j) 
i=l j=l 
where i= symbol type: variable, digit, procedure and relational 
operator 
j= symbol 
i. j = symbol (j) of type (i) 
By using the above equation on sample programs written in trivial 
languages the method can be examined further. 
Language 1. 
The first simple program has been written in a Pascal-like 
language; 
PROCEDURE product (x: REAL, y: REAL) 
VAR i: INTEGER; 
BEGIN 
FOR i=I TO 5 DO 
BEGIN 
x: =x*y; 
END 
END. 
Various measures can be calculated using the expressions 
developed. Figures for Decision Content, Plexus, Relative 
Redundancy and Error-proneness for the whole program are; 
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H= 8BLog 64 = 528 
t 
p= 41.8 
t 
r=0.934 92.1Z 
t 
E=7.9Z 
t 
The actual calculations are giver7 in Table 3. 
Language 2. 
The second program is written in a FORTRAN-like language. 
SUBROUTINE (X, Y) 
DO 20 1a1,5 
20 X=X*Y 
RETURN 
and for the whole program the measures are 
H= 43Log 64 = 258 
t 
p= 38.0 
t 
r=0.853 = 85.3Z 
t 
E= 14.7X 
t 
These trivial examples show that whilst Language I has a Plexus 
of 41.8 and an Error-Proneness of 7.9Z, Language 2 has a Plexus of 
38.0 and an Error-Proneness of 14.71. These measures are absolute 
for each language and comparisons are not easily made between 
languages. 
Having seen the method applied to simple programs written in 
trivial languages the method can be applied to non-trivial languages, 
like Pascal, Basic and Fortran, using example programs. 
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4.4.6 Example Programs 
Pascal Version 
I The program has been compiled using UCSD PASCAL. The program 
and syntax rules have been taken from Jensen & Wirth, [5]. 
PROGRAM graph2 (output); 
CONST d=0.0625; 
s=32; 
hl=34; 
h2=GB-, 
czG. 28318; 
lim=32; 
VAR i, j, k, n: INTEGER; 
x, y: REAL; 
a: ARRAY[l.. h2l OF CHAR; 
BEGIN 
FOR j: =l TO h2 DO a[jl: z' 
FOR i: =O TO lim DO 
BEGIN 
x: zd*i; 
Y: =EXP(-x) * SIN(c*x); 
a[hll: =': '; 
n: =ROUND(s*y) + hl; 
aCnl: --'*'; 
IF n< hl THEN k: chl 
ELSE k: zn; 
FOR j: zl TO k DO WRITE(a[jl); 
WRITELN; 
a[nl: =' 
END 
END. 
Using the expression developed and the data contained in Table 3 the 
Plexus for the wh. ole program is calculated as 
H= 312Log 96 = 2054.5 
t 
P= 483.0 
t 
r=0.769 z 76.5Z 
t 
E=0.235 = 23.5Z 
t 
If the measures are to be used for comparison with similar 
programs written in languages not requiring declarations, then the 
calculations should omit the declaration part. The figures for the 
program become 
H= l6lLog 96 = 1060.2 
t 
p= 248.2 
t 
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r=0.766 = 76.6Z 
t 
E=0.234 = 23.4Z 
t 
BASIC Version 
A program written as a BASIC equivalent of the Pascal program 
used, using Microsoft BASIC-80, could be 
10 DIM AS[G83 
20 FOR J=1 TO G8 
30 A$[J]=CHRS(32) 
40 NEXT J 
50 FOR I=O TO 32 
60 X=I*. 0625 
70 Y=EXP(-X)*SIN(6.28318*X) 
80 A$[34]=CHRS(58) 
90 NZ=32*Y+34 
100 A$ENXI: CHR$(42) 
110 IF NZ<34 THEN K=34 ELSE K=NZ 
120 FOR J=l TO K 
130 PRINT ASCJI; 
140 NEXT J 
150 PRINT 
160 A$ENXI: CHR$(32) 
170 NEXT I 
180 END 
for the whole program 
H= 21SLog 68 = 1314.9 
t 
p= 283.7 
t 
r=0.784 = 78.41 
t 
E=0.216 = 21.6Z 
t 
If the declaration part is not included in the calculations the 
figures become 
H= 20BLog 68 = 1254.0 
t 
p= 248.9 
t 
r=0.802 = 80.21 
t 
Ez0.198 = 19.8Z 
t 
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FORTRAN Version 
The following program is a FORTRAN version of the Pascal program 
and has been prepared using Microsoft FORTRAN-80. 
PROGRAM GRAPH2 
LOGICAL M168) 
D01J=1.68 
I M(J)X' I 
D021=0.32 
X=I*0.0625 
Y=EXP(-X)*SIN(6.28318*X) 
M(34)=*: ' 
N=32*Y+34 
M(N)=**' 
IF(N. LT. 34)K=34 
IF(N. GE. 34)K=N 
WRITE(1,3)M 
3 FORMAMH 68Al) 
2 M(N)=' 
END 
for the whole program 
H= l8lLog 68 = 1101.8 
t 
P= 304.1 
t 
r=0.724 = 72.4% 
t 
E=0.276 = 27.6Z 
t 
and omitting the declarations 
H= 15BLog 68 = 949.6 
t 
P= 269.3 
t 
r=0.716 = 71.6Z 
t 
E=0.284 = 28.4% 
t 
It was stated earlier that the metric, Plexus, cannot be used to 
compare programs written in different languages unless a measurement 
is available to take account of the richness of vocabulary within the 
languages. However, a meaningful comparison can be made if the 
declarative part is omitted from the Plexus equation. 
iss 
4.4.7 System Plexus 
Having addressed the problem of measuring the Plexus of single 
programs the expression for the Plexus of two or more programs 
coupled together in some way, whose individual Plexus is known, can 
be addressed. Assuming that eacb module will be activated through 
some kind of operating system, then any communication between the 
modules is equally probable. Therefore the effects of uni- 
directional communications between modules is ignored. 
As an example of how the Plexus of two modules can be combined 
to give the System Plexus, take two modules, A and B, whose Plexus is 
known. 
The combining rule for two measures of information relating to 
two equally probable entities m and n, is 
- Log (m + n) 
and the combined value for A and 8 is 
- Log (A + 8) 
however. A and B are logarithmic values so the expression for System 
Plexus, Ps, becomes 
8A 
Ps Log (2 +2 
A-B 
B- Log (I +2 
As an approximation the Log series is expanded to 
23 
In (I + x) =x-x+x 
T7 
for logarithms of base 2 the expression is 
Log (1 +x) zln(l+x) 
ln 2 
A-B 
2 
In 2 
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sustituting, an aproximation is 
A-B 
System Plexus, Ps B-2 
ln 2 
Assuming module A has a Plexus of and module B has a Plexus of 
3. then the actual value of the System Plexus, Ps, is 
BA 
Ps Log (2 +23.32 
and as an approximation, ^Ps, is 
-2 
"Ps 3-23.36 
ln 2 
Combining th'ree modules A. 8 and C whose Plexus figures are 
individually given as 1,3 and 5 respectively, then the System 
Plexus, Ps, is 
cBA 
Ps Log (2 +2+2 
Log (35) 
5.13 
The general rule for combining two or more modules into a system 
when the individual Plexus is known can be expressed as; 
np 
Ps = Log 12 
P=j 
where Ps is the System Plexus 
p is the individual module Plexus 
n is the number of modules being combined. 
4.4.8 Discussion 
The concern in this section of Chapter 4 has been the amount of 
information required to prepare a program and developing a method of 
measuring syntactic complexity, called Plexus. If the Plexus for 
each of the example programs is compared, omitting declarations to 
allow comparison, with the Fallibility Index from Chapter 4.2 and the 
number of characters in the program, it can be shown that as the 
number of characters increases so the Plexus and Fallibility Index 
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decreases, Figure 4.4.6.1. A comparison of the values derived from 
the proposed metric, Plexus, and those of Halstead for the same 
I 
programs is contained in the Graphs 6 to 9. 
Figure 4.4.6.1 Comparison of Fallibility Index and Plexus 
Language Nc Fallibility Plexus 
Index (1) 
FORTRAN 187 18.5 304.1 
(omitting the declarations) 
174 19.4 269.3 
BASIC 234 10.5 283.7 
(omitting the declarations) 
197 12.2 248.9 
PASCAL 334 3.7 483.0 
(omitting the declarations) 
233 3.7 248.2 
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CHAPTER 5 
A Method of Conducting a Safety Audit on Software 
The assessment of the level of risk resulting from the use of 
software as a control element has been advanced in previous Chapters. 
The possibility of introducing errors at each stage of the 
development of the software has been discussed along with a basis for 
measuring the possibility for such errors. 
As part of the research for this thesis a commercially available 
product was examined and the methods and measures discussed earlier 
in this thesis were applied in an attempt to determine the 
applicability of such techniques. 
Based on the research for this thesis, this Chapter presents an 
argument for using a set of procedures called Software Safety Audits 
to assess the software used in industrial-based control systems. 
Such a Software Safety Audit would normally be conducted against a 
set of criteria considered to be acceptable by the designer and by 
the User but presently there is no standard criteria, so the 
assessment undertaken has to stand alone. The Chapter discusses 
certain aspects of the Software Safety Audit carried out on the 
product examined. 
The analysis of the product can only be discussed briefly as the 
commercial confidence of the company, and of the product, must be 
maintained. 
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5.1 The Software Safety Audit 
There is a probability of errors being created at each stage of 
the software development cycle. It is not practicable to remove all 
these errors from the software before the software is considered by 
the designer to be ready for operational use in a safety-related 
process or product. Since all software will have errors remaining 
after the testing stages have been completed then there needs to be 
some form of final check aiming to identify any unsafe aspects of the 
software. Such a set of checks on the software is called a Software 
Safety Audit. 
The purpose of a Software Safety Audit is to give some measure 
of the operational safety when using the software and to make some 
subjective judgement whether the software is, or can be made, 
operationally safe, given the safety criteria being used. If the 
software is not, or cannot be made. operationally safe then the 
software should not be used until the software has been modified to 
meet the criteria or the User is prepared to acknowledge and accept 
the features identified as being unsafe. 
In assessing the operational safety of the software it must be 
remembered that the software is only one component of a total system 
which includes the software, the computer hardware, the plant and 
associated hardware and the Operating Personnel. Once an assessment 
has been made of the software then the software should be maintained 
at the same safe state to which it was assessed. 
There are three elements to analyse in the Software Safety 
Audit; the software, the system and the integrity of the system. 
The three elements form three levels of assessment in which the 
software element is the lowest level. 
A Software Safety Audit could be developed starting with the 
software, followed by the system and its integrity. The safety 
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assessment of the software element can be considered to assist the 
person conducting the audit of the whole system. However, the 
I 
assessment of the whole system assists the person conducting the 
audit of the software element and provides an insight into the 
functioning of the whole system. 
An approach to Software Safety Audit needs to consider the 
software and the whole system and once the Software Safety Audit has 
assessed the software to be safe a mechanism of ensuring the 
continued integrity of the system should follow. 
5.1.1 The Need and Form of a Software Safety Audit 
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, (21, Section 6 (1). 
states "It shall be the duty of any person who designs, manufactures, 
imports or supplies any article" to meet certain requirements towards 
safety and, specifically, towards the testing of the article. 
Section 7 of the Act requires *every employee while at work' to take 
due regard for health and safety of himself and of others. Section 
8 states "No person shall intentionally or recklessly interfere with 
or misuse anything provided in the interests of health, safety or 
welfare". The Act, therefore, makes all parties involved in the 
design, manufacture, installation and operation of safety-related 
equipment responsible for ensuring the health and safety of those 
affected by its operation. 
The aim of a Software Safety Audit is to give a measure of the 
operational safety involved in using the software in the system being 
audited and to assist in rendering as impotent any errors detected in 
the software or the system which might otherwise jeopardise safety. 
In accordance with Sections 6,7 and 8 of the Health and Safety at 
Work Act the interpretation is that a Software Safety Audit may be 
requested by 
-a manufacturer of a new product at the design stage or before 
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it is offered for sale 
- by the supplier of a product before it is supplied to the end- 
user 
- by an end-user who requires a Software Safety Audit to be 
carried out an each stage of the development of a contracted 
system or 
- by an end-user before the contracted system is permitted to 
become operational. 
Whoever requests the Software Safety Audit is called the 
Requesting Authority and those undertaking the Safety Audit are 
called the Auditors. 
The fact that an item of software and its system has been 
assessed for safety before becoming operational can afford the 
designer some measure of confidence in its use. If the designer has 
the knowledge that the software was ultimately found to be safe then 
the confidence will be high. When the designer has the knowledge 
that a number of iterations were necessary before a safe assessment 
was achieved then confidence in the software may be reduced. 
The user's knowledge of a Software Safety Audit will influence 
confidence in the software. When a Software Safety Audit is carried 
out on the software before it becomes operational then the user's 
confidence will be high even though a number of iterations may have 
been necessary before being assessed as safe. When a Software 
Safety Audit of the software is undertaken retrospectively after 
being operational, even though the software has been assessed to be 
safe, then the user's confidence in the software and its system will 
be less since the inference is that there is cause for concern by the 
manufacturer or supplier. The confidence of the designer and the 
user in the software is influenced by knowledge of the Software 
Safety Audit having been carried out and this knowledge may have 
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commercial consequences. Therefore, a Software Safety Audit ought 
to be conducted in confidence with the control of the knowledge of a 
Software Safety Audit being conducted and the use of the results of 
the Software Safety Audit resting in the hands of the Requesting 
Authority. If the Requesting Authority is a commercial concern then 
the information on the Software Safety Audit may be suppressed. 
Alternatively. if the Requesting Authority is not a commercial 
concern, for instance a Trade Union or a group representing the 
public-interest, then the information may be made public in order to 
cause some action to be taken, for example a public inquiry. 
The ordering of the assessment procedures used for the Software 
Safety Audit can be fixed by legislation, but the order should be 
changeable such that the assessment procedures can take account of 
research developments. 
On finding an error or inconsistency in the software or the 
system a change may be made. The change may alter some feature 
which had been checked previously. To retain credibility the 
Software Safety Audit should repeat the preceeding procedures. To 
do any other may lower the credibility of the Software Safety Audit 
in the view of the Requesting Authority. The number of instances 
where it is necessary to repeat a number of the earlier procedures 
can be minimised by the ordering of the Software Safety Audit. 
The ordering of the proced ures used in the assessment for this 
research was considered to give an increased probability of finding 
errors early in the assessment process and to reduce the number of 
revisions required as a result of finding errors. 
The structuring of the software has been shown to influence 
safety, so before any other assessment can be carried out the 
structuring of the software should be examined. 
The Software Safety Audit proposed in this Chapter starts with 
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an assessment of the structure of the software. Software Fault Tree 
Analysis and Software Event Tree Analysis methods are used later in 
the Audit to examine for particular failure conditions. Once the 
software has been assessed at the system level by means of Fault Tree 
Analysis and Event Tree Analysis, the software is assessed for the 
perturbation of variable and constant names, followed by a 
calculation of the Fallibility Index and the Plexus. The final 
activity of the Software Safety Audit would normally be to assign an 
Integrity Lack to each program. 'ýThis was not possible in the 
assessment for this thesis as only the listings were available for 
the assessment and not the actual programs. 
The ordering of the assessment procedures used in the Software 
Safety Audit for this thesis was: 
Software Structural Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis 
Perturbation of Variable Names 
Calculation of the Fallibility Index 
Calculation of the Plexus 
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5.2 An Example Software Safety Audit 
To demonstrate the method of conducting a Software Safety Audit 
a genuine industrial-based application needed to be tested rather 
than one artificially created for the purpose. It was considered 
necessary to approach a manufacturer or supplier of electronic 
products who was known to incorporate a computer with some 
application software into a commercially available product which was 
intended for use in a safety-related control application. 
There is a wide range of products on the market which can be 
shown to meet the criteria. A major manufacturer of medical 
electronic products was approached and it was agreed with the 
manufacturer that a particular product could be assessed provided 
that confidentiality was maintained at all times regarding the 
identity of the company, the product and the outcome of the 
assessment. 
For reasons of commercial confidence the manufacturer must 
remain anonymous in this thesis. So that a description can be given 
of the product assessed, the product will continue to be referred to 
simply as 'the product' meaning the commercial product and 'device' 
to mean particular components of the product. 
5.2.1 The Product 
The product is used extensively in the medical service. 
particularly where hospitalisation of the patient is necessary, for 
instance Intensive Care Units and Surgical Wards. Earlier versions 
of the product have been in use for many years in the United Kingdom 
and abroad employing hard-wired logic to monitor and control the 
products function. Due to market pressures the company chose to 
develop the product further and to incorporate a microprocessor into 
the product to take over the control functions from the hard-wired 
logic. The product's principle function is to monitor and control 
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flow'rates of drugs at a desired value within a medically acceptable 
tolerance level. The product was suitable for the trial application 
of a Software Safety Audit as it i6corporated a microprocessor, it 
was used in a safety-related situation and the amount of application 
software involved was not too large for assessment by manual methods; 
approximately 4000 bytes of computer memory. 
A full description of the product is not possible without 
breaking the confidence of the company. However, a brief summary 
can be given. 
The product is used to monitor and control the flow rate of 
drugs to a patient and is made operational by an action, on the part 
of the nursing staff, indicating to the product the desired fl. ow 
rate. The flow rate is indicated by means of a set of thumb-wheel 
switches and is input to the microprocessor when the 'START' button 
is pressed. A device then adjusts the flow rate to the desired flow 
rate value. Once the desired flow rate is reached a device monitors 
the flow rate to ensure that it remains within the medically accepted 
tolerance. If at any time during the operation of the product an 
alarm condition is reached then a set of actions are available to the 
microprocessor ranging from the sounding of alarm buzzers to rapidly 
closing off the flow. The product can be stopped or reset by 
pressing the 'STOP/RESET' button. The flow rate sensor is an 
optical device placed in the drug supply line. 
Physically the product contains two decade thumb-wheel switches, 
'START' and 'STOP/RESET' buttons and four status indicators all 
mounted on the front facia panel. Extending from the device are the 
mains electricity supply cable and the monitoring sensors. Within 
the product there is an electro-mechanical device designed to rapidly 
close off the flow rate in the case of a particular alarm. 
The product uses a commonly available 6-bit microprocessor with 
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the application software being written in the Assembler language for 
that microprocessor, though the initial development of the software 
was written in Pascal. The use of Pascal was abandoned as the 
management of the company felt that Assembler language would yield a 
more compact object code and would have greater speed of operation. 
The software development was done on a microprocessor development 
system. 
In discussion with the company it emerged that the software had 
been developed by competent electronic engineers. who had no formal 
training in software engineering, without the benefit of any form of 
design specification. Software modules were written as it was felt 
necessary to meet the overall design objectives set by the Designer. 
Testing was limited to testing what the company called the 
"functionality of the modules and inter-module communication". 
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5.3 Analysis of the Example Application 
In discussion with the company, the company suggested that the 
criteria for the Software Safety Audit should be to examine the 
system for the catastrophic failure "an excessive flow rate without 
an alarm being raised such that life could be put at risk". It was 
the view of the company that this was the maximum credible incident 
for the product and this failure condition was used as the basis for 
the assessment. 
5.3.1 Input Mechanism 
The product assessed relied upon the medical staff, most likely 
a nurse, dialling the desired flow rate on a pair of decade thumb- 
wheel switches. The flow rate was to be in the range 1 to 99 with 
no display of the value read by the microprocessor from the thumb- 
wheel switches. 
The absence of a microprocessor-driven display showing the value 
read by the microprocessor may be considered to be unsafe as there is 
a probability that the system will incorrectly read the desired 
value. As a means of entering the desired flow rate a number of 
options were available to the designer in addition to thumb-wheel 
switches. Two such options were thumb-wheel switches with some 
display or a display counter. Considering the three methods of 
input mentioned as being available to the designer it can be assumed 
that the probability of an error caused by the nursing staff 
incorrectly reading the displayed value and the probability of error 
in computing the value read, does not change. As an exercise the 
use of thumb-wheel switches, or one of the two options mentioned, has 
been studied to see how a Software Safety Audit can be carried out on 
the equipment. The exercise also shows how the inter-relationships 
between the software, the hardware and people is considered in a 
Software Safety Audit. 
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a) Thumb-wheels alone 
In this scheme the nurse enters the desired value on the thumb- 
wheel switches which are then read by the microprocessor. If the 
nurse has dialled the wrong value then it is expected that the error 
will be noticed by the nurse and corrected by entering the correct 
value. The scheme can be represented diagrammatically as 
Thumb-wheels Thumb-wheels 
Per 
Microprocessor 
Pec 
where Per is the probability of an error in the thumb- 
wheel switches when the input is read 
and Pec is the probability of an error in the 
microprocessor when computing the 
value read 
The reliability of the system is therefore influenced by the 
probability of an error when the value is read by the microprocessor 
from the thumb-wheel switches. 
b) Thumb-wheels with display 
In this scheme the nurse enters the desired value on the thumb- 
wheel switches which are then read by the microprocessor. The 
microprocessor interprets the value and displays it to the nurse by. 
say, a Liquid Crystal Display. Any errors are observed by the nurse 
noting a differance between the thumb-wheel switches and the 
displayed value. The correction is made by the nurse altering the 
dials on the thumb-wheel switches accordingly. The scheme can be 
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represented as: 
Thumb-wheels 
Per 
Microprocessor 
Pec 
where Ped is the probability of an error in displaying 
the value read by the microprocessor 
c) Display Counter 
A display counter would work by the nurse pressing a button 
according to the desired value. The number of times the button was 
been pressed would be accumulated by some internal electronics which 
would display the accumulated value to the nurse by, say, a Liquid 
Crystal Display. Once the desired value was reached an 'Accept' 
button would be pressed by the nurse causing the microprocessor to 
Display 
read the value. Such a scheme can be represented as 
Per 
Pei 
Counter 
Pec 
Display 
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where Pei is the probability of an error in the 
internal electronics. 
If it is assumed that when the microprocessor reads the desired 
value the probability of an error is the same for each of the three 
options discussed, then the use of thumb-wheels alone has the lower 
risk attached to it. In the context of a man-machine interface, the 
scheme could leave the user, in this instance a nurse, in doubt 
whether the value shown an the thumb-wheels was the value that the 
computer had read and was using in its calculations. 
The use of a display counter is less reliable than thumb-wheels 
but would engender, in the user. a greater sense of safety since the 
desired value is only input to the microprocessor when the 
accumulated value is seen to be the same as the desired value. 
In the context of human confidence the use of thumb-wheel 
switches with some display would seem to be desirable since the nurse 
can observe any differences between the value set on the thumb-wheel 
switches and that displayed. However. before taking up this option 
it is necessary to examine the likelihood of the nurse noting the 
error. Consideration must also be given to the probability that the 
microprocessor refreshes the display more than once and that the 
value-displayed remains the one being used in calculations. If the 
microprocessor creates the display value only at the time of reading 
the thumb-wheel switches then there is the additional probability of 
an error due to data corruption of the internal value being used. 
The controlling influence on safety is the desire to achieve a 
particular function with a low risk. In the case of the product the 
probability of an error when the microprocessor reads the value is 
influential to the safety of the control function. The use of 
thumb-wheel switches alone has the lowest probability of error, given 
that there are fewer components contributing to the probability of 
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error. Therefore, given the options examined, the use on the 
product of thumb-wheel switches alone can be considered to be the 
safer option. 
5.3.2 Software Structural Analysis 
The software in the product comprised three main modules; 
Standby, Start-up and Background with a fourth module being concerned 
with interrupt handling. Shared data was the method used for 
passing values between modules. Other routines were included in the 
system as function calls. 
The structure of the Assembler code was such that the interrupt 
handler determined which entry point of the code to use dependent 
upon the interrupt being raised. 
The software catered for two alarm conditions; 'System Alarm' 
and 'Functional Alarm'. The mechanisms concerned with ensuring 
safety were incorporated into the control modules such that the 
failure of the control module could result in the failure of the 
system to maintain safety. 
Beizer, Ell, p. 237, recounts that a contributory factor to the 
disaster at Three Mile Island was the belief of the Operators that an 
actuator's real position could not be at variance with its position' 
reported by the computer system. 
In the case of the product's functional alarm, the alarm 
condition required the software to command the microprocessor 
hardware to release a mechanical device to rapidly close the flow. 
It is not reasonable to assume that once the release command, which 
is a safety procedure, has been sent to the output port that the 
action will be effected as requested, since there is a probability 
that the output port will not function as commanded. A checking 
mechanism could be implemented in such cases to determine that the 
action has actually been effected. If the required action has not 
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been effected then some alternative procedure should be adopted, such 
as sounding an additional alarm buzzer. When assessing the safety 
of the product it was found that no checking mechanism existed to 
ensure that this, or any other, safety actions had been effected once 
initiated. In the product assessed, a release command could be 
issued and the software would assume that the mechanism had been 
released even though, in fact, it had not. If the reason for the 
release of the mechanism was to prevent an unsafe condition from 
existing then, without some form of mechanism ýo check that the 
action had effected, the unsafe condition would persist. 
A similar situation was found in the case of an alarm condition 
requiring movement from a pinch-wheel via a stepping motor; once the 
command had been issued by the software to the output port requesting 
the movement to the 'home' position there was no checking mechanism 
within the software to ensure that the motor was actually in motion, 
in the direction requested. Also when the motor was being used as 
part of the control system there was three independent routines 
called to effect movement of the motor, rather than just one. if 
just one motor control module had been used then the possibility of 
'deadlock' would have been greatly reduced. 
From the analysis undertaken it was apparent that features such 
as the motor control and release mechanism, which are essentially 
safety modules, were incorporated into seperate modules. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the system is a more safe construction when 
the software is seperated into safety modules and control modules. 
A recommendation to the company, therefore, could be that both the 
alarm modules should be extended to incorporate checks that the 
requested actions had been effected, rather than allowing the 
software to make an assumption on the operation. 
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5.3.3 Risk Analysis of the Product 
The application of Software Fault Tree Analysis and Software 
Event Tree Analysis was discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of 
high-level languages. However, the product assessed had been 
written in an Assembler language so it was helpful to this research 
to code the software into a Pascal-like language from the Assembler 
before applying Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis. 
complete SFTAISETA of the system would undoubtedly reveal the 
product's identity and as the analysis was only possible provided 
confidentiality was maintained only a small part, the Functional 
Alarm Module FALARM, will be illustrated. 
5.3.3.1 Software Fault Tree Analysis 
The assembler code for the Functional Alarm Module (FALARM) was: 
FALARM: DI 
POP IY 
LD SP, RAMTOP+l 
LD A. 11110100B 
OUT (PORTC), A 
FALRLP: -CALL STOPRD 
JP Z. STDBYE 
LD A. 111001008 
OUT (PORTC), A 
CALL DELAY3 
CALL STOPRD 
JP Z, STDBYE 
LD A. 111100008 
OUT (PORTC), A 
CALL DELAY3 
JR FALRLP 
CALL SALARM 
, disable_maskable_interrupts 
; save address of calling_module in IY 
; reinit. stack_pointer 
; reset RT_latch 
; release pull_in_solenoid 
; visual_run OFF 
; audible-alarm ON 
; visual_alarm ON 
; visual_stdbye OFF 
; wdog OFF 
; stop/reset pressed ? 
; IF_YES go to standbye_mode 
; ELSE flash visual_alarm and 
; pulse audible_alarm 
; audible_alarm OFF 
; visual_alarm ON 
; visual_stdbye OFF 
; wdog OFF 
; stop/reset pressed ? 
: IF_YES go to standbye 
; ELSE 
; audible_alarm ON 
; visual_alarm OFF 
; visual_stdbye OFF 
; wdog OFF 
; loop till stop/reset pressed 
; slw trap 
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which was recoded into a Pascal-like language for analysis: 
solenoid FALSE; 
audible TRUE; 
visual TRUE; 
WHILE NOT stopped DO 
BEGIN 
audible FALSE; 
visual TRUE; 
delay3; 
IF NOT stopped THEN 
BEGIN 
audible :z TRUE; 
visual :x FALSE; 
delay3; 
END; 
END; 
standby; 
where STANDBY, STOPPED and DELAY3 are predefined functions. 
When the module was analysed for the failure "failure to stop 
the flow" the SFTA diagram, summarised in Figure 5.3.3.1.1. was 
developed. 
From the analysis it was observed that a failure of Port C, 
which controls both the alarms and the solenoid release mechanism, 
would cause the flow to continue uninterrupted without an alarm 
condition being signalled to the nursing staff. Using the knowledge 
of the probability of a failure of Port C, recommendations could be 
made to the company to put the solenoid release mechanism onto a 
different output port from the one which contained the alarms and 
also to include a check that the solenoid had actually been released 
when requested. 
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Following the recommendations, the Functional Alarm Module could 
be altered to the following program: 
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Figure 5.3.3.1.1 SFTA of the Product's Functional Alarm 
solenoid := FALSE; 
delay3; 
IF NOT (solenoid) AND NOT (solenoid_released) 
THEN klaxon; 
audible TRUE; 
visual TRUE; 
WHILE NOT stopped DO 
BEGIN 
audible FALSE; 
visual TRUE; 
delay3; 
IF NOT stopped THEN 
BEGIN 
audible TRUE; 
visual FALSE; 
delay3; 
END; 
END; 
standby; 
where KLAXON is a function call to initiate some additional alarm 
action. 
5.3.3.2 Software Event Tree Analysis 
The Software Event Tree Analysis, SETA, of the whole of the 
software was also done as a Pascal-like version of the Assembler code 
and produced an event tree which took many sheets of paper. The 
event tree did, however, demonstrate that SETA could be used. 
As an illustration of how SETA was applied to the whole of the 
software. the FALARM Module used for SFTA will be used with statement 
numbers added; 
I solenoid FALSE; 
2 audible TRUE; 
3 visual TRUE; 
4 WHILE NOT stopped DO 
5 BEGIN 
6 audible FALSE; 
7 visual TRUE; 
8 delay3; 
9 JF NOT stopped THEN 
10 BEGIN 
11 audible TRUE; 
12 visual FALSE; 
13 delay3; 
14 END-, 
is END; 
16 standby; 
In SETA the emphasis is on the control flow and the BEGIN and 
END statements form bounds. to statement blocks and only indirectly 
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control the flow, so they are not considered. 
The SETA for the module FALARM is; 
I 
Figure 5.3.3.2.1 SETA of the Product's Functional Alarm 
11 12 13 
not stoppey 
9 789 stopped 
not stop ed \\ '*\ N 
234 stopped 
"* * _* 
To the SETA would normally be applied the probabilities of 
success, which at present have not been determined. If the 
probabilities were attached then the failure of the solenoid and Port 
C would be taken into account in the probability calculations 
associated with the procedure SOLENOID. In which case, the failure 
branch from node I would be correspondingly large and so be 
noticeable as a cause for further examination and concern. 
It was apparent during the assessment that some research needs 
to be undertaken to determine typical failure probabilities for 
programming statements as these were difficult to obtain for the 
current analysis. 
5.3.4 Application of Metrics 
The manual application of the metrics developed in Chapter 4 was 
found to be time consuming. It would have been more efficient if 
some software tools had existed so that the actual Assembler code 
could have been mounted onto a computer for automatic analysis. The 
development of software tools to analyse the assembler code would 
reduce the time needed to conduct an assessment and would also 
provide more scope for analysis. Using the few tools that had been 
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developed as part of the research and, in the case of Fallibility 
Index, some manual calculation the following analysis was obtained: 
a) Perturbation of Names I 
Number of Variable Names = 51 
Total Number of Variable References z 388 
Number of Variables with a Hamming Distance of one = 10 
Number of Undetectable Alternates = 298 
Number of Undetectable Omissions =3 
Number of Undetectable Insertions z 57 
b) Fallibility Index 
Number of Alternates, Na = 95616 
Number of Omissions, No 1016 
Number of Insertions, Ni 19676 
Number of Poss. Errors, Npe a 2271168 
Fallibility Index z 5.12Z 
c) Plexus 
Number of Characters = 17743 
Number of control statements a 1819 
Plexus = 11024 
Decision Content = 106458 
Relative Redundancy = 89.65Z 
Error-Proneness = 10.35Z 
The interpretation of the analyses supports the hypothesis that 
any measurement of safety is conjoint and dependent upon empirical 
observations. To place the analysis in context it can be compared 
with the values determined for the example program in Chapter 4. 
Such a comparison shows that the product's Fallibility Index and 
Error-proneness could be considered as being reasonable given that it 
has a large Plexus value. 
From the analysis of the perturbation of names it can be noted 
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that variables with a Hamming distance of one, 10 in number, had a 
high frequency of usage. This high frequency of usage influenced 
the number of undetectable alternates. If those variables with a 
Hamming distance of one were changed to have a Hamming distance of 
two or more, then for a relatively small change a large response 
would be achieved in the number of undetectable alternates. The 
change would also be reflected in a favourable change in the 
Fallibility Index. 
It may be possible to automate the procedures for detecting 
variables with a Hamming distance of one prior to compilation and to 
recommend to the prpgrammer the necessary changes. The advantage of 
such automation would be to reduce the time needed for testing the 
software and also to reduce the Fallibility Index. 
5.3.5 Integrity of the Product 
The creation of a unique identity, Integrity Lock, for the 
product's software was not practicable since it was only possible to 
have access to the program listings and not to the actual Assembler 
code. To generate an Integrity Lock manually from the listings was 
considered to be too time-consuming for the research. The 
generation of an Integrity Lock is more efficiently achieved by 
automation using the internal representation of the software as it is 
this representation which needs to be protected and checked at run- 
time. 
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a Safety Audit could be considerably reduced by the removal of the 
constraints experienced and priority being given to the development 
of software tools. It was also apparent that access to design 
documents, test records and design personnel would have made a 
Software Safety Audit more comprehensive. 
In order for the product to be certified as safe the lack of 
checking mechanisms within the software on initiated actions and the 
assumption on the correct working of devices would need to be re- 
examined by the company. 
It is not possible to place any importance on the metric values 
obtained as little is known about the relationship between the values 
and safety. In order to place the values on a scale of values some 
research is needed to calibrate values obtained for a number of real 
systems. However, the form that a calibration exercise would take 
is difficult to envisage without returning to the use of a subjective 
judgement on the ordering of the values within the scale of values. 
This subjectivity endorses the view that safety will remain 
subjective until some mapping function is found to relate the 
definition of safety and the set of scales of values. Until such a 
mapping function is found the use of procedures, like those 
illustrated, are needed to guide the Auditor towards a judgement on 
the safety of the software or the system. 
The use of non-quantitative procedures to guide judgement based 
an experience and what is called 'best world practice' are found in 
other engineering fields, for example shipping insurance. The 
analysis of the product has shown that such procedures can also be 
aplied to the analysis of software. 
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5.4 Discussion 
The reason for conducting the Software Safety Audit was to 
examine the practicability of the ýrocedures and not simply to derive 
some values for a system. To this end it has been possible to show 
that the procedures are practicable and incidentally to derive some 
values from a real system. 
The Software Safety Audit was carried out over a period of 
approximately five weeks which was longer than originally 
anticipated, mainly because of the manual calculation of the 
Fallibility Index. The effort required to conduct the Software 
Safety Audit was influenced by many constraints, principally, 
unfamiliarity with the programming language, lack of knowledge of the 
system being assessed, the lack of appropriate software tools and 
very limited access to the design personnel. The most significant 
of these was the lack of familiarity with the language and this 
needed to be addressed with care. 
The effort expended on the assessment could be reduced by the 
development of software tools and with more experience in the 
application of the procedures. The problem of familiarity with the 
programming language used in the system being assessed could be 
minimised if the software toolset included tools for analysing a 
language syntax and which could be generated relatively easily for 
uncommon languages. Such a tool could be created wit6 the aid of 
tools such as YACC, which is part of the UNIX Operating System. 
It was evident during the Software Safety Audit that whilst it 
is possible to apply SETA to application software there was a need 
for further research into SETA before it could be considered to be as 
useful as SFTA. 
The method of conducting a Software Safety Audit worked well 
given the constraints mentioned above. The time taken to carry out 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
The control of industrial processes by computer has new risks 
associated with it. One of the new risks is the incorporation of 
software into the control system of a controller. 
It has been shown in this thesis that measurements of software 
reliability and measurements of software safety do not have the same 
goals. Software reliability and software safety have been shown to 
be related subjects and that software safety is a seperate and 
distinct subject. 
The terms hazard. risk. danger and safe have been defined in 
terms of industrial control and a relationship between these terms 
has been postulated. Though an attempt has been made to discuss the 
philosophy of safety it is evident that there is considerable scope 
for further work. A formal definition of software safety has been 
proposed and the terms 'safe' and 'unsafe' have been shown to be 
subjective judgements. 
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that software influences the 
safe operation of industrial-based controllers incorporating software 
and that the risk can be assessed and quantified. 
The subjectivity of safety has been examined and it is suggested 
that an assessment of safety is a conjoint measurement. 
An examination of the factors affecting the software development 
process and the metrics available for measuring the influence of 
these factors has shown that there are many influences affecting 
software but that there are few metrics available. 
The research for this thesis found that the software 
incorporated into industrial-based controllers has an influence on 
the safety of the control system and that there are many aspects to 
assessing the safety of software used for industrial control. it 
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has been shown that some of these aspects can be quantified but there 
is no evidence that metrics have yet been proved to measure the 
safety of software used for industtial control. 
The research for this thesis applied analytical methods, taken 
from other engineering disciplines, to assess the risk of using an 
item of software. It was found that the structure of the software 
can be examined using Software Fault Tree Analysis and Software Event 
Tree Analysis but that further research is needed into Software Event 
Tree Analysis before its usefulness can be exploited. 
The research also examined the use of State Transition Diagrams 
as a method of determining erroneous states and found that the number 
of such states can become unmanageable when all the possible failure 
conditions are considered, even for relatively simple control 
systems. 
Three categories of danger have been proposed for the ocassions 
when software is used in industrial-based control systems; minor, 
Major and Serious. The structuring of the software for safety has 
also been examined and a suggestion has been made on the use of 
Safety Modules and a mechanism called an Integrity Lock. 
The research for this thesis has shown that software errors'can 
be introduced at each stage of the development of the software and 
two methods of measuring the possibility for error have been 
proposed; Plexus and Fallibility Index. Further rigorous 
development of the Plexus metric and the Fallibility Index is 
required before the meaning of the measurements is known. 
It was found from an experiment that variables declare. d with 
seven characters had a significantly better probability of correct 
interpretation than for variables declared with more than or less 
than seven characters. 
The combination of the risk analysis, structural analysis and 
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software analysis into a set of assessment procedures has been called 
a Software Safety Audit. A Software Safety Audit was done on a 
commercial product and it was founo that further development of the 
assessment method is needed. 
'Loss Containment' is a term often used in the Process 
Industries to describe procedures for containing the consequences of 
the loss of safe-working within acceptable criteria. The loss 
containment of software requires requires a judgbment to be made on 
the course of action to take when the software or the system becomes 
. unsafe'. Such a judgement will need to consider both the economic 
and the social consequences of the action, the practicability of such 
action and the time needed for the action to achieve a state which is 
considered to be 'more safe*. 
In some systems it may be possible to dýtermine the possible 
unsafe states and make a prior judgement on the appropriate action to 
take for each unsafe state. 
In some systems it will not be possible to determine the 
possible unsafe states as the number may be unmanageable. 
Similarly, it may not be possible to make a judgement on the 
appropriate actions to take as these may be too numerous, may be 
subject to a large number of variables or may be indeterminate. In 
such systems some method is required which will allow a judgement to 
be made based on the current safety practice, the current unsafe 
state, available states, time available to respond to the current 
unsafe state and possibly many other variables. The development of 
what are called Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems may be applicable 
and research could be conducted into the use of these systems as 
monitors of safety-related systems. 
The research for this thesis has made a start on the subject of 
assessing and quantifying the safety of software used for industrial 
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control. The research has identified subject areas which, with more 
research, could produce methods and metrics to quantify the safety of 
software. 
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APPENDIX I 
Database Program 
The following dBase II prograro was used in the experiment 
reported in Chapter 4.3. 
SET TALK OFF 
SET FORMAT TO SCREEN 
USE B: PSYCHO. DBF 
ERASE 
DO WHILE T 
V ARE YOU PREPARED TO HELP A RESEARCH STUDENT 
V WITH A SIMPLE EXPERIMENTV 
If so, then press any key. 
WAIT TO ACTION 
ERASE 
DO WHILE T 
7' Thank you-for agreeing to assist in this simple experiment to* 
Vtry and determine the level of difficulty people experience in the' 
Vuse of mnemonics in the place of lines of text. ' 
7' You are asked to suggest a suitable mnemonic for each line of' 
Vtext presented to you. As an example you might suggest that a' 
Vsuitable mnemonic for the text LENGTH OF STRING IN METRES could be' 
VMETRELENGTHS. Please limit your suggested mnemonic to no more 
Vthan 20 characters. You will be asked to suggest eight such 
Vmnemonics. ' 
76 After which the screen will clear and you will be asked to 
Vrestate the mnemonics from memory. Finally, you will be asked to' 
Vinput your understanding of the mnemonics. ' 
V Terminate each input with a RETURN before starting the next' 
Vquestion. ' 
When you are happy that you understand what is to happen, 
Vsignal your readiness by pressing any key' 
WAIT TO ACTION 
ERASE 
ACCEPT "What is your SURNAME? " to d: name 
ACCEPT " and your INITIALS " to d: inits 
ACCEPT " State which OU Summer School " to d: venue 
ACCEPT " Please enter todays date " to d: date 
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Please suggest a mnemonic for the following: * 
ACCEPT "TIME OF DAY * to M: 1 
ACCEPT "VALVE 8 POSITION " to m: 2 
ACCEPT "AMBIENT TEMPERATURE" to m: 3 
ACCEPT *LIQUID FLOW IN LITRES/MINUTE* to m: 4 
ACCEPT "MOTOR SPEED IN R. P. M" to m: 5 
ACCEPT 'WEIGHT OF PRODUCT IN TONNES" to m: 6 
ACCEPT 'DISTANCE FROM THE VALVE CONTROLLER TO THE VALVE IN METRES" to 
m: 7 
ACCEPT *PERCENTAGE OF SULPHUR DIOXIDE IN THE ATMOSPHERE" to m: 8 
ERASE 
Ca n you now re-enter the mnemonic you suggested for' 
ACCEPT "TIME OF DAY" to, t: l 
ACCEPT *LIQUID FLOW IN LITRES/MINUTE* to t: 4 
ACCEPT "WEIGHT OF PRODUCT IN TONNES" to t: 6 
ACCEPT *VALVE 8 POSITION" to t: 2 
ACCEPT "PERCENTAGE OF SULPHUR DIOXIDE IN THE ATMOSPHERE* to t: 8 
ACCEPT *AMBIENT TEMPERATURE* to t: 3 
ACCEPT *DISTANCE FROM THE VALVE CONTROLLER TO THE VALVE IN METRES" to 
t7 
ACCEPT *MOTOR SPEED IN R. P. M. * to t: 5 
ERASE 
APPEND BLANK 
REPLACE SURNAME with d: name, INITIALS with d: inits 
REPLACE DATE with d: date, VENUE with d: venue 
REPLACE MNEMONICI with m: 1, MNEMONIC2 with m: 2 
REPLACE MNEMONIC3 with m: 3, MNEMONIC4 with m: 4 
REPLACE MNEMONICS with m: 5. MNEMONIC4 with m: 4 
REPLACE MNEMONICS with m: 5, MNEMONIC6 with m: 6 
REPLACE MNEMONIC7 with m: 7, MNEMONIC8 with m: 8 
REPLACE TEXT1 with t: 1, TEXT2 with t: 2, TEXT3 with t: 3 
REPLACE TEXT4 with t: 4, TEXT5 with t: 5, TEXT6 with t: 6 
REPLACE TEXT? with t: 7, TEXT8 with t: 8 
7 
?. C an you now try and give a short description for the following' 
Vmnemo nic you suggested-. ' 
2 12.5 SAY MNEMONIC1 GET ANSWER1 
@ 13.5 SAY MNEMONIC2 GET ANSWER2 
@ 14.5 SAY MNEMONIC3 GET ANSWER3 
15.5 SAY MNEMONIC4 GET ANSWER4 
16.5 SAY MNEMONICS GET ANSWERS 
17.5 SAY MNEMONIC6 GET ANSWERG 
@ 18.5 SAY MNEMONIC7 GET ANSWER7 
@ 19.5 SAY MNEMONIC8 GET ANSWER8 
READ 
USE 
DO A: PS YCHO 
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APPENDIX 2 
Program Analyses 
The programs analysed below are linear expansions of those 
referred to in Chapter 4.4. A comparison of the measures is plotted 
in Graph 3 to Graph 5. The values were calculated using the program 
given in Appendix 3. 
Program 1 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, N4 = 12.75 
VAR: x, Halsteads Volume, V z 36.49 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN Decision Content, H = 282.1 
x: =2; Plexus, P z 29.8 
y: =95; Error Proneness, Ez 10.6z 
X: =X+Y; Number Characters. Nc z 53 
PRINT: x; 
END 
Program 2 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, NA= 12.75 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, V z 50.53 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN Decision Content, H = 319.3 
x: =2-, Plexus, P a 34.6 
y: =95; Error Proneness, E = 10.8X 
x: zx+y; Number Characters, Nc z 60 
x: =X+Y; 
PRINT: x; 
END 
Program 3 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, N4 = 12.75 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, V 2 64.57 
VAR: y-, 
BEGIN Decision Content, Ha 356.57 
x: =2; Plexus, P = 39.4 
y: =95; Error Proneness, E= 11.0Z 
x: zx+y; Number Characters, Nc 2 67 
x: =X+Y; 
x: =x+y; 
PRINT: x; 
END 
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Program 4 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, NA = 12.75 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, V= 78.61 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN Decision Content, Ha 393.8 
x: =2; Plexus, P2 44.1 
y: =95*, Error Proneness. E= 11.21 
X: =X+Y; Number Characters, Nc = 74 
x: =X+Y; 
X: zx+y; 
x: =X+Y; 
PRINT: x; 
END 
Program 5 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, NA = 12.75 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, Va 92.64 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN Decision Content, H= 431.1 
x: --2; Plexus, P2 48.9 
y: =95-, Error Proneness, Ea 11.31 
x: zx+y; Number Characters, Nc = 81 
x: =X+Y; 
x: =X+Y; 
x: =x+y; 
X: zx+y; 
PRINT: x; 
END 
Program a 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, N4 = 12.75 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, V= 50.5 
VAR: y-, 
BEGIN Decision Content, Hz 319.3 
x: =2; Plexus, PC 34.6 
y: =95; Error Proneness, Ez 10.8z 
X: =X+Y; Number Characters, Nc = 60 
y: =x+y; 
PRINT: y; 
END 
Program b 
PROGRAM Halsteads Length, V= 16.36 
VAR: x; Halsteads Volume, V2 54.0 
VAR: y; 
VAR: p; 
BEGIN Decision Content, H= 351.25 
x: =2; Plexus, P : 43.2 
y: =95; Error Proneness, E a 12.3Z 
x: =x*y; Number Characters. Nc : 66 
p: =x+y; 
PRINT: p; 
END 
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Program c 
PROGRAM 
VAR-. a; 
VAR: x; 
VAR: y; 
BEGIN 
x: =2 -, 
Y: =95; 
X: =X+Y; 
a: =x+y; 
PRINT: a; 
a: =x+a; 
x: =1025; 
X: =y+x; 
y: za+x; 
PRINT: y; 
END 
Program d 
PROGRAM 
VAR: a; 
VAR: b; 
VAR: x; 
VAR: y-, 
VAR: p-, 
BEGIN 
x: --2; 
y: =95; 
x: zy+yI 
P: =X+Y; 
PRINT: p; 
a: =x+p; 
b: cl 025; 
x: =y+b; 
y: --a+x; 
PRINT: y; 
END 
Halsteads Length, V 20.3 
Halsteads Volume, V 120.5 
Decision Content, H= 548.2 
Plexus, Pz 70.9 
Error Proneness, E= 12.9Z 
Number Characters, Nc a 103 
Halsteads Length, N4 = 28.75 
Halsteads Volume, V= 131.46 
Decision Content, Hz 612.0 
Plexus, Pz 95.7 
Error Proneness, E= 15. GZ 
Number Characters, Nc = 115 
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APPENDIX 3 
BASIC Program 
The BASIC Program that follow, s was written to enable the 
analysis of the example programs given in Chapter 4.4 and also to 
provide the data included in Appendix 2 and Table 3. 
10 DIM VARFREQ(25) 
20 DIM DIGFREQ(25) 
30 DIM PROCFREQ(25) 
40 REM 
50 REM -------------------- Inputs for Halstead --------- 
60 REM ---------- Variables are: N1, N2, NNI, NN2 -------- 
70 REM 
80 INPUT "Halsteads Number of Unique Operators, ni *; N1 
90 INPUT 'Halsteads Number of Unique Operands, n2 *; N2 
100 INPUT "Halsteads Number of Operators, N1 *; NNI 
110 INPUT "Halsteads Number of Operands, N2 "; NN2 
120 REM 
130 REM ------- Inputs for Decision Content L Complexity ---- 
140 REM ----- are: LOD, LOP, NC, NV, NP, NO, NSC, NSD, VS --- 
150 REM 
160 INPUT "Number of Characters in Character Set, Cs z *; CS 
170 INPUT "Number of Declarations, Dz"; LOD 
180 INPUT "Number of Control Statements, Sc z "; LOP 
190 INPUT "Number of Characters in the Program, Nc z "; NC 
200 INPUT "Tot. No. of Unique Variables, Nv = "; NV 
210 INPUT "Tot. No. of Digit Values, Nd a '; ND 
220 INPUT "Tot. No. of Relational Ops + Procedures, Np = "; NP 
230 INPUT "No. of Available Control Statements, Nsc z '; NSC 
240 INPUT "No. of Avail. Declarative Statements. Nsd z *; NSD 
250 INPUT 'No. of Possibilities for Variables, Vs a *; VS 
260 REM 
270 REM -------- Calculate Halsteads Length L Volume -------- 
280 REM -- Variables are: LENGTH, VOLUME, N1, N2, NNI, NN2 -- 
290 REM 
300 LENGTH =(N1 * (LOG(Nl)/LOG(2))) + (N2 * (LOG(N2)/LOG(2))) 
310 VOLUME = (NN1 + NN2) * (LOG (N1 + N2)/LOG (2)) 
320 REM 
330 REM ---------- Input Frequency of Variables ------------- 
340 REM ----- Variables used are: NOVAR, NV, VARFREQ(I) ----- 
350 REM 
360 NOVAR z0 
370 FOR I=1 TO NV 
380 INPUT "Input Frequency of Variable "; VARFREG(l) 
390 NOVAR = NOVAR + VARFREQ(I) 
400 NEXT I 
410 REM 
420 REM ------ Input Frequency of Digital Values ------------ 
430 REM ----- Variables used are: NODIGS, ND, DIGFREQ(I) ----- 
440 REM 
450 NODIGS 0 
460 FOR 11 TO ND 
470 INPUT "Input Frequency of Digit *; DIGFREQ(I) 
480 NODIGS = NODIGS + DIGFREQ(I) 
490 NEXT I 
500 REM 
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510 REM - Input Frequency of Relational Ops and Procedures -- 
520 REM --- Variables used are: NOPROCS, NP, PROCFREOH) ---- 
530 REM 
540 NOPROCS =0 
550 FOR I=I TO NP 
560 INPUT "Input Frequency of Operator/Procedure"; PROCFREO(I) 
570 NOPROCS = NOPROCS + PROCFREG(l) 
580 NEXT 1 
590 REM ------------------ Clear Screen --------------------- 
600 PRINT CHR$(12) 
610 REM 
620 REM --------- Calculate for the Declaration Part -------- 
630 REM Var's used are: TEMP, LOD, NSO, NY, VS, 1, IDEC 
640 REM 
650 TEMP 0 
660 PRINT *Plexus, P 
670 IDEC 0 
680 IF LOD =0 OR NSD 0 THEN GOTO 830 
690 PRINT LOD; *Log"; NSD; "+"; 
700 FOR 11 TO NY 
710 TEMP TEMP * (LOG (VS - (I - IMLOG (2)) 
720 PRINT "Log"; VS-(I-1); 
730 IF I< NY THEN PRINT "+*; ELSE PRINT 
740 NEXT I 
750 IDEC = LOD * (LOG (NSD)/LOG (2)) + TEMP 
760 REM 
770 REM ----------- Calculate for the Procedure Part -------- 
780 REM Var's are: TEMPI, NY, VARFREQ(I), NOVAR, TEMP2 --- 
790 REM TEMP3. NP. PROCFREQM, NOPROCS, NO, L, NSC, LOP - 
800 REM ------- and DIGFREQ(I), NODIGS ---------------------- 
810 REM 
820 REM 
830 TEMPI 0 
840 PRINT +"; LOP; "Log'; NSC; "+"; 
850 FOR 11 TO NY 
860 TEMPI TEMPI + VARFREO(I)*(LOG(NOVAR/VARFREO(I))/LOG(2)) 
870 PRINT VARFREO(l); "Log"; NOVAR; "/"; VARFREO(I); 
880 IF I< NY THEN PRINT "+"; ELSE PRINT 
890 NEXT I 
900 TEMP2 0 
910 PRINT +. 
920 FOR 11 TO ND 
930 TEMP2 TEMP2+DIGFREO(I)*(LOG(NODIGS/DIGFREO(I))/LOG(2)) 
940 PRINT DIGFREO(I); "Log"; NODIGS; */*; DIGFREO(l); 
950 IF I< ND THEN PRINT "+"; ELSE PRINT 
960 NEXT 1 
970 TEMP3 0 
980 PRINT +. 
990 FOR 11 TO NP 
1000 TEMP3=TEMP3+PROCFREQ(I)*(LOG(NOPROCS/PROCFREO(l))/LOG(2)) 
1010 PRINT PROCFREQ(I): "Log'; NOPROCS; */*; PROCFREO(l); 
1020 IF I( NP THEN PRINT "+"; ELSE PRINT 
1030 NEXT 1 
1040 REM 
1050 REM ------- Calculate the Plexus as a Sum ---------- 
1060 REM Var's used: INFO, LOP, NSC, TEMPI, TEMP2, IDEC -- 
1070 REM 
1080 INFO LOP * (LOG(NSC)/LOG(2))+TEMP1+TEMP2+TEMP3+IDEC 
1090 REM 
1100 REM -------- Calculates the Decision Content ----------- 
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1110 REM -------- Variables used are: DECISION, NC ---------- 
1120 REM 
1130 DECISION = NC * (LOG (CS)/LOG (2)) 
1140 REM ------------ Clear Screen -------------------------- 
1150 REM PRINT CHR$112) 
1160 REM 
1170 REM ---------- Display the Results --------------------- 
1180 REM -- Var's used: INFO, DECISION, REDUNDANCY. ERRORS 
1190 REM --------- and N1, N2. NN1, NN2, VOLUME, LENGTH ----- 
1200 REM 
1210 PRINT 
1220 PRINT " Plexus, P =*; INFO 
1230 PRINT " Decision Content =*; DECISION 
1240 REDUNDANCY = (DECISION - INFO) / DECISION * 100 
1250 PRINT "Relative Redundancy a*; REDUNDANCY; *X" 
1260 ERRORS 100 - REDUNDANCY 
1270 PRINT Error-Proneness z"; ERRORS; "Z* 
1280 PRINT 
1290 PRINT 
1300 PRINT "Halsteads Length. N* =*; N1; "Log'; N1; " + '; N2; 
1310 PRINT *Log"; N2; " z *; LENGTH 
1320 PRINT "Halsteads Volume, V z*; NN1+NN2; *Log"; N1+N2; 
1330 PRINT "z"; VOLUME 
1340 PRINT 
1350 PRINT 
1360 PRINT 
1370 GOTO 80 
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APPENDIX 4 
Graph I 
Fallibility Index against the Number of Characters (Nc) to write 
a Program 
[Source: Chapter 4.21 
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The Plexus Metric and Halsteads Volume Metric against the Number 
of Characters (Nc) -to write a Program. 
[Source: Chapter 4.4 and Appendix 23 
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Graph 5 
The Plexus Metric and Error-Proneness 
[Source: Chapter 4'. 4 and Appendix 23 
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The Plexus Metric and Halstead's Volume Metric Plotted against 
the Number of Characters to write a Program 
- Declaration Part Included. 
[Source: Chapter 4.4 and Table 31 
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Graph 7 
v 
Halstead's Volume Metric and the Plexus Metric against the 
Number of Characters'to write a Program 
- Declaration Part Omitted. 
[Source: Chapter 4.4 and Table 33 
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The Plexus Metric plotted against the Fallibility Index 
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APPENDIX 5 
Table 1. Analysis of the Literature Survey 
1% 
----------- ---- AppLication by ----------- Scientific ------ ----------- ----------- ------- -------- ------ ------- -------- 
Risk Level. inc. Infra Indust. High Sub- 
Factors 
- - 
Academic 
- -- 
DP 
- -- 
structure Control 
- 
Risk 
------- 
Total 
-------- 
Def. 
------ 
Metric 
- ------- 
Totat 
- ------ --- --- 
1. Specification/Design 
-------- - 
(2) 
- -- 
(M 
----------- 
(7) 
---------- 
(6) (11) (40) (11) (6) (57) 
1.1 Formal. 2 a 5 3 7 25, 5 2 32 
1.2 Functional. 2 1 2 2 7 3 2 12 
1.3 Language 1 2 3 2 2 7 
1.4 Structure 4 1 5 1 - 6 
2. Languages (10) (17) (10) (8) (21) (66) (5) (3) (74) 
2.1 ADA 1 3 4 4 
2.2 RTL12 L CORAL I I 
2.3 BASIC I I 
2.4 PASCAL 1 1 1 4 7 7 
2.5 FORTRAN 3 3 1 4 it it 
2.6 AssembLer 1 1 2 2 
2.7 Structured 4 9 3 3 3 22 3 25 
Programming 
2.6 S/W Redundancy I 1 1 3 6 6 
2.9 S/W Metrics 1 4 3 4 12 2 3 17 
3. Support Environment 
and Testing (10) (17) (5) (9) 115) Q (66) (6) (8) (80) 
3.1 Most Systems 3 1 4 4 
3.2 TooLsets 4 1 1 6 6 
3.3 Test MadeLs 5 6 1 8 20 4 7 31 
3.4 Correctness Proo l's I 1 1 8 11 2 1 14 
3.5 Validation L I 1 2 2 6 6 
Verifications 
3.6 Path L Program 3 1 3 7 7 
Proving 
3.7 Simulation 1 6 2 3 12 12 
4. Operational. 
Env't & PersonneL (5) (5) (2) (5) (5) (22) (3) (4) (29) 
4.1 PsychoLogicaL 3 2 2 1 3 11 11 
4.2 Personal 1 1 2 4 4 
Environment 
4.3 Hardware Failure 1 2 3 3 4 to 
4.4 Documentation 2 2 4 4 
----------------------- TOTALS 
---------------------- 
------------ (27) 
----------- 
------ (53) 
------ 
----------- (24) 
----------- 
----------- (28) 
----------- 
------- (62) 
------- 
-------- (194, 
--------- 
------- (25) 
------- 
-------- (21) 
-------- 
------- (240) 
------- 
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Table 2. Analysis of Data Gathered from the Experiment 
Analysis of CORRECT Answers 
No. ChaNcters 1234567a9 10 11 12 13 t4 15 16 17 18 19 20 TotaL 
--- ---------------------------------------------------------- -- ---- - ------ Mneikonici 
I- Frequency 03 33 20 14 6 18 6212001100000 107 
-- --------- -....... . ....... ................................... . ....................... ft ........ 
--- -- - ------ ------------------------------- ft ................................. 
2- Frequency 0256 16 6 20 10 a4501100a000 64 
-- - ---- - -- ----- w ---- - ----- - ----- -- -- --------------- -- a--aa - ------ w-a--a ......... .... 
3- Frequency 05558 12 43 24 020100000000 105 
-- -- -------- --- - -- -- ----------- - --------- ft .............. ft ---------------- - --- .... ft ...... 
------- - -- a ------------- - ---------------- ft ...... ft ------- 
4- Frequency 00343 11 76965961221000 75 
-- ----- -- ----- - ------ - --- - ------------------------- a ----------- ftft ----------------------------- -- ---------- - ---------------_- a -------------------------- - ------------------------- -- 
5- Frequency 00 12 6 10 10 it 6 10 75642011001 92 
__. _w -- -------------------- - ------------ a ------------------------ - --------- 
-- --- - --- - ----- --- ---------- ------------------------------ ft ---------------------- --w ------- 
6- Frequency 00055642648143110110 52 
------ w- --- - ------- .... ft --- - ------------- w ----------- ft-a ------------ aa ........... a. -- - ---- --- --------------- - ------- ft ---------------------- ---- ft -------- ft--ft -------- ft --------- 
7- Frequency 0111165017966131A255 64 
------------------- ft -------------- -------------------------- 
--- - ------- a .......... w .................... .. W-wa ------- ft--w-. 
8- Frequency 002 10 6 It 11 27aa8251112? 2 B9 
w. - --- --------- - -------- a --------------------------------- --- - -- - ---------- ...................... ft ----- ft --------- ft ----------- w--ft ......... ... w. 
ALL - Frequency 0 It 61 57 63 68 19 56 43 39 42 31 23 14 a&658a 668 
- -- - --- ---- - ------------------------------------------------------- ww ......... ------ - ----- --- - -- - ------ ------- ft ------------------------------- a ---------------------- W- ...... 
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Analysis of INCORRECT Answers 
No. Characters 0123456789 10 It 12 U t4 15 16 17 IS 19 20 Tot. 
-- --- - ---- ------ - -- - ---------------- - -- ------------ --- ------- - ------- - -- Mnemonict 
I- Frequency a00431021100000000000 12 
-- -------- - -------- -- -- - ---------- - 
- -- --- ---- - 
2- Frequency 0029a5563300101000000 35 
- ------ - ---- -------- 
3- Frequency 2a1142030100000000000 14 
--- -- - -- - -- ------ 
4- Frequency 0004114 10 544231320a000 44 
- ---- -- ------- - -- ----- -- ------- - ------------ -- ------------------- - ------- --- 
5- Frequency a015453223010001000a0 27 
-- ---------- -- ---------- -- ---- - ----- - --- - -- - ------ --- ----- 
6- Frequency 102367 20 54534142a00000 67 
- ----- - ---- - ------------ - ------------ - ----- ----- ---- - --- ------ ---------- --------- 
7- Frequency 310331375517321011125 55 
------ --- - ------ - -- -- --------- - ---------------------------------------------------------- - --- - --- - -- - ----- - --------------------- - ------------------- 
8- Frequency 210154013630110020000 30 
- -- ------ -------------------------------------------------------- - -- - ---- - -- --- - ----------------- - --------------- - ------------------------------------------- - -- - ------------- 
ALL - Frequency a26 30 26 26 35 36 23 28 It 14 987331125 284 
---- -------------- - --------------------- - ------------------------------ - -- --- ---------- - ------ --------- --- ---- - ----- --- 
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Analysis of ALL Answers 
No. Characters 01234567a9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 Tot. 
---------------------- ---------------------------- Mnemonic; 
I- Frequency 003 37 23 15 6 20 7312001100a00 119 
---- - ----- ----- ---- --- -------- 
-- -- -------------- - -- - --------- - ---- -- ------ 
2- Frequency 004 14 6 21 It 26 13 11 45112000000 119 
--- - ---- --------- -- 
3- Frequency 20669 10 12 46 24 120100000000 119 
4- Frequency 00a754 15 17 It 13 10 7 12 74421000 119 
5- Frequency 001 17 10 15 13 13 S 13 76642111001 119 
-- -------- 
6- Frequency 1023 It 12 26 96 11 7 12 285110110 119 
- -- - -------- 
7- Frequency 3114429 12 568 16 98232437 10 119 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
- ----- - -------- - -- - ------ - 
8- Frequency 2103 15 10 11 12 5 13 It 8935131222 119 
----- --------------- - -- - ----- - ----------------------- - -------- - ---------- --- 
ALL - Frequency 82 17 91 83 89 103 155 79 71 50 56 40 31 21 It 976 10 13 951, 
-- ---- --- ----- - ---- - ------ - --- - ------ - ----------------------------------- - --------- ---- 
- --------- - ---------- - ----------------------------- - --- --- ----- 
The Probability of the Correct Interpretation of a Variable 
Nc PC Nc PC Nc PC Nc PC 
1 0.000 6 0.071 11 0.044 16 0.006 
2 0.012 7 0.125 12 0.033 17 0.006 
3 0.064 a 0.059 13 0.024 18 0.005 
4 0.060 9 0.045 14 0.015 19 0.008 
5 0.066 10 0.041 15 0.008 20 0.008 
where Ne is the number of characters in the variable and 
Pc is the probability of a correct interpretation of the 
variable. 
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Table 3. Data Used in the Plexus Calculations 
nt n2 NJ N, l Cs D Sc Nc mv Nd Np Nsc Nsd Vs Fvi Fdi Fpi N' vHprE 
Lang. 3546 64 25 88 321 12 2 26 211 16.36 30.0 528.0 41.8 92.1 7.9 
MIt 
I 
Lang. 3647 64 13 43 33103 26 211 20.26 34.1 258.0 38.0 85.3 
14.7 
(2) 
Pascat 5M 19 38 96 14 t4 312 13 5 10 26 7 33696 21 12 86.70 257.8 2054.5 483.0 76.5 23.5 
(1) 424 
311 
521 
311 
2t 
41 
11 
t1 
31 
1 
1 
1 
(2) 161 (Dedarations not incLuded) 86.70 257.8 1060.2 248.2 76.6 23.4 
BASIC 5 16 19 39 68 1 14 216 799 36 9 26 514 75.60 254.7 1314.9 283.7 78.4 2t. 6 
M421 
241 
312 
2t 12 
514 
331 
11 
t1 
(2) 206 (Dedarations not incLuded) 75.60 254.7 1254 248.9 80.2 t9.8 
FORTRAN 6 19 19 48 68 1 14 181 7 12 10 29 9 26 521 96.22 31t. 1 1101.8 304.1 72.4 27.6 
M26t 
221 
321 
214 
611 
It 
51 
21 
1 it 
2 
1 
(2) 156 (Dedarations not incLuded) 96.22 311.1 949.6 269.3 71.6 26.4 
Note: The definition of the column headers is to be found in 
Chapter 4.4. 
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